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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the design and analysis of strong de Bruijn sequences
and span n sequences, and nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) based pseu-
dorandom number generators for radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. We
study the generation of span n sequences using structured searching in which an
NLFSR with a class of feedback functions is employed to find span n sequences.
Some properties of the recurrence relation for the structured search are discovered.
We use five classes of functions in this structured search, and present the number
of span n sequences for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20. The linear span of a new span n sequence lies
between near-optimal and optimal. According to our empirical studies, a span n
sequence can be found in the structured search with a better probability of success.
Newly found span n sequences can be used in the composited construction and in
designing lightweight pseudorandom number generators.
We first refine the composited construction based on a span n sequence for
generating long de Bruijn sequences. A de Bruijn sequence produced by the com-
posited construction is referred to as a composited de Bruijn sequence. The linear
complexity of a composited de Bruijn sequence is determined. We analyze the
feedback function of the composited construction from an approximation point of
view for producing strong de Bruijn sequences. The cycle structure of an approx-
imated feedback function and the linear complexity of a sequence produced by
an approximated feedback function are determined. A few examples of strong de
Bruijn sequences with the implementation issues of the feedback functions of an
(n+ 16)-stage NLFSR are presented.
We propose a new lightweight pseudorandom number generator family, named
Warbler family based on NLFSRs for smart devices. Warbler family is comprised
of a combination of modified de Bruijn blocks (CMDB) and a nonlinear feedback
Welch-Gong (WG) generator. We derive the randomness properties such as period
and linear complexity of an output sequence produced by the Warbler family. Two
instances, Warbler-I and Warbler-II, of the Warbler family are proposed for passive
RFID tags. The CMDBs of both Warbler-I and Warbler-II contain span n sequences
that are produced by the structured search. We analyze the security properties of
v
Warbler-I and Warbler-II by considering the statistical tests and several cryptan-
alytic attacks. Hardware implementations of both instances in VHDL show that
Warbler-I and Warbler-II require 46 slices and 58 slices, respectively. Warbler-I can
be used to generate 16-bit random numbers in the tag identification protocol of the
EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard, and Warbler-II can be employed as a random
number generator in the tag identification as well as an authentication protocol for
RFID systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Randomness plays an essential role in cryptography. A good random number or
sequence generator is a crucial component used in designing a secure system. Secu-
rity of cryptographic algorithms and protocols extensively relies on random numbers
and keys. Random number generators can be classified into two categories, namely
true random number generators and pseudorandom number generators. The role
of a pseudorandom sequence or number generator becomes crucial in a practical
scenario when a true random bit generator cannot produce enough truly random
bits or a true random bit generator cannot be employed to produce random bits.
Pseudorandom sequence/number generators are broadly used in stream ciphers,
generating random numbers, cryptographic protocols, digital signature generation
algorithms, RFID systems, and sensor networks. This chapter provides an intro-
duction to cryptographic pseudorandom sequences, and the motivation and outline
of this thesis.
1.1 Pseudorandom Sequence Generators
A pseudorandom sequence generator (PRSG) is a deterministic algorithm, which
takes a small length truly random sequence, called the seed, as input, and generates
an output sequence of any desired length. The output sequence is called a pseu-
dorandom sequence, which is random-looking to an outside observer, and will be
1
indistinguishable from a truly random sequence. Obviously, the output sequence
length is much greater than the input sequence length. In other words, a PRSG
is used to expand a truly random seed to a long length pseudorandom sequence,
which should have the following statistical properties: long period, balance, equal
distribution of runs, uniform tuple distribution, ideal 2-level autocorrelation, low
crosscorrelation, and high linear span [19,43,45,102].
Numerous algorithms and techniques can be found in the literature for gener-
ating pseudorandom sequences including feedback shift registers (FSR), feedback
with carry shift registers, linear congruential generators, lagged fibonacci genera-
tors, many designs based on block ciphers and hash functions. The feedback shift
register has a rich theory, and that can be classified into two categories, namely
linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLF-
SRs) [43]. Feedback shift register sequences such as de Bruijn sequences and span
n sequences have good randomness properties, and FSRs have an efficient imple-
mentation in hardware [43]. The designs of the eSTREAM profile 2 finalists Grain
and Trivium are based on feedback shift registers [30]. Several architectures of
FSR-based PRNGs and stream ciphers can be found in [19]. A wide range of ap-
plications of FSRs can be found in cryptography, spread spectrum communication,
test vector generation in hardware design, etc. [43, 45].
1.2 Cryptographic Pseudorandom Sequences and
Their Applications
In cryptography, strong pseudorandom sequences are significant for providing se-
curity in various applications. A PRSG is called a cryptographically secure PRSG
if no polynomial-time algorithm with the first l bits of a sequence as input can
predict the (l+ 1)-th bit of the sequence with probability significantly greater than
1
2
[87]. Known cryptographically secure PRNGs are Shamir’s generators and Blum-
Blum-Shub generators [87]. For an FSR-generated sequence, the value of l should
be approximately equal to the period of the sequence. A cryptographically secure
sequence should have an indistinguishability property, an unpredictability prop-
2
erty, and good statistical properties such as long period, high linear span, balance,
equal distribution of runs, uniform tuple distribution, ideal 2-level autocorrelation,
and low crosscorrelation. Moreover, the pseudorandom sequence generator will be
resistant to the cryptanalytic attacks. Many cryptographic statistical tests have
been proposed to measure the randomness in a pseudorandom sequence, for exam-
ple the NIST statistical test suite [103]. In practice, the randomness in a sequence
is measured by applying the statistical tests to an arbitrary but small segment of
an output sequence. Due to computational limitations, it is not possible to take
the entire sequence as input to the statistical testing algorithms. A cryptographic
sequence should pass all the statistical tests. A cryptographic pseudorandom se-
quence generator needs to be characterized by the statistical properties of its output
sequences, and by its attack resistance properties.
It is desirable that the period or the lower bound of period of a pseudorandom
sequence be known for cryptographic applications. For instance, in a stream cipher,
the length of a sequence needs to be the same as the length of a message, and the
sequence will never be repeated. Furthermore, the linear span or linear complexity
of a sequence must be high, so that an adversary is not able to generate the entire
sequence from a partially known segment by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [79].
For a cryptographic pseudorandom sequence, the period and linear span or com-
plexity of a sequence must be large because the linear complexity is the measure of
unpredictability of a sequence.
There are several applications of (pseudo)random sequences and numbers in
both symmetric-key and public-key cryptography. In any cryptosystem, the keys
of an encryption and decryption scheme are chosen in a random fashion from a
keyspace; pseudorandom sequences can be used for those purposes. For example,
prime numbers and the private key in an RSA cryptosystem can be chosen using
a PRNG. A stream cipher uses a pseudorandom sequence generator for generating
keystreams to encrypt and decrypt messages. A variety of applications of NLFSR-
based PRNGs can be found in resource constrained-environments such as RFID tags
and sensor networks. Note that most of the authentication protocols use nonce as a
challenge and the security of the protocol depends on nonces. In those application
3
scenarios, the pseudorandom sequences could be a better choice to use as nonces.
Last but not least, a segment of a pseudorandom sequence can be used as a random
number in a digital signature generation algorithm to protect the private key.
1.3 Motivation and This Thesis
A pseudorandom sequence generator constructed by feedback shift registers can
be observed as a system of multivariate algebraic equations. Over the past few
decades, a number of cryptanalytic attacks on FSR-based PRNGs/PRSGs have
been developed, for instance algebraic attacks, correlation attacks, cube attacks,
time-memory-data (TMD) tradeoff attacks, and discrete fourier transformation
(DFT) attacks [6,20,21,24,46,84,100,105]. These attacks are very powerful against
LFSR-based PRNGs or stream ciphers. However, it is believed that an NLFSR-
based PRNG or stream cipher can resist the existing attacks due to the hardness of
solving a system of multivariate nonlinear equations over the binary field. Replac-
ing the LFSR building blocks by well-chosen NLFSRs in the existing architectures
of PRSGs, such as filtering generator and combinatorial generator, either the afore-
mentioned attacks can be prevented or the attacks’ complexities are increased so
that launching the attacks become infeasible. Feedback shift registers can also be
implemented efficiently in hardware. Motivated by the attack-resistance properties
and efficient hardware implementations of NLFSR-based PRSGs/PRNGs, we study
nonlinear feedback shift registers, and NLFSR-based pseudorandom sequence and
number generators in this thesis.
This thesis concentrates on the generation of de Bruijn sequences and span n
sequences using NLFSRs due to their good randomness properties. A binary de
Bruijn sequence generated by an NLFSR has period 2n in which all binary n-tuples
occur exactly once, and linear complexity at least 2n−1+n [14]. On the other hand,
a binary span n sequence or modified de Bruijn sequence generated by an NLFSR
has period 2n − 1 where every nonzero n-tuple occurs exactly once in a period. A
span n sequence may also have high linear complexity. An NLFSR that generates
a de Bruijn sequence or a span n sequence needs to be used as a building block in
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designing a PRNG or a stream cipher, because the randomness properties of output
sequences can be promised for a suitable design. Unfortunately, there is no known
general construction of an NLFSR that can generate a span n sequence.
In Chapter 4, we use the structured search methods employing a class of nonlin-
ear feedback functions to study the generation of span n sequences using NLFSRs.
Chapter 5 refines and examines the composited construction and its sequence prop-
erties for producing long and strong de Bruijn sequences. Chapter 6 presents War-
bler family, a new pseudorandom number generator family based on NLFSRs with
desirable randomness properties for smart devices such as radio frequency identifi-
cation tags. Using the span n sequences newly found by the structured search, we
design two instances, Warbler-I and Warbler-II, of the Warbler family in Chapters 7
and 8, respectively, for radio frequency identification systems.
1.4 Radio Frequency Identification Systems
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a promising technology for automatic
identification of remote objects. A typical RFID system consists of three main
components, namely a reader, tags, and a backend database. A general overview of
an RFID system is provided in Figure 1.1.
• Readers: A reader is a transceiver, which queries to the tags through radio-
waves. Readers are as powerful as computers, and have enough capabilities
to perform cryptographic operations. A reader is connected to a backend
database by a secure wired/wireless channel.
• Tags or transponders: A tag is composed of a tiny integrated circuit for
storing and processing identification information, and a radio antenna for
wireless data transmission. There are three basic types of RFID tags, and
the computation capability of a tag depends on the type of tag.
– Active tags: An active tag contains internal batteries so that it can ini-
tialize communications with the reader and perform heavy computations.
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– Semi-passive tags: Semi-passive tags use batteries only to power up their
circuit and harvest power from the reader for communication.
– Passive tags: A passive tag does not contain any battery, it solely ob-
tains power from the reader for both computation and communication.
Passive tags usually have constrained capabilities in every aspect of com-
putation, communication, and storage, due to the extremely low produc-
tion cost. The reading range of a passive tag is up to several meters.
• Backend database: A backend database is connected to a reader, and it effi-
ciently stores information about all the tags in the system, for example IDs,
secrecy keys of tags. The connection between the backend server and the
reader can be a wired or wireless connection.
Backend database 
Reader 
Tag population 
connected 
Figure 1.1: An RFID system
The EPC C1 Gen2 Tag Identification Protocol
The EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 Gen2 in brief) standard has been
approved as an ISO 18000-6C standard in 2006 [29]. Figure 1.2 shows an overview
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of the tag identification protocol. In the EPC C1 Gen2 tag identification protocol,
two main operations, namely inventory and access, are performed for managing the
tag population. In the inventory operation (Steps 1-4 in Figure 1.2), after receiv-
ing a request from the reader, a tag generates a 16-bit random number, denoted
by RN16, and temporarily stores the number in a slot counter. When the slot
counter is zero, the tag backscatters RN16 to the reader. Thereafter, the reader
copies RN16 to an acknowledgement packet to be sent to the tag. When the tag
receives the acknowledgement packet, it first compares the random number in the
acknowledgement packet with RN16. If these two numbers are the same, then the
tag backscatters the acknowledgement packet.
Reader   Tag 
Request/Query 
RN16 
ACK[RN16] 
PC, EPC, CRC-16 
Req_RN[RN16] 
RN16’ 
Command[RN16’’] 
⁞ 
Command[RN16’] 
Req_RN[RN16’] 
RN16’’ 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Figure 1.2: The EPC C1 Gen2 tag identification protocol
In the access operation (Steps 5-7 in Figure 1.2), after receiving a request,
denoted by ReqRN , from the reader, the tag compares the random number in the
request ReqRN with the stored RN16. If two random numbers match, the tag
generates another random number RN16′, which is called handle and backscatters
it to the reader. The reader then issues the commands such as Read, Write, and
BlockWrite. Steps 8-10 in Figure 1.2 demonstrate a further access operation. Note
that for each access operation the tag generates a new random number.
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1.5 Overview and Main Contributions
We provide an overview and the main contributions of this thesis. The thesis is
divided into three parts. The first part includes Chapters 1,2 and 3 that provide an
introduction, a literature survey on the de Bruijn and span n sequences and ran-
dom number generators, and preliminaries to pseudorandom sequence and number
generators. The second part includes Chapters 4 and 5 that concentrate on the
generation of strong span n sequences and de Bruijn sequences, and the third part
contains Chapters 6, 7 and 8 that present the application of span n sequences in
designing lightweight pseudorandom number generators for the RFID tags.
• Chapter 1 starts by providing an introduction to cryptographic pseudoran-
dom sequence and number generators. This thesis concentrates on nonlinear
feedback shift register based pseudorandom sequence and number generators.
We give a brief overview of radio frequency identification systems. We also
provide the motivation and an outline of this thesis in this chapter.
• Chapter 2 presents a survey on the existing techniques for generating de
Bruijn sequences and span n sequences. The random number generator pro-
posals for the EPC C1 Gen2 RFID tags are presented as well.
• Chapter 3 describes and defines the mathematical concepts related to finite
fields, sequences and Boolean functions, which are fundamental mathematical
concepts behind designing and analyzing a pseudorandom sequence genera-
tor. We present the basic concepts related to feedback shift registers and
their sequence properties such as period, linear complexity. We recall the
cryptographic properties such as nonlinearity, algebraic immunity of Boolean
functions, which are also important in designing secure pseudorandom se-
quence/number generators.
• Chapter 4 focuses on the generation of span n sequences using nonlinear
feedback shift registers. The span n sequences are generated by the structured
search where in a nonlinear recurrence relation is composed of a permutation
and a trace function over a finite field, a decimation number and a t-tap
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position when 5 ≤ t < n. We use several classes of feedback functions such as
WG transformations, 5-term functions, 3-term functions, monomial functions
with a Kasami exponent, and MCM functions in the structured search. We
present the number of span n sequences produced by the aforementioned
functions in an NLFSR for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20. We study the linear complexity
of new span n sequences, and our analysis shows that the linear complexity
of a span n sequence lies between (2n − 2 − 3n) (near-optimal) and optimal
(2n − 2). Moreover, we summarize the upper and lower bounds of span n
sequences for each class of feedback functions. Our empirical comparison
shows that a span n sequence with optimal or near-optimal linear complexity
can be found by the structured search with a better probability of success
than that of a random span n sequence generation method.
• Chapter 5 investigates how to generate a strong de Bruijn sequence from
a span n sequence by the composited construction. We first refine the com-
posited construction by Lempel and Mykkeltveit et al. for generating long
de Bruijn sequences by nonlinear feedback shift registers. In the compos-
ited construction, an (n + k)-stage NLFSR is constructed from an n-stage
NLFSR by repeatedly applying the composition operation. A de Bruijn se-
quence produced by the composited construction is called a composited de
Bruijn sequence. The linear complexity of a composited de Bruijn sequence is
determined. We perform a cryptanalysis of the composited construction for
generating strong de Bruijn sequences. In the analysis, we first consider an ap-
proximation of the feedback function of an (n+ k)-stage composited NLFSR.
Then, we determine the cycle structure of an approximated feedback function
and the linear complexity of a sequence produced by an approximated feed-
back function. Our analysis shows that a de Bruijn sequence produced by the
composited construction can be strong if the span n sequence produced by
the n-stage NLFSR is strong. We present a few instances of cryptographically
strong de Bruijn sequences with periods in the range of 235 and 240, whose
feedback functions are known. Finally, we consider the implementation issues
of a feedback function of an (n+ 16)-stage NLFSR.
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• Chapter 6 proposes Warbler family – a new lightweight pseudorandom num-
ber generator family with desirable randomness properties. Warbler family
is composed of two building blocks, namely a combination of modified de
Bruijn blocks and a nonlinear feedback WG generator. The combination of
modified de Bruijn blocks is built by a number of primitive NLFSRs, and
the nonlinear feedback WG generator is composed of an NLFSR and a WG
transformation module over a finite field. We derive the randomness proper-
ties of sequences generated by the combination of modified de Bruijn blocks,
followed by a description of the initialization and running phases of the War-
bler family. Randomness properties such as period and linear complexity of
output sequences produced by the Warbler family are inherited from the com-
bination of modified de Bruijn blocks. Some parameter selection criteria for
the Warbler family are proposed. Two instances of the Warbler family are
presented in the next two chapters for RFID tags.
• Chapter 7 presents a new instance, Warbler-I, of the Warbler family for
the EPC C1 Gen2 RFID tags. Warbler-I is a nonlinear feedback shift regis-
ter based pseudorandom number generator, and can generate 16-bit random
numbers for the tag identification protocol of the EPC C1 Gen2 standard.
Warbler-I, uses WG-5 transformations, is composed of two building blocks.
The first one contains two primitive NLFSRs of lengths 17 and 18, and the
second building block contains an NLFSR of length 6 over F25 . We conduct
a security analysis of Warbler-I in two steps. First, we perform the crypto-
graphic statistical tests proposed by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST
standard. Then, we perform a cryptanalysis against Warbler-I by considering
algebraic attacks, cube attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks in great
detail. Furthermore, a hardware implementation on a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA
device shows that the new PRNG can be implemented using 46 slices.
• Chapter 8 proposes another instance, Warbler-II, of the Warbler family, which
is designed to offer a better security level. We give a detailed mathematical
description of the design of Warbler-II, which also uses WG-5 transformations
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in both building blocks. The combination of modified de Bruijn blocks of
Warbler-II contains three primitive NLFSRs of lengths 19, 21 and 22. The se-
curity analysis of Warbler-II is conducted in a similar way to that of Warbler-I,
which is twofold. In the first step, we performed the statistical tests proposed
by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST standard. In the second step, we
investigate the attack resistance properties of Warbler-II by considering alge-
braic attacks, cube attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks, Mihaljevic´ et
al.’s attacks, and weak internal state and fault injection attacks. A hardware
implementation in VHDL for the low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 FPGA device
shows that Warbler-II can be implemented using about 58 slices. Warbler-II
can be used as a random number generator in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard
tag identification protocol and RFID authentication protocols.
• Chapter 9 summarizes the key contributions of this thesis, and presents
future research directions related to the research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter presents the existing methods for the generation of span n sequences
and de Bruijn sequences, and the random number generators for the EPC C1 Gen2
passive RFID tags. A one-to-one correspondence exists between a de Bruijn se-
quence and a span n sequence or modified de Bruijn sequence: A span n sequence
can be obtained from a de Bruijn sequence by removing one zero from the run of
zeros of length n, and likewise, a de Bruijn sequence can be obtained from a span
n sequence by adding one zero to the run of zeros of length n − 1. We refer the
reader to Chapter 3 for the explanation of the technical terms used in this chapter.
2.1 Existing de Bruijn Sequence Generation Meth-
ods
Construction of a de Bruijn sequence is a mathematical problem and it is widely
investigated in the literature. Several authors studied the problem from graph
theoretic, algorithmic, and feedback shift register points of view. The FSR-based
de Bruijn sequence generation technique is the simplest one among them from an
implementation point of view. Plenty of publications in the literature have been
discussed various techniques about producing de Bruijn sequences, e.g., [2, 15, 17,
32–39, 53, 59, 67, 81, 83, 91, 92, 107, 111]. There are two main challenges for the
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production of de Bruijn sequences: One challenge is to produce plenty of de Bruijn
sequences of the same period using different recurrence relations, another one aims
to produce long de Bruijn sequences that can have many practical applications in
cryptography to design stream ciphers and PRSGs. Most of the existing techniques
are concerned about the production of different de Bruijn sequences of the same
period, and that are not efficient for generating long period de Bruijn sequences
[2, 15, 32, 36, 53, 59, 111]. A few recent publications consider the production of long
period de Bruijn sequences using NLFSRs by the exhaustive search [27, 99]. The
problem of generating a de Bruijn sequence efficiently for large values of n still
needs to be investigated for the practical applications of de Bruijn sequences. In
this thesis, we concentrate on the generation of long de Bruijn sequences.
2.1.1 D-homomorphism Based de Bruijn Sequence Con-
struction
In 1970, Lempel [67] introduced the idea of D-morphic image and preimages of a
binary sequence. As an application of D-morphic preimages, Lempel presented a
construction of producing a de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+1 from a de Bruijn
sequence of period 2n by first computing D-morphic preimages of the de Bruijn
sequence of period 2n and then concatenating two preimages at a conjugate pair.
The conception of the composition of two feedback functions f and g was sug-
gested by Green and Dimond [50] in 1970 and independently by Mykkeltveit in
1976 [90]. Later on, in 1979, Mykkeltveit et al. [92] studied the cycle structures
of f composed with g and g composed with f , and presented the construction of
Lempel [67] in the form of a composited recurrence relation of a de Bruijn sequence.
Annexstein [2] proposed a recursive algorithm based on the above ideas of Lem-
pel for generating a long de Bruijn sequence. In the algorithm, a long de Bruijn
sequence is obtained by repeatedly computing preimages of (lower order) de Bruijn
sequences and concatenating at the conjugate pair. This algorithm is not efficient
for producing a long de Bruijn sequence of period 2n, say n = 40. Chang et al. [17]
proposed another algorithm based on Lempel’s D-homomorphism for producing a
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long de Bruijn sequence from a short de Bruijn sequence.
Games [39] proposed a generalized construction of de Bruijn sequences in which
a de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+1 is constructed from two different de Bruijn
sequences of period 2n. In the construction, two D-morphic preimages p0 and p1 of
a de Bruijn sequence r of period 2n and D-morphic preimages q0 and q1 of another
de Bruijn sequence s of period 2n are obtained. Then a de Bruijn sequence of
period 2n+1 is constructed from either p0 and q1 or p1 and q0 by concatenating
preimages p0 and q1 or p1 and q0 at a conjugate pair. This can be regarded as
Lempel’s idea of concatenating at the conjugate pair. Games also introduced the
notion of reverse-complementary de Bruijn sequences, and a reverse-complementary
de Bruijn sequence can be constructed using r and s where s is a reverse de Bruijn
sequence of de Bruijn sequence r with the images of D-morphic preimages of s and
r are the same.
Mandal and Gong [71] recently analyzed the composited de Bruijn sequences
produced by the composited construction by exploiting the higher order D-morphic
preimages of binary sequences. Moreover, a new iterative technique with its parallel
extension for evaluating the feedback function of the composited construction is
proposed. The D-morphic analysis and the efficient iterative technique are not
included in this thesis.
2.1.2 Cycle Joining Algorithms for de Bruijn Sequences
Jansen et al. [59] presented an algorithm based on the principle of joining cycles for
generating de Bruijn sequences using feedback shift registers. The feedback function
g = (f + q) of a de Bruijn sequence is composed of two function modules, one is
a feedback function f , and another function q is constructed using the feedback
function f . They showed that O(2
2n
log(2n) ) de Bruijn sequences of period 2n can be
produced by considering the feedback functions for all irreducible polynomials in
a feedback shift register. The storage requirement for the implementation of the
cycle joining method is 3n bits, and 4n shifts are required to generate one bit of a
de Bruijn sequence.
Yang and Dai [111] proposed a construction of an m-ary de Bruijn sequence
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based on joining the cycles using modification sets of a feedback function f . In the
construction, a nonlinear feedback function F of a de Bruijn sequence is constructed
from the feedback function f using the modification sets of f . This method is not
efficient for large values of n, since the method requires the cycles decomposition
of f to construct the function F , and for a large n, it is very hard to obtain the
cycle decomposition of f . Moreover, the feedback function would contain many
product terms for joining of the cycles. The aim of the authors is to construct a
number of feedback functions that can generate de Bruijn sequences. They showed
that at least 2(
mn
n
−mn) feedback functions that generate de Bruijn sequences can be
constructed by choosing f = x0.
Hauge and Helleseth [53] proposed a technique based on an irreducible polyno-
mial and its adjacency graph to generate de Bruijn sequences. In this technique,
a de Bruijn sequence is obtained as maximum spanning trees from the adjacency
graph of a feedback function corresponding to an irreducible polynomial. The lower
bound for the number of de Bruijn sequences is determined in terms of the cyclo-
tomic numbers.
2.1.3 Algorithmic Approach for the de Bruijn Sequence
Generation
Fredricksen and Kessler [37] developed a technique based on lexicographic com-
positions for constructing de Bruijn sequences. In [38], Fredricksen and Maiorana
presented an algorithm for generating necklaces of length n in k colors, and a k-ary
de Bruijn sequence of period kn is produced by juxtaposing in order the periodic
reductions of the necklaces.
Fredricksen [35] proposed an algorithm for generating nonlinear de Bruijn se-
quences, and the algorithm requires 3n units of storage and outputs one bit in
around n units of time. Fredricksen also showed that a new de Bruijn sequence
can be obtained from a de Bruijn sequence by the method of cross-joining. More-
over, Fredricksen demonstrated that a set of new 22n−5 de Bruijn sequences can
be obtained from a de Bruijn sequence by the cross-joining pairs. The storage re-
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quirement for the implementation of the cross-join method is about 6n units. A
detailed summary of many other de Bruijn sequence generation techniques can be
found in [36].
Etzion and Lempel [32] presented a construction of de Bruijn sequences, where
the linear complexity of a de Bruijn sequence can attain the lower bound (2n−1+n)
for all n ≥ 3.
A nonsingular feedback shift register f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) = x0+g(x1, ..., xn−1) can
be used to generate de Bruijn sequences. Fredricksen [36] first characterized the
feedback functions of de Bruijn sequences by the Hamming weight of function g.
In [81], Mayhew presented the distribution of the feedback functions of de Bruijn
sequences for the odd weights of g for 4 ≤ n ≤ 6 and n = 7 (partial results).
2.1.4 Linear Span Based de Bruijn Sequence Construction
Chan et al. [14] first proved the linear complexity of a de Bruijn sequence of period
2n lies in the range of (2n−1 + n) and (2n − 1). Etzion and Lempel [32] showed a
construction of de Bruijn sequences that can attain the minimal linear complexity
value (2n−1+n). Games [39] presented a special construction of a de Bruijn sequence
of period 2n+1 with maximum linear complexity 2n+1−1 from a de Bruijn sequence
of period 2n with maximum linear complexity. A summary on the linear complexity
of de Bruijn sequences can be found in [31].
2.2 Span n Sequence Generation by the Exhaus-
tive Search Method
We provide a review on the existing techniques for the generation of span n se-
quences using nonlinear feedback shift registers. Golomb [44] introduced the term
span n sequence for a sequence of period 2n − 1 in which every nonzero binary
n-tuple occurs exactly once in a period. A span n sequence is also known as a
modified de Bruijn sequence. Mayhew and Golomb first studied the characteristic
of span n sequences produced by NLFSRs and their feedback functions [80,82].
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2.2.1 Exhaustive Search for Small Span n Sequences
Mayhew and Golomb [80] presented the upper and lower bounds on the linear span
of a span n sequence, and showed the (LFSR) characteristic polynomial of a span n
sequence is a product of irreducible polynomials of degree between 1 and n. They
categorized the number of span n sequences for different values of the linear span
for 4 ≤ n ≤ 6, where the span n sequences are found by computer simulations.
The experimental result shows that the linear span of a span n sequence generated
by an NLFSR lies in the range of 3n and 2n − 2. In [82], they characterized the
nonlinear feedback functions, and presented the recurrence relation for a reverse
span n sequence when the recurrence relation of the span n sequence is known.
Mayhew and Golomb also classified the number of span n sequences according to
the number of monomials in a feedback function for the same values of n.
2.2.2 Span n Sequence Generation Using Quadratic Feed-
back Function
Chan et al. [16] considered the quadratic feedback functions to generate span n
sequences. The quadratic functions are of two types: 1) a function in 4-variable
has only three terms, two linear terms and one term of degree 2, 2) a function
in 2-variable has only two terms, one linear term and one quadratic term. They
reported the number of span n sequences for 4 ≤ n ≤ 7.
Dubrova [27] presented a few span n sequences of period 2n − 1, for 4 ≤ n ≤
24. All span n sequences are generated by nonlinear feedback functions with few
linear terms and one or two quadratic terms. Note that all the techniques use
an exhaustive search to verify whether the feedback function generates a span n
sequence.
2.2.3 Span n Sequence Generation Using Cubic and Quar-
tic Feedback Functions
Gammel et al. [41] proposed stream cipher Achterban:128/80 based on nonlinear
feedback shift registers where each NLFSR generates a span n sequence. They
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presented thirteen NLFSRs for span n sequences of periods in the range of 221 − 1
and 233− 1, and the feedback functions for the NLFSRs contain only few monomi-
als. Another two variants of Achterban contains eight and ten NLFSRs that also
generate span n sequences of periods in the range of (221− 1) and (232− 1) [40,42].
Some recent studies on the generation of span n sequences can be found in
[27, 99]. Rachwalik et al. presented seven span n sequences of periods (225 − 1)
and (227 − 1) in [99]. The feedback functions of the NLFSRs contains few terms,
and that are of degree three and four. These NLFSRs were found by an exhaustive
search using an FPGA implementation.
2.2.4 General Studies on Span n Sequences
The period of a sequence produced by an NLFSR trace generator is investigated
by Ng in [95] where a nonlinear feedback function of the NLFSR trace generator
is the sum of a linear term and a trace function in (n− 1) variables with different
decimations. The NLFSR trace generator can generate a span n sequence for a
proper combination of a decimation number and a basis of the finite field where
the trace function is defined. The number of span n sequences produced by the
NLFSR trace generator is reported for n = 7, 8, 9 and 10 in [95].
Gong [48] studied the randomness properties of span n sequences where a span
n sequence is viewed as an output of a filtering generator composed of an LFSR
and a filtering function. It is well-know that m-sequences are a class of span n
sequences generated by LFSRs. A de Bruijn sequence can also be constructed from
an m-sequence using their one-to-one correspondence. When a de Bruijn sequence
is constructed from an m-sequence, the linear complexity of the de Bruijn sequence
is at least (2n−1 + n) [14]. An attacker can remove one zero from the run of zeros
of length n of the de Bruijn sequence, then it again becomes an m-sequence with
linear complexity n. The linear complexity of the sequences fluctuates drastically.
Gong suggested to study the randomness properties of span n sequences instead of
de Bruijn sequences for cryptographic applications.
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2.3 RNG for the EPC C1 Gen2 Standard
Over the last few years, a number of random number generators have been proposed
for the EPC C1 Gen2 passive RFID tags [4,18,57,64,85,97,109]. A random number
generator (RNG) is the only component in an RFID tag for providing security func-
tionalities. Random number generators can be classified into two categories, namely
true random number generators (TRNGs) and pseudorandom number generators
(PRNGs). True random number generators are implemented by relying on a physi-
cal process/phenomenon, and some instances of TRNG can be found in [4,57,109].
Pseudorandom number generators, on the other hand, are designed using complex
nonlinear mathematical relations [64,97]. Other than these two types of proposals,
another type of proposal can be found in the literature, and that is composed of a
true random number generator and a pseudorandom number generator [18,85].
2.3.1 TRNG Based RNG Proposals
Che et al. [18] designed a PRNG based on a combination of an oscillator-based
TRNG and a linear feedback shift register with 16 stages. Randomness in a 16-bit
number is introduced by adding one true random bit to each bit of the 16-bit random
number. In 16 clock cycles, a 16-bit random number is generated by the PRNG.
Due to the linear structure, Che et al.’s scheme has been attacked by Melia-Segui
et al. in [85] with high success probability.
Melia-Segui et al. [85] proposed a PRNG based on multiple primitive polyno-
mials in an LFSR in order to avoid the linear structure. The PRNG module is
comprised of an LFSR of 16 stages with eight primitive polynomials and a TRNG
where a primitive polynomial is chosen according the TRNG in a clock cycle. A
hardware implementation of the PRNG requires 761 gate equivalents (GE) where
the cost of the TRNG is not included, and a 16-bit random number is produced
within 16 clock cycles. Melia-Segui et al. [86] recently proposed J3Gen, which con-
tains four PRNGs based on the same design principle. The lengths of the internal
states of four LFSRs in the PRNGs are 16, 24, 32, 64, and each LFSR contains
either 8, 16 or 32 primitive polynomials.
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2.3.2 Pseudorandom Number Generator Proposals
Peris-Lopez et al. [97] proposed a PRNG named LAMED for RFID tags, which can
provide 32-bit random numbers as well as 16-bit random numbers. The internal
state of LAMED is of 64 bits, and the operations involved to update the internal
states are bitwise XOR operations, modular algebra, and bit rotations. A compact
hardware implementation of LAMED requires 1, 585 GE and LAMED can produce
random numbers each 1.8 ms.
Mart´ın et al. [78] proposed two pseudorandom number generators, named AKARI-
1/2 based on T -function, introduced by Klimov and Shamir in [64]. The internal
state of AKARI-1/2 is of m bits, m = 2i, 3 ≤ i ≤ 9 and the operations used
to update the internal state are modular addition, multiplication, shift operation,
bitwise AND and OR. For AKARI-1 and AKARI-2, an m/2-bit random number is
obtained by taking lower-half from the m-bit internal state after applying 64-round
and 50-round of a state update schedule, respectively. They presented the hardware
implementation of both AKARI-1/2 in [78].
2.4 Summary of Chapter 2
In this chapter, we reviewed the existing methods for generating de Bruijn sequences
and span n sequences. Current method for verifying the span n property of a binary
sequence of period (2n−1) is the exhaustive search method whose time complexity is
exponential in n. Most proposed techniques for generating de Bruijn sequences are
not efficient for a large value of n. The pseudorandom number generator proposals
for the EPC Class 1 Gen2 RFID tags are presented.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we recall the mathematical concepts related to finite fields, se-
quences, and Boolean functions that we use to design and describe pseudorandom
sequence and number generators. The theory of finite fields and feedback shift
registers presented here can be found in [43,45,68].
3.1 Finite Fields
We denote by F2 = {0, 1} the Galois field with two elements. Let F2t (t ≥ 2) be
an extension field or a finite finite with 2t elements, which is defined by a defining
element α where α is a root of an irreducible polynomial.
A polynomial f(x) of degree t over F2 is called a primitive polynomial if f(x)|(x2t−1+
1) but f(x) - (xr +1) when r < 2t−1, and the order of f(x) is 2t−1. For a positive
t, the number of primitive polynomials of degree t is equal to φ(2
t−1)
t
, where φ(·) is
Euler’s phi function. We always define the finite field F2t by a primitive polynomial
over F2. It is well-known that F2t is isomorphic with Ft2 = {(x0, x1, · · · , xt−1) :
xi ∈ F2}, a vector space with 2t elements over F2.
Definition 1 Let α be a defining element of F2t, which is a root of an irreducible
polynomial p(x), i.e., p(α) = 0, where p(x) is irreducible of degree t over F2. Then,
the polynomial basis of F2t is given by α = {1, α, α2, ..., αt−1}.
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According to the polynomial basis α, the field F2t is represented by
F2t = {c0 + c1α + · · ·+ ct−1αt−1 : ci ∈ F2}.
In this thesis, we always take α to be a root of a primitive polynomial p(x) over
F2, and the polynomial basis α is used to represent the elements of F2t .
Definition 2 The cyclotomic coset of s modulo (2t−1) is defined as Cs = {s, 2s, ..., 2j−1s}
where j is the smallest number such that s ≡ 2js mod 2t− 1. The smallest element
in Cs is called the coset leader of Cs.
We define a set Dt that contains the coset leaders as
Dt = {d : gcd(d, 2t − 1) = 1, d is a coset leader}
where gcd(a, b) is the greatest common divisor of a and b. Then the size of Dt,
denoted by |Dt|, is equal to = φ(2t−1)t .
Definition 3 The trace function Tr : F2t → F2 is defined by
Tr(x) = x+ x2 + x2
2
+ · · ·+ x2t−1 , x ∈ F2t .
3.2 Feedback Shift Register Sequences
This section presents the fundamental concepts related to feedback shift register
sequences.
3.2.1 Basic Definitions and Properties of NLFSRs
A binary sequence {ai}i≥0 can be generated by an n-stage feedback shift register
whose recurrence relation is defined as [43]
an+k = f(ak, ak+1, · · · , an+k−1), ai ∈ F2, k ≥ 0 (3.1)
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where (a0, a1, · · · , an−1) is called an initial state and Sk = (ak, ak+1, · · · , an+k−1) is
called the k-th state of the shift register. An n-stage feedback shift register is also
called a feedback shift register of length n. The sequence {ai}i≥0 is called a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) sequence if the function f is linear and is of the form
f(x0, x1, · · ·, xn−1) = c+ c0x0 + c1x1 + · · ·+ cn−1xn−1, c, ci ∈ F2.
Otherwise, it is called a nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) sequence.
Definition 4 The sequence {a0, a1, · · · , aT−1, · · · } is called periodic with period T
if ai = ai+T , i ≥ 0.
For generating a periodic sequence, a feedback function must have the form
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1 [43] Let a = {ai} be a binary sequence generated by the recurrence
relation an+i = f(ai, ai+1, · · · , ai+n−1). Then the sequence a is periodic if and only
if f is written as
f(ai, ai+1, · · ·, ai+n−1) = ai + g1(ai+1, · · · , ai+n−1) (3.2)
where g1 is a Boolean function in (n− 1) variables.
A recurrence relation of the above form is called a nonsingular recurrence rela-
tion. Denoting the left shift operator by L. For a periodic sequence a = {ai}i≥0 with
period T , the k-th shift of sequence a is defined as Lk(a) = {ak, ak+1, ..., aT−1, a0, ...,
ak−1} and the sequence Lk(a) is called the k-th shifted sequence of a.
Definition 5 A binary sequence with period 2n − 1 generated by an n-stage linear
feedback shift register is called an m-sequence.
Assume that α is a primitive element of F2n , then an m-sequence {ai} of period
(2n − 1) can be written as ai = Tr(αi), i = 0, 1, ..., 2n − 2.
Let a = {ai} and b = {bi} be two periodic binary sequences with period T1
and T2, respectively. Then the crosscorrelation between a and b over F2 is defined
25
as [45]
Ca,b(τ) =
T∑
i=0
(−1)ai+τ+bi , τ = 0, 1, ...,
where T is the least common multiple of T1 and T2. If b = a, then Ca,a(τ) is called
autocorrelation of a [45].
Definition 6 The linear span or linear complexity of a sequence is the length of
the shortest LFSR that generates the entire sequence.
Linear complexity is an important property of a sequence and that measures
the unpredictability of a sequence. For a sequence to be useful in cryptographic
applications, the sequence must have a large linear complexity. Note that an m-
sequence has good randomness properties: period (2n − 1), balance, ideal run dis-
tribution, k-tuple distribution and ideal 2-level autocorrelation. But, it has the
least linear complexity n, i.e., if only any 2n consecutive bits are known from
the entire sequence, then it is possible to determine the characteristic polynomial
uniquely by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [79], thereby the entire sequence can
be reconstructed. On the other hand, a random sequence has linear complexity
approximately half the length of the sequence [102].
3.2.2 Golomb’s Randomness Postulates
For a periodic binary sequence {ai} with period T , the randomness of the binary
sequence can be measured by the following properties [43,45]:
1. In a period, the difference between the number of zeros and the number of
ones is almost equal, i.e., |∑T−1i=0 (−1)ai | ≤ 1.
2. In a period, half the runs have length 1, one fourth have length 2, 1
2k
runs
have length k, and so on.
3. The autocorrelation of the sequence is two valued and defined by
C(λ) =
{
N if λ ≡ 0 mod T
K if λ 6≡ 0 mod T
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for odd T , K = −1 and even T , K = 0.
These three properties are known as Golomb’s randomness postulates.
3.2.3 Relationship Between de Bruijn Sequences and Span
n Sequences
Definition 7 A binary sequence of period 2n is called a de Bruijn sequence if all
binary n-tuples occur exactly once in a period.
Example 1 For n = 4, the feedback function f(x0, x1, x2, x3) = 1+x0+x1+x1x2+
x1x3 + x1x2x3 in recurrence relation 3.1 generates the following de Bruijn sequence
of period 24 = 16. The de Bruijn sequence is {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}.
Definition 8 A binary sequence of period 2n − 1 is called a span n sequence or
modified de Bruijn sequence if every nonzero n-tuple occurs exactly once in a period.
Example 2 For n = 4, the feedback function f(x0, x1, x2, x3) = x0+x2+x3+x2x3
in recurrence relation 3.1 generates a span n sequence of period (24− 1) = 15. The
span n sequence is {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}.
Definition 9 A feedback function of an n-stage FSR that generates a span n se-
quence of period 2n − 1 is called a primitive feedback function.
Definition 10 A nonlinear feedback function of an n-stage NLFSR that generates
a span n sequence of period 2n − 1 is called a primitive feedback function, and the
NLFSR is called a primitive NLFSR.
We remember that the “span n” property and “linear span” property are two
different properties of a sequence. The span n property of a sequence is referred to
as when all nonzero n-tuples occur exactly once in a period of the sequence, and
the linear span or linear complexity of a sequence is the measure of unpredictability.
A one-to-one correspondence between a de Bruijn sequence and a span n se-
quence is provided in the following theorem.
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Proposition 3.2.2 [43] Let f be a feedback function in n variables that generates
a span n sequence, then the function h = f +
n−1∏
i=1
(xi + 1) generates a de Bruijn
sequence.
An m-sequence generated by an LFSR is a span n sequence, but a span n se-
quence generated by an NLFSR is not an m-sequence. It has been conjectured that
only m-sequences have 2-level autocorrelation [44]. The truth of the conjecture
signifies that a span n sequence generated by an NLFSR cannot have 2-level auto-
correlation. Nonlinearly generated de Bruijn and span n sequences have excellent
randomness properties. A binary span n sequence generated by an NLFSR has the
randomness properties: long period 2n − 1, balance, and n-tuple distribution. A
span n sequence may also have high linear span [44,80].
Definition 11 The minimal polynomial of a sequence a is defined by the charac-
teristic polynomial of the LFSR of shortest length that can generate the sequence,
and the degree of the minimal polynomial determines the linear complexity of the
sequence a.
Property 1 The linear span of a de Bruijn sequence, denoted as LSdb, is bounded
by [14]
2n−1 + n ≤ LSdb ≤ 2n − 1. (3.3)
On the other hand, the linear span of a span n sequence, denoted as LSs, is bounded
by [80]
2n < LSs ≤ 2n − 2. (3.4)
From this property, we say that a span n sequence has the optimal or near-
optimal linear span if its linear span is equal to 2n− 2 or close to 2n− 2. Similarly,
we call a de Bruijn sequence has the optimal or near-optimal linear span if its linear
span is equal to 2n − 1 or close to 2n − 1.
Definition 12 Two sequences are called shift distinct of each other if one sequence
can not be obtained from the shifted version of another.
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For an LFSR sequence produced by a feedback function f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) =∑n−1
i=0 cixi, the periodicity of the sequence can be determined by calculating the
period of the polynomial p(x) = c0 + c1x + · · · + cn−1xn−1 + xn over the field
F2. When the feedback function f is nonlinear, determining the periodicity of a
sequence produced by f is an unsolved problem.
3.2.4 Unsolved Problems on Synthesis of NLFSRs
Due to the existence of polynomial time algorithms, determining the period of a
univariate polynomial is possible in polynomial time. As a result, the period of an
LFSR sequence can be determined certainly. For a nonlinear feedback function,
there is no polynomial time algorithm for checking the primitivity of a nonlinear
feedback function. The exhaustive search is the only method for checking the
primitivity of an NLFSR, and its time complexity is exponential in the length of
the NLFSR. Therefore, determining the period of an NLFSR sequence is infeasible
for a long length of the NLFSR in real time. Most of the known results on the
synthesis of NLFSRs are collected in Golomb’s book [43]. Following problems are
still open since last five decades for a nonlinear feedback function in the theory of
NLFSRs.
1. There is no known general construction of an NLFSR that can generate a
span n sequence or a de Bruijn sequence.
2. For a given positive integer P , no construction of a feedback function that
can generate sequences with periods bounded below by P is known.
3. There is no algorithm other than the exhaustive search for checking the prim-
itivity of a nonlinear feedback function of an NLFSR.
3.2.5 D-homomorphisms and Compositions of NLFSRs
This section presents the notion of D-homomorphism of binary sequences and the
composition of feedback functions of NLFSRs, which will be used in Chapter 5.
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The D-morphisms of Binary Sequences
In 1970, the idea of the D-homomorphism (D-morphism in brief) and its inverse of a
binary sequence was first introduced by Lempel in [67]. As an application, Lempel
showed that the preimages of a de Bruijn sequence of period 2n can be used to
construct another de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+1. Let a = (a0, a1, a2, ..., aN−1)
be a binary sequence of length N(≥ 1). The first order D-morphic image of a is
defined as [67]
D(a) = (a0 + a1, a1 + a2, a2 + a3, ..., aN−2 + aN−1).
The D-morphic preimages of a binary sequence a are given by [67]
z = (zi) = (0, a0, a0 + a1, a0 + a1 + a2, ...,
N−1∑
i=0
ai) and z¯ = (z¯i), z¯i = zi + 1.
Cycle Decomposition of NLFSRs
A nonsingular recurrence relation with an initial state generates a sequence of
states and ends with the initial state. The sequence of states is called a cycle
[43]. A nonsingular feedback shift register with a feedback function f partitions
the space of 2n binary n-tuples into a finite number of cycles, which is known as
the cycle decomposition or cycle structure of f , and we denote by Ω(f) the cycle
decomposition of f [43]. Each cycle in Ω(f) is nothing but a periodic sequence.
The nonsingular recurrence relation generates the same cycle for any n-tuple of the
cycle, and it generates a different cycle when an n-tuple initial state is not in that
cycle. For the details of the cycle decomposition, see [43]. For an arbitrary feedback
function, the method other than the exhaustive search of determining the number
of cycles produced by the feedback function is unknown in general.
In particular, the cycle decomposition of a feedback function that generates
a span n sequence contains only two sequences, namely a span n sequence and
the zero sequence. Similarly, the cycle decomposition of a feedback function that
generates a de Bruijn sequence contains only one sequence, the de Bruijn sequence.
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Composition of Recurrence Relations
Let g(x0, x1, ..., xn−1, xn) = x0+G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1)+xn = 0 and f(x0, x1, ..., xm−1, xm) =
x0 + F (x1, x2, ..., xm−1) + xm = 0 be two recurrence relations of n and m stages,
respectively that generate periodic sequences, where G and F are Boolean func-
tions in (n − 1) and (m − 1) variables, respectively. Then, a composite recurrence
relation, denoted as g ◦ f , is defined by [92]
g ◦ f = g(f(x0, ..., xm), f(x1, ..., xm+1), ..., f(xn, ..., xm+n−1)) = 0,
which is a recurrence relation of (n+m) stages. The operation “◦” is regarded as
the composition operation of recurrence relations. Note that g ◦ f and f ◦ g are not
the same in general for nonlinear feedback functions. For any feedback function
f , the cycle decomposition of g is a subset of the cycle decomposition of g ◦ f .
For more detailed treatments on the cycle decomposition of a composite recurrence
relation, see [92].
In 1979, Mykkeltveit et al. [92] presented the construction of Lempel [67] for
producing a de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+1 from a de Bruijn sequence of period
2n in terms of the composition of recurrence relation.
Lemma 3.2.3 [92] Let p be a characteristic polynomial, and q(x0, ..., xn) = x0 +
xn + w(x1, ..., xn−1) where w is a Boolean function in (n − 1) variables and let
a ∈ Ω(q) and x ∈ Ω(q ◦ p). If the minimal polynomial of a is coprime with p, then
x = b + c where b’s minimal polynomial is the same as the minimal polynomial of
a and c’s minimal polynomial is p.
Theorem 3.2.4 [92] Let g = x0 + xn + f(x1, ..., xn−1), which generates a de
Bruijn sequence with period 2n and let ψ(x0, x1) = x0 + x1. Then both h1 = g ◦ψ+∏
i∈Zno
xi
∏
i∈Zne
(xi+1) and h2 = g◦ψ+
∏
i∈Zno
(xi+1)
∏
i∈Zne
xi generate de Bruijn sequences
with period 2n+1.
We denote by ei = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0) ∈ F2i and eˆi = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0) ∈ F2i
the conjugate pair for an i-stage NLFSR.
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3.3 Boolean Functions
In this section, we define some definitions which are used to characterize a Boolean
function in cryptography. The concepts related to Boolean functions presented here
can be found in [23].
3.3.1 Nonlinearity of Boolean Functions and Vector Boolean
Functions
Let f(x0, ..., xn−1) be a Boolean function in n variables. A Boolean function f is
called balanced if the truth table of f contains equal number of 0’s and 1’s.
Definition 13 The algebraic normal form of a Boolean function f in n variables
is defined as
f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) = a0 +
n−1∑
i=0
aixi +
∑
0≤i<j≤n−1
ai,jxixj + · · ·+ ai1,i2,...,in−1xi1xi2 ...xin−1
where a0, a1, ..., ai1,i2,...,in−1 ∈ F2 are called coefficients. The algebraic degree of
the Boolean function is defined as the number of variables in the highest nonzero
coefficient. A Boolean function of the form f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) = a +
∑n−1
i=0 aixi is
called an affine or linear function.
Definition 14 The support of a Boolean function f , denoted as Supp(f), is de-
fined as the set of all inputs for which f(x) = 1, x ∈ F2n.
Definition 15 The Hamming weight of a Boolean function f , denoted as H(f), is
defined as the number of ones in the truth table of the function f . In other words,
the Hamming weight of f is the cardinality of Supp(f).
The Hadamard (or Walsh or Fourier) transform of f is defined by
fˆ(w) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+w·x =
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)f(x)+Tr(wx)
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where w = (w0, ..., wn−1) ∈ Fn2 and w · x =
∑n−1
i=0 wixi, the inner product of w and
x.
The distance between two binary vectors a = (a0, ..., an−1) and b = (b0, ..., bn−1),
denoted by d(a,b), is defined as the number of disagreements of terms of a and b,
i.e.,
d(a,b) = |{i : ai 6= bi, 1 ≤ i < n }| or equivalently
d(a,b) = H(a + b)
where H(x) is the Hamming weight of x.
The nonlinearity of f , denoted as Nf , is defined by the minimum distance
between f and all affine functions. In other words,
Nf = min
w∈Fn2 ,c∈F2
d(f,w · x + c)
or equivalently
Nf = 2
n−1 − 1
2
fˆmax
where
fˆmax = max
w∈Fn2
|f̂(w)|.
The nonlinearity of a Boolean function is an important cryptographic property and
it should be high enough to prevent having a linear approximation of the Boolean
function.
We say that F is an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function or simply an (n,m)-
function if it is a function mapping from Fn2 to Fm2 . An (n,m)-function F can be
written as [13]
F (x0, · · · , xn−1) = (f0(x0, ..., xn−1), ..., fm−1(x0, ..., xn−1))
where fi’s are Boolean functions in n variables and known as component functions.
The nonlinearity of F , denoted as NF , is defined by [13]
NF = min
b∈F2m
Nb·F
33
where b · F is the inner product. Or equivalently,
NF = 2
n−1 − 1
2
Fˆmax
where
Fˆmax = max
w∈Fn2 ,b∈Fm2
|b̂ · F (w)|.
Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial boolean function. For any a (6= 0) ∈ Fn2 ,b ∈ Fm2 ,
we call that F is differentially k-uniform [13] if the following equation has at most
k solutions in Fn2
F (x) + F (x + a) = b.
3.3.2 Resiliency and Propagation of Boolean Functions
Let f be a Boolean function in n variables. The additive autocorrelation of f is
defined as [45]
Af (a) =
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)f(x)+f(x+a), a ∈ F2n .
We say that f has k-order propagation if Af (a) = 0 for 1 ≤ H(a) ≤ k. A Boolean
function f is said to be k-order correlation immune if fˆ(λ) = 0 for 1 ≤ H(λ) ≤ k
[105]. A balanced k-th correlation immune Boolean function is called k-resilient
Boolean function.
3.3.3 Algebraic Immunity of Boolean Functions
Let Bn be the set consisting of all Boolean functions in n variables. The algebraic
immunity of f , denoted by AI(f), is defined as
AI(f) = min
g∈Bm
{deg(g) | f · g = 0 or (f + 1) · g = 0}
where deg(g) is the algebraic degree of g and f · g is the product of two Boolean
functions f and g. For a Boolean function f in n variables, the maximum value of
the algebraic immunity is equal to dn
2
e [21].
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3.4 Some Permutations and Functions over F2t
In this section, we review the definitions of WG transformations, five-term func-
tions, three-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami exponents, and MCM
functions over finite fields.
3.4.1 The Welch-Gong (WG) Transformation
Let t 6≡ 0 mod 3 and k be a positive integer such that 3k ≡ 1 mod t. We define the
function h : F2t → F2t as h(x) = x + xq1 + xq2 + xq3 + xq4 where qi’s are given by
q1 = 2
k + 1, q2 = 2
2k + 2k + 1, q3 = 2
2k−2k + 1, q4 = 22k + 2k−1. Then, the function
from F2t to F2t defined by
WGP(x) = h(x+ 1) + 1
is called the WG permutation and h(x) is called the five-term permutation. We
define functions from F2t to F2 as
WG(x) = f(x) =Tr(WGP(x)) =
∑
i∈I
Tr(xi), x ∈ F2t
g(x) =Tr(h(x)), x ∈ F2t
where I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3 ∪ I4, I1 = {2 k−12 + 2 + i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 k−12 − 2}, I2 =
{2 k+12 + 1 + 2(i + 2 k−12 (2j+1 − 1) + 2j − 1) : 0 ≤ j ≤ k−7
2
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2j}, I3 =
{2 k+12 + 1 + 2(i+ 2 k−12 (2 k−32 − 1) + 2 k−52 − 1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 k−52 } and I4 = {2 k+12 + 1 +
2(i+2
k−1
2 (2
k−1
2 −1)+2 k−32 −1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ 2 k−32 } when m mod 3 = 1, and I = I5∪ I6,
I5 = {22k−1+2k−1+2+j : 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k−1−3} and I6 = {22k+2·j+1 : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k−1−1}
when m mod 3 = 2 [76]. Then f(x) is known as the WG transformation and g(x)
is the five-term (or 5-term) function [25, 47]. The WG transformation has good
cryptographic properties such as high algebraic degree, nonlinearity, linear span,
and at least 1-order resiliency. We widely use the Welch-Gong transformations in
this thesis in designing pseudorandom sequence and number generators.
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3.4.2 Three-Term Function
Let t = 2k+1 and t ≥ 5. We denote the permutation by h(x) over the field F2t and
given by h(x) = x+ x2
k+1 + x2
k−1, which is known as three-term permutation [45].
Then the three-term (or 3-term) function from F2t to F2 is defined by
f(x) = Tr(h(x)), x ∈ F2t .
3.4.3 Monomial Function with Kasami Exponent
Let t be an odd positive integer. The Welch-Kasami exponent is defined as d =
22k − 2k + 1, where gcd(k, t) = 1. Then the function
h(x) = xd, x ∈ F2t
is a monomial permutation over F2t [25]. A monomial function with Kasami expo-
nent, from F2t to F2, is defined by
f(x) = Tr(h(x)), x ∈ F2t .
3.4.4 MCM Polynomial
Let m > 5 be an odd integer and k < m be odd with gcd(k,m) = 1. Then the
MCM polynomial, from F2m to F2m , is defined as [45]
fk(x) =
k−1∑
i=0
x(2
k+1)2i−2k
which is a permutation over F2m (Cohen and Matthews 1994). For a particular k,
Tr(fk(x
d)) is a class of functions mapping from F2m to F2 for different values of d
and different bases of the finite field F2m .
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3.5 Summary of Chapter 3
This chapter presented some concepts related to finite fields, sequences, and compo-
sitions of feedback functions which will be used in the later chapters. We reviewed
some mathematical functions over finite fields that we use as feedback functions in
nonlinear feedback shift registers.
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Chapter 4
Span n Sequence Generation by
the Structured Search
A binary span n sequence generated by an n-stage NLFSR is a sequence with
randomness properties: period 2n − 1, balance, and ideal n-tuple distribution. A
span n sequence may have a high linear span thereto. A span n sequence can
be converted to a de Bruijn sequence using their one-to-one correspondence, and
vice-versa. From a standpoint of linear complexity, a span n sequence with linear
complexity L ( 2n−1) can be converted to a de Bruijn sequence with linear com-
plexity varies between (2n−1 + n) and (2n − 1) by adding one zero to the run of
zeros of length n − 1. Likewise, one can remove any zero from the run of zeros of
length n from the de Bruijn sequence, then the sequence becomes the original span
n sequence with linear complexity L. For an m-sequence, the lower bound of the
linear complexity drops drastically from the linear complexity at least (2n−1 +n) to
L = n. This suggests to study the linear complexity of a span n sequence instead
of the linear complexity of a de Bruijn sequence for cryptographic applications.
This chapter studies the problem of generating span n sequences using nonlinear
feedback shift registers. We present the theoretical results on span n sequences in
Section 4.2 and computational results on finding the number of span n sequences in
Sections 4.3 - 4.4. The nonlinear recurrence relation for an NLFSR is composed of
three parameters, namely a decimation number, a primitive polynomial and a t-tap
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position. Finding span n sequences using this recurrence relation is called a struc-
tured search. In the theoretical results, we show that a feedback shift register (FSR)
generates a maximum number of span n sequences when about half the length of
the FSR tap positions participate in the feedback function. We also determine an
approximate number of feedback functions used in the structured search. In the
computational results, we use Welch-Gong (WG) transformations, three-term func-
tions, five-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami exponent, and MCM
functions in an NLFSR, and present the number of span n sequences produced by
the structured search using the aforementioned functions for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20. The
success probability of obtaining a span n sequence in the structured search is em-
pirically compared with the success probability of obtaining a span n sequence in a
random generation method. In Section 4.5, we analyze the linear span or complex-
ity for each class of span n sequences, and the analysis shows the linear complexity
of a span n sequence lies in the range of (2n − 2− 3n) (near-optimal) and (2n − 2)
(optimal). Partial contents of this chapter can be found in [69].
4.1 Related Work and Motivation
Most of the research efforts devoted on the study of span n sequences have been
concerned about the number of span n sequences and the characteristics of non-
linear feedback functions [44,80,83] including the number of terms in the feedback
functions [82,83] and the weight of truth tables of the feedback functions [81,83]. A
survey on the generation of span n sequences can be found in Chapter 2. Note that
all the methods use an exhaustive search for verifying the primitivity of a feedback
function or whether the feedback function generates a span n sequence.
For n ≥ 8, it is difficult to employ all feedback functions in n variables in an
NLFSR, and produce all span n sequences due to the huge number of functions.
Our goal is to use a class of feedback functions with t (< n) variables in an n-stage
NLFSR and produce a number of span n sequences, where the class of feedback
function is composed of a permutation polynomial and a trace function, and a dec-
imation number. Finding span n sequences in this technique is called a structured
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search, since all the feedback functions of the NLFSR have a special representation.
Another aim of the structure search is to obtain long span n sequences that can be
used to design lightweight PRNGs and stream ciphers. For a feedback function of
an NLFSR, the primitivity of the feedback function is verified by the exhaustive
search method. In the structured search, we prefer to use small values of t for an
efficient implementation of an NLFSR.
4.2 Theoretical Results on Span n Sequences
This section presents some theoretical results on the structured search for producing
span n sequences. We first describe the recurrence relation of nonlinear feedback
shift registers whose feedback functions are composed of a permutation and a trace
function over a finite field. In an n-stage NLFSR, the feedback function is a Boolean
function in t variables where 5 < t ≤ n − 1. All the feedback functions in t vari-
ables are balanced as a function composed by a permutation and trace function is
balanced and have even Hamming weight 2t−1. Thus, the new span n sequences
generated by a class of feedback functions belong to the weight class 2n−2. Then,
we calculate the approximate number of feedback functions used in the structured
search.
4.2.1 Description of a Span n Sequence Generation Proce-
dure
Let a = {ai} be a binary sequence generated by an n-stage nonlinear recurrence
relation, which is defined as
an+k = ak ⊕ fd(xk) = ak ⊕ Tr(P (xdk)), xk = (ar1+k, ar2+k, . . . , art+k) ∈ F2t ,
d ∈ D∗t , 0 < t < n, k ≥ 0 (4.1)
where (r1, r2, ..., rt) with 0 < r1 < r2 < . . . < rt ≤ n− 1 is called a t-tap position of
the NLFSR, fd(x) = Tr(P (x
d)), P (x) is a nonlinear permutation over F2t , and ⊕ is
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the addition over F2. The recurrence relation is depicted in Figure 4.1. For a proper
selection of a t-tap position and a feedback function fd(x), the binary sequence a
can be a span n sequence. We note that for any choice of a t-tap position and
a feedback function fd(x), the binary sequence may not be a span n sequence.
The reason for choosing t ≤ (n − 1) is to employ a small number of internal state
variables in the feedback functions for an efficient implementation of an NLFSR as
well as the production of more feedback functions.
... 
... 
Tr (P( x )) 
a1 an-1 a0 
Figure 4.1: Span n sequence generation by the structured search
Let b = {bi} be a binary sequence generated by the following recurrence relation
bn+k = 1⊕ bk ⊕ fd(xk) = 1⊕ bk ⊕ Tr(P (xdk)), xk = (br1+k, . . . , brt+k) ∈ F2t ,
d ∈ D∗t , k ≥ 0. (4.2)
Similarly, for a proper selection of a t-tap position and a feedback function fd(x),
the complementary binary sequence b¯ of b can be a span n sequence, but the
sequence b is not a span n sequence since it contains the all-zero state.
If the number of terms in the algebraic normal form representation of the func-
tion fd is even, then the recurrence relation (4.1) cannot generate a span n sequence
for any choice of a t-tap position, since for the all-one state the recurrence relation
generates the all-one sequence. When the number of terms in fd is even, the re-
currence relation (4.2) cannot generate a span n sequence, as the complement of
sequence {bi} will contain the all-zero tuple.
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Proposition 4.2.1 If Tr(P (xd)) = 0 for x = (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ F2t, then recurrence
relations (4.1) and (4.2) cannot generate span n sequences.
Varying three parameters, namely the primitive polynomial p(x), the decima-
tion number d, and the t-tap position (r1, r2, ..., rt) in recurrence relations (4.1)
and (4.2), a number of new span n sequences can be produced and that number
mainly depends on the length n of the NLFSR and the number t of inputs to the
function fd. We call this searching technique a structured search, where an NLFSR
has a compact representation in terms of feedback functions and tap positions.
Note that we may not always obtain a span n sequence for a fixed value of t and
for any length n of the NLFSR. A special case of recurrence relation (4.1) with the
trace function in (n− 1) variables as the feedback function is defined in [95].
A periodic reverse binary sequence is defined as follows [81, 82]: For a binary
sequence {a0, a1, ..., a2n−2} with period 2n − 1, the reverse sequence of the binary
sequence is defined by {a2n−2, a2n−3, ..., a1, a0}. A reverse sequence of a span n
sequence is also a span n sequence, which is not shift equivalent to the original one
and the reverse span n sequence can be generated by the same function but with a
different t-tap position.
Proposition 4.2.2 [81] Let g(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) = x0 ⊕ f(x1, . . . , xn−1) generates
a span n sequence with period 2n − 1. Then the function h(x0, xn−1, . . . , x1) =
x0 ⊕ f(xn−1, . . . , x1) generates a reverse span n sequence.
Our span n sequences generated by recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) with a
permutation are uniquely determined by the following three parameters:
1. the decimation number d,
2. the primitive polynomial p(x), and
3. the t-tap position (r1, r2, ..., rt).
Similarly, the reverse span n sequence of a span n sequence with parameters d, p(x),
and (r1, r2, ..., rt) is represented by the same decimation number d and the same
primitive polynomial p(x), but with a different t-tap position (n−r1, n−r2, ..., n−rt).
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For a fixed function fd(x), a span n sequence generated by fd(x) is different if the
t-tap position is different.
Using Proposition 3.2.2 and recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2), we form the
following recurrence relations that can generate de Bruijn sequences.
si+n = s0 ⊕ Tr(P (xdi ))⊕
n−1∏
i=1
(si ⊕ 1), xi = (sr1+i, sr2+i, ..., srt+i), d ∈ D (4.3)
zi+n = 1⊕ z0 ⊕ Tr(P (ydi ))⊕
n−1∏
i=1
zi, yi = (zr1+i, zr2+i, ..., zrt+i), d ∈ D (4.4)
We note that sequence {si} is a de Bruijn sequence when recurrence relation (4.1)
generates a span n sequence and the complementary sequence of {zi} is a de
Bruijn sequence when recurrence relation (4.2) generates a complementary span
n sequence.
Example 3 The following example describes our span n sequence generation pro-
cedure for t = 5 when the permutation P is the WG permutation. The WG
transformation over F25 is given by
f(x) = Tr(x+ (x+ 1)5 + (x+ 1)13 + (x+ 1)19 + (x+ 1)21), x ∈ F25
= Tr(x19), after simplification.
For t = 5, the set of coset leaders for which fd(x) is nonlinear is given by D
∗
t =
{1, 3, 7, 11, 15}. The d-th decimation of f(x) is given by
fd(x) = f(x
d) = Tr(xd
′
), d′ = (19 · d) mod 2t − 1, d ∈ D∗t .
The n-stage nonlinear recurrence relation with a t-tap position is given by
an+k = ak ⊕ fd(xk), xk = (ar1+k, . . . , ar5+k) ∈ F25 , k ≥ 0.
For n = 7, the span n sequences produced by recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2)
are presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Span n sequences generated using WG5 for n = 7
By recurrence relation (4.1)
Decimation Polynomial t-tap position
d (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4) (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 4 5 6
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 6
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 5 6
7 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 5 6
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 5 6
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 4 5 6
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 5 6
By recurrence relation (4.2)
Decimation Polynomial t-tap position
d (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4) (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 5 6
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 4 5 6
7 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 5 6
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
4.2.2 Approximate Number of Functions in the Search
Space
Note that three parameters, namely a decimation number d, a primitive polynomial
p(x), and a t-tap position determine a nonlinear recurrence relation or a feedback
function that may generate a span n sequence. In other words, each feedback
function can be considered as a candidate span n sequence. For a fixed value of n
and t, we form a search space by including all possible combinations of these three
parameters. In order to find span n sequences, an exhaustive search is performed
over this search space. We now determine the size of the search space or the number
of candidate span n sequences in terms of n and t in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.3 For any n > t ≥ 6, the number of feedback functions in the
search space of recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) is given by C =
(
φ(2t−1)
t
)2 (
n−1
t
)
.
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Proof As in the recurrence relations the first position is fixed for the sequence
to be periodic and any t tap positions is chosen from n − 1 positions (n ≥ 6) to
form a t-tap position, the number of distinct t-tap positions is given by T =
(
n−1
t
)
.
Again, the total number of nonlinear feedback functions is given by np · |D∗t |, where
np =
φ(2t−1)
t
is the number of t degree primitive polynomials over F2 and |D∗t | is
the number of decimation numbers for which the feedback function is nonlinear.
Hence, for fixed n and t, the number of feedback functions in the search space is
C = np · |D∗t | · T =
(
φ(2t − 1)
t
)2(
n− 1
t
)
for |D∗t | =
φ(2t − 1)
t
.
2
Proposition 4.2.4 A feedback shift register defined by recurrence relations (4.1)
and (4.2) produces the maximum number of span n sequences when about half the
length of the shift register tap positions participate in the feedback functions.
Proof Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of terms in a feedback
function is even in order to produce a span n sequence. In the FSR, for different
t-tap positions, the feedback functions are different. Thus, for a particular value of
n and t and for a feedback function in t variables, the number of different feedback
functions in n variables is equal to Nn,t =
(
n−1
t
)
and Nn,t is maximum when t =
⌈
n
2
⌉
(For linear feedback functions, t is always odd and t ≈ ⌈n
2
⌉
). If the feedback
functions in n variables that generate span n sequences are uniformly distributed
over the set of all Boolean functions, then the FSR generates the maximum number
of span n sequences when t ≈ ⌈n
2
⌉
. Hence, the assertion is established. 2
We note that an LFSR also produces the maximum number of span n sequences
when t ≈ ⌈n
2
⌉
(see Table 4.2). This property is also satisfied by the nonlin-
early generated span n sequences using recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) (see
Tables 4.3, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8).
We now estimate the number of feedback functions in the search space for finding
the maximum number of span n sequences. Assume that we use NLFSRs defined
by recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) for t =
⌈
n
2
⌉
. Let N denote the number
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Table 4.2: Tap position distribution for an LFSR of length ≤ 20
# of taps 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
2 2 2 4 – 2 2 2 – – – 6 – 6 2 – 2
4 4 4 10 12 16 20 44 18 66 42 82 52 152 72 158 100
6 – – 4 4 28 28 80 86 236 226 470 368 1050 718 1774 1104
8 – – – – 2 10 50 36 264 338 720 812 2674 2296 6696 4522
10 – – – – – – – 4 60 140 450 648 2696 2910 10238 8436
12 – – – – – – – – 4 12 66 156 1006 1470 6766 7000
14 – – – – – – – – – – 6 12 122 284 1772 2460
16 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 24 190 354
18 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 22
of span n sequences (including reverse span n sequences) obtained by recurrence
relations (4.1) and (4.2). Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.5 An approximate number of candidate span n sequences or feed-
back functions in recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) is given by C0, where C0 ≈(
φ(2dn2 e−1)
dn2 e
)2
· 2n−1√
pi·n−1
2
and C0 ≈ 22n−1−2
3n
2 +1√
pi·(dn
2
e)5/2 , if 2
t−1 is a Mersenne prime, and the
success probability of obtaining such a span n sequence is given by N
C0
.
Proof We recall that an approximated number of functions in the search space is
approximately
C =
(
φ(2t − 1)
t
)2(
n− 1
t
)
, for |D∗t | =
φ(2t − 1)
t
.
Putting t =
⌈
n
2
⌉
in the above formula, then we get
C0 =
(
φ(2dn2 e − 1)⌈
n
2
⌉ )2 · (n− 1⌈n
2
⌉ )
=
(
φ(2dn2 e − 1)⌈
n
2
⌉ )2 · ( n− 1⌊n−1
2
⌋
+ 1
)
, for positive n
=
(
φ(2dn2 e − 1)⌈
n
2
⌉ )2 · (n−
⌊
n−1
2
⌋− 1) · ( n−1bn−12 c)
(
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
+ 1)
.
47
By Stirling’s formula (
m⌊
m
2
⌋) ∼ 2m√
pim/2
,
the above equation can be written as
C0 ∼
(
φ(2dn2 e − 1)⌈
n
2
⌉ )2 · ⌊n−12 ⌋ · 2n−1
(
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
+ 1) ·
√
pi · n−1
2
∼
(
φ(2dn2 e − 1)⌈
n
2
⌉ )2 · 2n−1√
pi · n−1
2
.
≈ 2
2n−1 − 2 3n2 +1√
pi · (dn
2
e)5/2 , if 2
t − 1 is a Mersenne prime.
Thus the success probability of obtaining a span n sequence is equal to N
C0
. Hence,
the result is proved. 2
Note that recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) use only a class of Boolean func-
tions in n variables where the total number of Boolean functions in n variables is
22
n−1
.
4.3 Span n Sequence Generation Using WG trans-
formations
In this section, we report the number of new span n sequences generated using
WG transformations, and show an empirical comparison of the success probability
of obtaining a span n sequence using WG transformations and a random span n
sequence generation method. We also present a heuristic method for searching long
WG span n sequences.
4.3.1 WG Span n Sequences
WG span n sequences are obtained by putting the WG permutation in recurrence
relations (4.1) and (4.2) for different t and n. The span n sequences are generated
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by computer simulations. We use the WG transformations over the field F2t for t =
5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 (see, Section 3.4.1). We denote by WG-t the WG transformations
over the field F2t . Table 4.3 presents the number of new span n sequences produced
by recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2), respectively for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20 (new reverse
span n sequences are not taken into account). However, this method can be applied
to generate long span n sequences. In Table 4.3, “×” represents the recurrence
relations are not defined for such values of n and t and ∼ represents those cases
the number of span n sequences is not yet determined. We present some instances
of new span n sequences in Appendix A.
Table 4.3: Number of WG span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
n
t WG-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
5 WG-5 0 9 7 14 8 11 17 11 13 10 3 7 7 0 1
7 WG-7 × × 3 25 42 63 108 138 138 125 126 111 83 86 63
8 WG-8 × × × 3 9 18 34 76 96 104 106 108 110 90 79
10 WG-10 × × × × × 5 40 107 246 373 627 819 999 ∼ ∼
11 WG-11 × × × × × × 31 204 574 1313 2539 4079 ∼ ∼ ∼
Total 0 9 10 42 59 97 230 536 1067 1925 3401 5124 – – –
By recurrence relation (4.2)
n
t WG-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
5 WG-5 1 7 7 10 16 18 10 8 4 10 2 1 3 1 0
7 WG-7 × × 4 25 47 59 121 122 137 125 123 98 74 84 54
8 WG-8 × × × 1 6 35 33 75 73 91 123 115 106 99 77
10 WG-10 × × × × × 4 47 118 270 401 680 863 ∼ ∼ ∼
11 WG-11 × × × × × × 33 186 576 1350 2522 4010 ∼ ∼ ∼
Total 1 7 11 36 69 116 244 509 1060 1977 3450 5087 – – –
A graphical representation of the number of new span n sequences for different
WG-t is provided in Figure 4.2. According to the figure for different t, the number
of span n sequences increases as n increases and it reaches the maximum for some
value of n, and thereafter the number of span n sequences decreases as n increases.
At a quick glance, we can observe that the number of span n sequences is maximal
when n close to 2t, which follows from the fact that the size of the search space is
a multiple of a binomial coefficient (see Proposition 4.2.4). This fact reveals that
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there exists a tradeoff between n and t for obtaining the maximum number of span
n sequences.
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
n
Th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f s
pa
n n
 se
qu
en
ce
s
 
 
WG5
WG7
WG8
Figure 4.2: Distribution for the number of span n sequences
Remark 4.3.1 We observe that there exist many span n sequences whose t-tap
positions and the bases of the finite fields are the same but their decimation numbers
are different.
4.3.2 The Success Probability Comparison
Usually, in a random generation method, a span n sequence can be produced by
choosing a nonlinear feedback function in n variables randomly and verifying the
primitivity of the feedback function. The success probability of obtaining a ran-
domly generated span n sequence is 1
2n−3 [83]. We compared the success probabil-
ity of obtaining a span n sequence (including reverse sequences) in our approach
with a random span n sequence generation method for t = 5, 7, 8 ( for t ≈ ⌈n
2
⌉
),
10 and 11 (for 13 ≤ n ≤ 17) and the comparison shows that in our approach one
can produce a span n sequence with a better success probability than that of a
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random span n sequence generation method. A comparison of success probability
for t = 5, 7, and 8 is provided in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: The success probability comparison for WG span n sequences
n = 2t Our approach Randomly chosen
WG5 10 1
26.56
1
27
WG7 14 1
29.98
1
211
WG8 16 1
211.81
1
213
4.3.3 The Search Complexity Reduction for WG Span n
Sequences
It is worth noticing that the number of feedback functions in the search space
increases exponentially as t increases. For large t, it will be hard to find span n
sequences by considering all functions in the search space. Thus, for large n and
t, a search in the search space can be performed for finding span n sequence by
restricting the search over a particular type of decimation numbers and over the
selections of t-tap positions. Below we list a type of decimation numbers and t-tap
positions observed for WG span n sequences. In some cases, we may not find any
span n sequence. However, according to our observations based on the above idea,
it is possible to obtain many span n sequences.
Observations on Decimation Numbers
We have performed a search on the following type of decimation numbers for dif-
ferent n
Ddec = {d : d ∈ D∗t and d = 2i − 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1}
for t = 7, 8, and 10 and the result shows that there exist many span n sequences
whose decimation numbers in the recurrence relation (4.1) and (4.2) are of the above
type. For this type of decimation numbers, an approximate number of feedback
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functions in the search space is given by
Cdec =
φ(2t − 1)
t
(t− 1)
(
n− 1
t
)
≈ φ(2t − 1)
(
n− 1
t
)
.
Obviously, the reduced complexity Cdec is less than the original complexity C.
Observations on t-tap Positions
Likewise, a search in the search space can be performed according to some pattern
of t-tap positions for finding long period span n sequences. Assume that it is
possible to fix, say, k tap positions (1 ≤ k ≤ t). Then, the total number of fixed
tap positions in the recurrence relations is (k+1) and we only need to choose (t−k)
positions out of (n − 1 − k) positions. So, for k fixed choices of tap positions, the
search complexity is
Ctap =
(
φ(2t − 1)
t
)2(
n− 1− k
t− k
)
.
Based on our observations on the t-tap positions for t = 7, 8, and 10, the follow-
ing types of t-tap positions are effective when the slope of the curves in Figure 4.2
increases gradually. For example, when t = 7, n = 11, 12, 13 and 14 and t = 8, n =
13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, the t-tap positions are given by: {1, 2, 3, 4, · · ·}, {1, 2, 3, · · ·, n−
1}, {1, 2, · · ·, n−2, n−1}, {1, · · ·, n−3, n−2, n−1}, where the numbers in the tap
positions represent fixed positions in the t-tap positions (i.e., k = 4 fixed positions)
and “. . .” represents a combination of (n − k − 1) tap positions. We performed
a search according to the first pattern of t-tap position, the following span n se-
quences generated by two WG transformations have been found for t = 13 and
n = 24.
Decimation Polynomial t-tap position
d (c0, c1, c2, ..., c11, c12) (r1, r2, ..., r12, r13)
1207 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22)
55 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17)
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4.4 Span n Sequence Generation by 3-term, 5-
term, and Monomial Functions and MCM
Functions
This section reports the number of span n sequences produced using three-term
functions, five-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami exponents and
MCM functions.
4.4.1 3-term and 5-term Span n Sequences
Considering three-term permutation and five-term permutation in recurrence rela-
tions (4.1) and (4.2), a number of span n sequences can be obtained by the struc-
tured search. Tables 4.5 - 4.6 present the number of span n sequences obtained
using the recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2) for three-term functions, five-term
functions. When t = 5, three-term functions and five-term functions degenerate to
the same functions. Furthermore, we compare the success probability of obtaining
a span n sequences using 3-term and 5-term functions in Table 4.7 for t = 5, 7, 8, 9.
Table 4.7 illustrates that a span n sequence can be produced using one of 3-term,
5-term and monomial functions with Kasami exponent with a better success prob-
ability.
4.4.2 Monomial and MCM Functions Span n Sequences
We take the monomial permutation and the MCM polynomials fk(x) (defined in
Section 3.4.4) in recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2), and produce span n sequences.
We call the span n sequences produced using MCM functions MCM span n se-
quences. The MCM polynomials for different values of k over the fields F2t , t = 7, 9
and 11 are considered. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the number of span n sequences
produced using monomial functions with Kasami exponents and MCM functions,
respectively for 8 ≤ n ≤ 20. Some examples of span n sequences produced by mono-
mial functions and MCM span n sequences are provided in Tables A.6 and A.7,
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Table 4.5: Number of three-term span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
n
t T3-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
5 T3-5∗ 1 3 9 8 9 8 4 3 5 2 3 1
7 T3-7 × × 6 25 51 89 103 150 131 128 127 123
9 T3-7 × × × × 8 52 104 223 391 549 710 770
11 T3-11 × × × × × × 35 190 624 1323 2580 4056
Total – 1 3 15 33 68 149 246 566 1151 2002 3420 4950
By recurrence relation (4.2)
n
t T3-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
5 T3-5∗ 1 2 2 5 10 5 6 5 3 1 3 5
7 T3-7 × × 4 24 44 84 98 122 133 146 128 111
9 T3-7 × × × × 12 47 109 237 361 553 694 823
11 T3-11 × × × × × × 34 186 578 1416 2554 4007
Total – 1 3 6 29 66 136 247 550 1075 2116 3379 4946
respectively. In tables, × denotes that the recurrence relation is not defined the
parameters t and n and ∼ denotes that the cases are incomplete due to a huge
number of functions in the search space. When t = 5, the WG transformations
and monomial functions with Kasami exponent degenerate to the same functions.
Table 4.7 contains an empirical success probability comparison between a span n
sequence generation using monomial functions and a random span n sequence gen-
eration method. Our empirical comparisons also show that the success probability
of obtaining a span n sequence by the structured search using MCM functions
is greater than that of a random span n sequence generation method. We don’t
provide the success probability values due to the large number of cases.
Remark 4.4.1 For 3-term, 5-term and MCM functions, the complexity of the
search space is the same as the complexity of the search space for WG transforma-
tions for t =
⌈
n
2
⌉
. For monomial functions with Kasami exponent, the complexity
of the search space can be obtained in the similar manner.
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Table 4.6: Number of five-term span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
n
t FT-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
5 FT-5∗ 1 3 9 8 9 8 4 4 5 2 3 1 0 1
7 FT-7 × × 5 22 44 66 118 131 115 135 124 118 99 90
8 FT-8 × × × 1 9 18 37 56 88 101 104 86 92 90
10 FT-10 × × × × × 9 37 116 246 411 621 797 943 ∼
11 FT-11 × × × × × × 25 171 590 1443 2618 4194 ∼ ∼
Total 1 3 14 31 62 101 221 478 1044 2092 3470 5196 – –
By recurrence relation (4.2)
n
t FT-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
5 FT-5∗ 1 2 2 5 10 5 6 5 3 1 3 5 0 1
7 FT-7 × × 8 19 43 74 108 138 138 127 117 102 84 91
8 FT-8 × × × 0 6 22 38 54 66 116 89 106 83 93
10 FT-10 × × × × × 7 47 119 223 443 627 861 ∼ ∼
11 FT-11 × × × × × × 20 172 609 1397 2558 4062 ∼ ∼
Total 1 2 10 24 59 108 219 488 1039 2084 3394 5136 – –
4.5 Linear Span Analysis of New Span n Sequences
In this section, we study the linear span of new span n sequences generated using
WG transformations, five-term functions, three-term functions, monomial func-
tions with Kasami exponent, and MCM functions. We note that all the nonlinear
feedback functions have a trace representation. The linear span of a sequence is
an important randomness property, which is considered as an upper bound on se-
quence unpredictability because, using only twice-linear span consecutive bits, one
can certainly predict the remaining bits of the sequence by the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [5, 79]. Sequences with optimal linear complexity are of practical inter-
ests in cryptography, since an attacker requires the whole sequence to decrypt the
message in a stream cipher. There is no theoretical result on the linear span of
span n sequences generated by a nonlinear feedback shift register. Other than the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, the linear complexity of a span n sequence can be
determined by computing the spectral sequence of a span n sequence. What we
know about the linear complexity of span n/de Bruijn sequences is the bounds
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Table 4.7: The success probability comparison for 3-term, 5-term and monomial
functions span n sequences
3-term Span n sequences
n ≈ 2t Our approach Randomly chosen
TT5 10 1
26.89
1
27
TT7 14 1
210.04
1
211
TT9 17 1
213.04
1
214
5-term Span n sequences
n = 2t Our approach Randomly chosen
FT5 10 1
26.89
1
27
FT7 14 1
210.10
1
211
FT8 16 1
212.02
1
213
Monomial functions with Kasami exponent Span n sequences
n ≈ 2t Our approach Randomly chosen
MF5 10 1
26.88
1
27
MF7 14 1
210.29
1
211
MF9 17 1
212.96
1
214
presented in Property 1 in Chapter 3.
We compute the linear span of new span n sequences by the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm and our computational results show that the linear spans attained by new
sequences are the optimal (2n− 2), the near-optimal (2n− 2− 3n) and between the
near-optimal and optimal. Table A.8 presents a summary of the linear spans of WG
span n sequences generated by the recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2). Moreover,
Tables A.9, A.10, A.11, and A.12 exhibit a summary of the linear spans of the
span n sequences generated by five-term functions, three-term functions, monomial
functions with Kasami exponent, and MCM functions, respectively for different
values of t. Our computational results also show that most of new sequences obtain
the optimal linear span (2n − 2), only very few span n sequences obtain the linear
span (2n−2−3n) and in some cases all the linear spans are greater than (2n−2−3n).
We summarize the above discussions in the following two properties.
Property 2 For all newly found span n sequences (including reverse span n se-
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Table 4.8: Number of span n sequences generated by monomial functions
By recurrence relation (4.1)
n
t MF-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
5 MF-5 0 9 7 14 8 11 17 11 13 10 3 7 7 0
7 MF-7 × × 6 17 41 76 79 118 108 99 125 78 88 72
9 MF-9 × × × × 10 43 120 258 410 519 662 788 ∼ ∼
11 MF-11 × × × × × × 26 188 604 1423 2491 4056 ∼ ∼
Total – 0 9 13 31 59 130 242 575 1135 2051 3281 4929 – –
By recurrence relation (4.2)
n
t MF-t 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
5 MF-5 1 7 7 10 16 18 10 8 4 10 2 1 3 1
7 MF-7 × × 4 25 45 60 98 117 114 104 116 96 86 77
9 MF-9 × × × × 6 37 131 239 367 558 740 860 ∼ ∼
11 MF-11 × × × × × × 32 184 596 1403 2547 4074 ∼ ∼
Total – 1 7 11 35 67 115 271 548 1081 2075 3405 5031 – –
quences), 7 ≤ n ≤ 20 and n is a prime number, the linear span or linear complexity
of the WG, 5-term, 3-term, monomial functions with Kasami exponent, MCM span
n sequences takes the following three values {2n − 2− 2n, 2n − 2− n, 2n − 2}.
Property 3 For 7 ≤ n ≤ 20 and all the other cases, except for those in Property
2, the linear span, denoted as LS, is bounded by
2n − 2− 3n ≤ LS ≤ 2n − 2
for all WG, 5-term, 3-term, monomial function, and MCM span n sequences when
n is a composite number and their respective reverse span n sequences for any n.
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4
This chapter presented the theoretical results on span n sequences and computa-
tional results about the number of span n sequences. In the theoretical results, we
described the nonlinear recurrence relations used in the structured search where
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Table 4.9: Number of MCM span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
n
t k 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
7 3 3 26 53 86 113 141 147 142 126 121 110 77 57
5 5 22 44 72 112 124 128 148 112 122 92 80 52
9 5 × × 13 47 106 247 418 553 674 799 846 ∼ ∼
7 × × 9 32 118 238 383 577 632 779 ∼ ∼ ∼
11 3 × × × × 23 196 614 1392 2595 4200 ∼ ∼ ∼
5 × × × × 39 188 610 1384 2560 3981 ∼ ∼ ∼
7 × × × × 30 187 565 1374 2587 4106 ∼ ∼ ∼
9 × × × × 48 196 615 1380 2606 4093 ∼ ∼ ∼
By recurrence relation (4.2)
n
t k 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
7 3 5 23 51 84 106 125 115 136 122 103 107 81 59
5 6 25 44 80 113 151 141 132 141 112 111 87 59
9 5 × × 9 59 131 250 372 577 679 854 830 ∼ ∼
7 × × 11 45 139 245 425 543 714 786 809 ∼ ∼
11 3 × × × × 35 174 615 1368 2493 4204 ∼ ∼ ∼
5 × × × × 26 179 559 1357 2596 3989 ∼ ∼ ∼
7 × × × × 22 172 585 1376 2551 4046 ∼ ∼ ∼
9 × × × × 24 192 566 1359 2520 4212 ∼ ∼ ∼
a feedback function of an NLFSR is composed of a decimation number, a primi-
tive polynomial and a t-tap position. We then showed that the structured search
produces the maximum number of span n sequences when half the length of FSR
tap positions participate in the feedback function, and estimated the approximate
number of feedback functions involved in the structured search for the above pa-
rameters.
In the computational results, we reported the number of span n sequences pro-
duced by the structured search using WG transformations, three-term functions,
five-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami exponent, and MCM func-
tions as nonlinear feedback functions. We calculated the probability of success for
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obtaining a span n sequences for each case. Our empirical comparison shows that
the success probability of obtaining a span n sequence in the structured search is
greater than that of a random span n sequence generation method when n close
to 2t. An analysis on the linear span of new span n sequences produced by the
aforementioned functions is conducted, and a summary of the bounds of the linear
span for different values of t is presented. The linear span of a new span n sequence
lies between the near-optimal and optimal. We observed that the majority of span
n sequences have an optimal linear span. Our computational results show that the
structure search can be used to find span n sequences with a moderate n.
Another aspect of studying the structured search is to find a general construc-
tion of a nonlinear feedback function that can generate a span n sequence. Unfor-
tunately, we could not establish any such general construction of a span n sequence.
The new span n sequences or span n sequences produced by the structured search
can be used as building blocks in designing lightweight PRNGs and stream ciphers
for securing communication systems.
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Chapter 5
Strong de Bruijn Sequences with
Large Periods by the Composited
Construction
The concept of the composition of two feedback functions f and g, defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.5, was suggested by Green and Dimond [50] in 1970 and independently by
Mykkeltveit in 1976 [90]. In 1970, Lempel [67] introduced the idea of D-morphic
image and preimages of a binary sequence, and presented a construction of produc-
ing de Bruijn sequences using D-morphic preimages. Later on, in 1979, Mykkeltveit
et al. [92] widely studied the cycle structures of f composed with g and g composed
with f , and presented the construction of Lempel in the form of a composited
feedback function.
This chapter investigates how to generate a strong de Bruijn sequence from a
span n sequence through the composition method by Lempel [67] and Mykkeltveit et
al. [92] where the span n sequence has an optimal or near-optimal linear complexity.
In Section 5.1, we refine the composited construction in which a feedback function
of a long de Bruijn sequence is constructed from a feedback function of a span n
sequence. Section 5.2 determines the linear complexity of a composited de Bruijn
sequence, and Section 5.3 conducts an analysis of a composited nonlinear recurrence
relation from a cryptographic point of view. In the analysis, we investigate an
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approximation of the feedback function by setting some product terms as constant
functions. We also determine the cycle structure of an approximated feedback
function and the linear complexity of a sequence generated by an approximated
feedback function. The analysis shows that a de Bruijn sequence generated by the
composited construction is strong if the starting span n sequence is strong. In
Section 5.4, we derive an algebraic representation of an (n+ 16)-stage NLFSR, and
present a few instances of cryptographically strong de Bruijn sequences with periods
in the range of 235 and 240. We use the span n sequences with optimal or near-
optimal linear complexity discovered in Chapter 4 in the composited construction.
We discuss the implementation issues of a composited NLFSR for a de Bruijn
sequence in Section 5.5. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 5.6. Partial
contents of the chapter have been published in [70] and some results can be found
in [71].
Table 5.1: Notations used in Chapter 5
Zno : Set of odd integers between 1 and n
Zne : Set of even integers between 1 and n
Supp(f): The support of Boolean function f
H(f): The Hamming weight of the Boolean function f
ψ(x0, x1) = x0 + x1: A Boolean function to be used for composition
ψk: The k-th order composition of ψ
Ω(g): Cycle decomposition of feedback function g
5.1 Feedback Functions of Composited de Bruijn
Sequences
In [92], Mykkeltveit et al. mentioned the idea of constructing a long stage NLFSR
from a short stage NLFSR by repeatedly applying Theorem 3.2.4 when g is a linear
function in two variables that generates a de Bruijn sequence. In this section, we
first refine Mykkeltveit et al.’s idea so that we can generate long de Bruijn sequences,
and then show an analytic formulation of a recursive feedback function of an (n+k)-
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stage NLFSR, which is constructed from a feedback function of an n-stage NLFSR
by repeatedly applying Theorem 3.2.4 and the composition operation.
5.1.1 The k-th Order Composition of a Boolean Function
Let g(x0, x1, ..., xn) = x0 + xn +G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1) be a Boolean function in (n+ 1)
variables, where G is a Boolean function in (n− 1) variables, and g(x0, ..., xn) = 0
is a nonsingular recurrence relation of n stages. The first order composition of g
and ψ, denoted as g ◦ ψ, is given by [92]
g(y0, ..., yn) ◦ ψ(x0, x1) = g(x0 + x1, x1 + x2, ..., xn + xn+1)
= x0 + x1 + xn+1 + xn +G(x1 + x2, ..., xn−1 + xn).
Similarly, the k-th order composition of g with respect to ψ is defined by
g ◦ ψk = (g ◦ ψk−1) ◦ ψ, k ≥ 2
where g ◦ ψk−1 is (k − 1)-th order composition of g with respect to ψ.
Proposition 5.1.1 For a positive integer k, the number of distinct variables in
xi ◦ ψk is equal to 2l where l is the Hamming weight of k.
We can simply expand xi ◦ψk by first computing the power set of {k1, k2, ..., kl}
with the empty is set to zero, and then summing up all the elements of each set
and adding i to each sum, where k =
∑l
j=1 kj, kj = 2
q for some q. For an efficient
evaluation of (g ◦ψk), the value of k must be chosen such that the Hamming weight
of k is low.
Example 4 The k-th order composition (1 ≤ k ≤ 16) of f = xi with respect to ψ
is given in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: The k-th order composition of xi w.r.t ψ
k f ◦ ψk k f ◦ ψk
1 xi + xi+1 9 xi + xi+1 + xi+8 + xi+9
2 xi + xi+2 10 xi + xi+2 + xi+8 + xi+10
3 xi + xi+1 + xi+2 + xi+3 11 xi + xi+1 + xi+2 + xi+3 + xi+8 + xi+9 + xi+10 + xi+11
4 xi + xi+4 12 xi + xi+4 + xi+8 + xi+12
5 xi + xi+1 + xi+4 + xi+5 13 xi + xi+1 + xi+4 + xi+5 + xi+8 + xi+9 + xi+12 + xi+13
6 xi + xi+2 + xi+4 + xi+6 14 xi + xi+2 + xi+4 + xi+6 + xi+8 + xi+10 + xi+12 + xi+14
7
∑7
l=0 xi+l 15
∑15
l=0 xi+l
8 xi + xi+8 16 xi + xi+16
5.1.2 Repeated Compositions of a Product Term
Let Xp0 be a product term in p variables which is given by
Xp0 =
∏
i∈Zpo
xi
∏
i∈Zpe
(xi + 1).
The first order composition of Xp0 with respect to ψ, denoted as X
p
1 , is given by
Xp1 =
∏
i∈Zpo
(xi + xi+1)
∏
i∈Zpe
(xi + xi+1 + 1)
which is a product-of-sum term or composed term in (p + 1) variables. Similarly,
the k-th order composition of Xp0 with respect to ψ, denoted by X
p
k , is defined as
Xpk = (X
p
k−1) ◦ ψ, k ≥ 2
which is a product-of-sum term in (p + k) variables. Note that the composition
operation with respect to ψ increases the number of variables in Xp0 by one when it
repeats once, but the composition operation does not increase the algebraic degree
of Xp0 .
We denote by Jn−1 =
n−1∏
i=1
(xi + 1). In a similar manner, the k-th order compo-
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sition of Jn−1 with respect to ψ, denoted as Jn−1k , is defined by J
n−1
k =
(
Jn−1k−1
) ◦ψ,
where Jn−1k−1 is the (k − 1)-th order composition of Jn−1.
Let us now define a Boolean function Ink in (n+ k − 1) variables as
Ink (x1, x2, ..., xn+k−1) = J
n−1
k +X
n
k−1 +X
n+1
k−2 + · · ·+Xn+k−21 +Xn+k−10
which is a sum of (k + 1) product-of-sum terms and the algebraic degree of Ink is
maximum and equals (n+ k − 1). Function Ink can also be written in terms of the
composition operation as follows
Ink+1 = I
n
k ◦ ψ +Xn+k0 , for k ≥ 0 and n ≥ 2,
where In0 = J
n−1.
5.1.3 The Composited Construction of a de Bruijn Sequence
We now present the construction of an (n + k)-stage NLFSR that is constructed
from an n-stage NLFSR.
Proposition 5.1.2 Let g(x0, x1, ..., xn) = xn+x0+G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1), which gener-
ates a span n sequence of period (2n− 1), where G is a Boolean function in (n− 1)
variables. Then, for any integer k ≥ 1, Rnk(x0, x1, ..., xn+k) = (xn + x0) ◦ ψk +
G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1) ◦ψk + Ink (x1, ..., xn+k−1) generates a de Bruijn sequence of period
2n+k.
Proof The feedback function (g + Jn−1) = 0 generates a de Bruijn sequence of
period 2n. By applying Theorem 3.2.4 to the feedback function (g+ Jn−1) k times,
the feedback function becomes
Rnk(x0, x1, ..., xn+k) = (xn + x0) ◦ ψk +G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1) ◦ ψk+
Ink (x1, ..., xn+k−1), k ≥ 0 (5.1)
= (xn + x0) ◦ ψk +G(x1 ◦ ψk, ..., xn−1 ◦ ψk)+
Ink (x1, x2, ..., xn+k−1). (5.2)
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The function Rnk = 0 is a feedback function in (n+ k) variables of an NLFSR, and
generates a de Bruijn sequence with period 2n+k. 2
Definition 16 A de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+k produced by recurrence rela-
tion (5.1) is referred to as a composited de Bruijn sequence.
Definition 17 The recurrence relation (5.1) is called a composited recurrence re-
lation, and the NLFSR for recurrence relation (5.1) is referred to as a composited
NLFSR.
One can construct the feedback function Rnk+1 from R
n
k in the following recursive
manner
Rnk+1 = R
n
k ◦ ψ +Xn+k0 or Rnk+1 = g ◦ ψk+1 + Ink+1, k ≥ 0
where Rn0 = (g + J
n−1).
Remark 5.1.3 For k = 1, Proposition 5.1.2 is the same as Theorem 3.2.4 which
is also found by Lempel in [67]. For k = 1 and g is a primitive polynomial,
Proposition 5.1.2 is similar to Theorem 2 in [92].
Remark 5.1.4 According to Theorem 3.2.4, the product termXp0 in the recurrence
relation (5.1) can be replaced by the product term
∏
i∈Zpo (xi + 1)
∏
i∈Zpe xi.
5.1.4 Algebraic Form of In16
We now present an algebraic form of In16 for a recurrence relation of (n+16) stages,
and the algebraic form is derived by putting k = 16 in the recurrence relation (5.1).
Then, the nonlinear recurrence relation of (n+ 16) stages is given by
Rn16(x0, ..., xn+16) = xn+16 + xn + x0 + x16 +G(x1 + x17, ..., xn−1 + xn+15)
+ Jn−116 +X
n
15 + · · ·+Xn+141 +Xn+150 = 0 (5.3)
where Jn−116 =
∏n−1
i=1 (xi +xi+16 + 1) and X
i
j = T
i
o,j ·T ie,j, n ≤ i ≤ n+ 15, 15 ≥ j ≥ 0,
T io,j and T
i
e,j are given in Table 5.3. In the product-of-sum terms, the subscripts
o and e represent the odd indices product terms and even indices product terms,
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respectively. Each product-of-sum term X ij, n ≤ i ≤ n + 15, 15 ≥ j ≥ 0, is a
function of (n+ 15) variables. The expansion of (xi ◦ψk) can be found in Table 5.2
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 16.
Table 5.3: Product-of-sum terms in In16 of the recurrence relation (5.3)
T no,15 =
∏
i∈Zno
(∑15
l=0 xi+l
)
T n+1o,14 =
∏
i∈Zn+1o
(∑7
l=0 xi+2l
)
T n+2o,13 =
∏
i∈Zn+2o (xi + xi+1 +
∑3
l=1(xi+2l + xi+2l+1)) T
n+3
o,12 =
∏
i∈Zn+3o (
∑3
l=0 xi+4l)
T n+4o,11 =
∏
i∈Zn+4o (
∑4
l=0 xi+l +
∑11
l=8 xi+l) T
n+5
o,10 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o (xi + xi+2 + xi+8 + xi+10)
T n+6o,9 =
∏
i∈Zn+6o (xi + xi+1 + xi+8 + xi+9) T
n+7
o,8 =
∏
i∈Zn+7o (xi + xi+8)
T n+8o,7 =
∏
i∈Zn+8o (
∑7
l=0 xi+l) T
n+9
o,6 =
∏
i∈Zn+9o (
∑3
l=0 xi+2l)
T n+10o,5 =
∏
i∈Zn+10o (xi + xi+1 + xi+4 + xi+5) T
n+11
o,4 =
∏
i∈Zn+11o (xi + xi+4)
T n+12o,3 =
∏
i∈Zn+12o (
∑3
l=0 xi+l) T
n+13
o,2 =
∏
i∈Zn+13o (xi + xi+2)
T n+14o,1 =
∏
i∈Zn+14o (xi + xi+1) T
n+15
o,0 =
∏
i∈Zn+16o xi
T ne,15 =
∏
i∈Zne (
∑15
l=0 xi+l + 1) T
n+1
e,14 =
∏
i∈Zn+1e (
∑7
l=0 xi+2l + 1)
T n+2e,13 =
∏
i∈Zn+2e (xi + xi+1 +
∑3
l=1(xi+2l + xi+2l+1) + 1) T
n+3
e,12 =
∏
i∈Zn+3e (
∑3
l=0 xi+4l + 1)
T n+4e,11 =
∏
i∈Zn+4e (
∑4
l=0 xi+l +
∑11
l=8 xi+l + 1) T
n+5
e,10 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (xi + xi+2 + xi+8 + xi+10 + 1)
T n+6e,9 =
∏
i∈Zn+6e (xi + xi+1 + xi+8 + xi+9 + 1) T
n+7
e,8 =
∏
i∈Zn+7e (xi + xi+8 + 1)
T n+8e,7 =
∏
i∈Zn+8e (
∑7
l=0 xi+l + 1) T
n+9
e,6 =
∏
i∈Zn+9e (
∑3
l=0 xi+2l + 1)
T n+10e,5 =
∏
i∈Zn+10e (xi + xi+1 + xi+4 + xi+5 + 1) T
n+11
e,4 =
∏
i∈Zn+11e (xi + xi+4 + 1)
T n+12e,3 =
∏
i∈Zn+12e (
∑3
l=0 xi+l + 1) T
n+13
e,2 =
∏
i∈Zn+13e (xi + xi+2 + 1)
T n+14e,1 =
∏
i∈Zn+14e (xi + xi+1 + 1) T
n+15
e,0 =
∏
i∈Zn+16e (xi + 1)
5.2 Linear Complexity of Composited de Bruijn
Sequences
This section determines the linear complexity of a composited de Bruijn sequence
produced by a composited nonlinear recurrence relation in which the linear com-
plexity of the starting span n sequence is known. In this chapter, we use the de
Bruijn sequence of order n and the de Bruijn sequence of period 2n interchangeably.
5.2.1 A Closer Look at the Composited Construction
Let s be a de Bruijn sequence of order (n + 1) produced by the recurrence rela-
tion (5.1) when k = 1. The composited construction of a de Bruijn sequence of
order (n + k) or the recurrence relation (5.1) can be interpreted as follows. Let
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a = {ai}i≥0 be a de Bruijn sequence of order n that is generated by h = g + Jn−1.
Then the D-morphic preimages of a are z and z¯, given in Section 3.2.5. Accord-
ing to the recurrence relation (5.1) for k = 1, the sequence s can be written as
s = z‖Et(z¯), where z = z′‖e, z¯ = z′′‖eˆ, 0 ≤ t ≤ 2n − 1, E is the left shift operator,
and ‖ denotes the concatenation operation [14].
We denote by si = zi‖Eti(z¯i) the de Bruijn sequence of order (n + i) for 0 ≤
ti ≤ 2n+i−1 − 1 and s0 = a. A de Bruijn sequence of order (n + k) is constructed
recursively by calculating preimages as follows:
s1 = z1‖Et1(z¯1) for 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 2n − 1
s2 = z2‖Et2(z¯2) for 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 2n+1 − 1
...
...
sk = zk‖Etk(z¯k) for 0 ≤ tk ≤ 2n+k−1 − 1
where zi and z¯i are D-morphic preimages of the de Bruijn sequence si−1. This is
an equivalence between the recurrence relation (5.1) and the construction of a de
Bruijn sequence of order (n + k) from a de Bruijn sequence of order n when the
concatenation is performed at the conjugate pair ei = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0) ∈ F2i
and eˆi = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0) ∈ F2i , n ≤ i ≤ n+ k − 1.
5.2.2 Linear Complexity of a Composited de Bruijn Se-
quence
We now determine the linear complexity of a de Bruijn sequence produced by
recurrence relation (5.1) in terms of the linear complexity of the starting span n
sequence generated by g. We use the notations of Section 5.2.1 in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let the linear complexity of a span n sequence generated by g be
optimal, i.e, 2n−2. Then the linear complexity of a de Bruijn sequence sk of period
2n+k generated by recurrence relation (5.1), denoted as LC(sk), is bounded below
by (2n+k − 2−∑ki=1 2mi) where 2mi | ti but 2mi+1 - ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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Proof For k = 1, the de Bruijn sequence s1 can be written as s1 = z1‖Et1(z¯1) for 0 ≤
t1 ≤ 2n − 1, where z1 = z′1‖e, z¯1 = z′′1‖eˆ. By Theorem 11 of [14],
LC(s1) ≥ 2n + 2n − 2− 2m1 = 2n+1 − 2− 2m1
where 2m1 | t1 but 2m1+1 - t1 as LC(s0) is greater than or equal to the linear
complexity of the starting span n sequence generated by g. As de Bruijn sequence
s2 is constructed from s1 in the same way, applying the same argument, the linear
complexity of sequence s2 is
LC(s2) ≥ 2n+1 + 2n+1 − 2− 2m1 − 2m2 = 2n+2 − 2− 2m1 − 2m2
where 2m2 | t2 but 2m2+1 - t2. In general, for k ≥ 1, the linear complexity bound of
sk is
LC(sk) ≥ 2n+k − 2−
k∑
i=1
2mi
where 2mi | ti but 2mi+1 - ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. 2
Since the exact linear complexity of a composited de Bruijn sequence depends
on the values of mi’s, we computed the linear complexity of many composited de
Bruijn sequences when the starting span n sequences generated by g have optimal
or near-optimal linear complexity for (n + k) = 11, 12, ..., and 20 and for different
values of k and n. Our experimental result shows that the linear complexities of
composited de Bruijn sequences are optimal or close to optimal, both of which are
much greater than the lower bound (2n+k−1 + n+ k).
Remark 5.2.2 In Theorem 5.2.1, the inequality is due to no knowing the exact
linear complexity of the de Bruijn sequence obtained from the span n sequence.
Remark 5.2.3 If L (≥ 2n−1 + 2) is the linear complexity of a span n sequence
generated by g, then the linear complexity of sk satisfies LC(sk) ≥ L+2n(2k−1)−∑k
i=1 2
mi .
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5.3 Cryptanalysis of a Composited NLFSR for a
de Bruijn Sequence
Since the function Ink contains (k+1) product-of-sum terms whose algebraic degrees
are high and the Hamming weights of these product-of-sum terms are low, as a
result, the function Ink can be approximated by a linear function or a constant
function with high probability. In this section, we first investigate the success
probability of approximating the function Ink by the zero function. We then study
the cycle decomposition of an approximated recurrence relation after a successful
approximation of the feedback function.
5.3.1 Hamming Weights of the Product-Of-Sum Terms
Before calculating the success probability of approximating the function Ink by the
zero function, we need to derive the Hamming weight of a product-of-sum term,
since Ink is a sum of (k + 1) product-of-sum terms.
Proposition 5.3.1 For an integer r ≥ 1, the Hamming weight of Xpr is equal to
2r.
Proof For any product term Xp0 , the r-order composition is of the form
Xpr =
∏
i∈Zpo
Ui ·
∏
i∈Zpe
Vi
where Ui is a sum of 2
c variables and Vi is a sum of 2
c variables and constant 1, c
is the Hamming weight of r. For simplicity, we assume that r = 2l, l ≥ 0. To find
the Hamming weight of Xpr , there are two cases arise.
Case I: When 1 ≤ p ≤ r + 1
If r = 2l, then Ui and Vj can be written as Ui = xi + xi+r, i ∈ Zpo , Vj = (xj +
xj+r + 1), j ∈ Zpe , respectively. Xpr = 1 if and only if Ui = 1 and Vj = 1 for all
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i ∈ Zpo and j ∈ Zpe . This implies
x1 = 1 + x1+r = 1 + x1+2r = · · · = 1 + xl1 = 0/1
x2 = x2+r = x2+2r = · · · = xl2 = 0/1
...
...
xp = 1 + xp+r = 1 + xp+2r = · · · = 1 + xln = 0/1, if p is odd
xp = xp+r = xp+2r = · · · = xlp = 0/1, if p is even
where li ≤ p + r, i = 1, 2, ..., p. Note that Xpr is a function in (p + r) variables.
For an (p + r)-tuple with Xpr = 1, the values at 2p positions are determined by
the values at p positions, which follows from the above set of equations and the
remaining (p+r−2p) positions can take any binary values. Hence, the total number
of (p+ r)-tuples for which Xpr = 1 is given by 2
p · 2r−p = 2r.
Case II: When p ≥ r + 1
Similarly, Xpr = 1 if and only if Ui = 1 and Vj = 1 for all i ∈ Zpo and j ∈ Zpe . This
implies
x1 = 1 + x1+r = 1 + x1+2r = · · · = 1 + xl1 = 0/1
x2 = x2+r = x2+2r = · · · = xl2 = 0/1
...
...
xr−1 = 1 + x2r−1 = · · · = 1 + xlr−1 = 0/1
xr = x2r = · · · = xlr = 0/1
where li ≤ (p + r), i = 1, 2, ..., r. According to the above system of equations, the
binary values at (p+r) positions are determined by the binary values at r positions
and these r positions can take any values. Hence, the total number of (p+r)-tuples
for which Xpr = 1 is given by 2
r.
Considering Ui = 1 and Vj = 1 for all i ∈ Zpo and j ∈ Zpe as a system of linear
equations with p equations and (p + r) unknown variables over F2, it follows that
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the Hamming weight of Xpr is equal to the number of solutions of the system of
linear equations, which is equal to 2p+r−r = 2r for any positive integer r. 2
Proposition 5.3.2 For any integer r ≥ 1, the Hamming weight of Jn−1r is equal
to 2r.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3.1. 2
Proposition 5.3.3 For any integer k ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2, the Hamming weight of
function Ink is equal to 2
k+1. One can approximate function Ink by the zero function
with probability (1− 1
2n−1 − 12n+k−1 ).
Proof By Proposition 5.3.1, the Hamming weight of Xn+k−1−jj , i.e, H(X
n+k−1−j
j ) is
equal to 2j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k−1. Note thatXn+k−1−jj = 1 is a system of linear equations
with (n+k−1−j) equations and (n+k−1) unknown variables and Supp(Xn+k−1−jj )
contains the set of all solutions. It is not hard to show that the support of Xn+k−1−ii
and Xn+k−1−jj are disjoint for 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n− 1. Again, (∪k−2j=0Supp(Xn+k−1−jj )) ⊂
Supp(Jn−1k ), and Supp(X
n+k−1
k−1 ) and Supp(J
n−1
k ) are disjoint. Then the cardinality
of the support of Ink is equal to (2
k+2k−1−∑k−2j=0 2j) = (2k+2k−1−2k−1+1) = 2k+1.
Hence, the Hamming weight of Ink is 2
k + 1.
Since the Hamming weight of Ink is 2
k + 1, the number of inputs for which Ink
takes the value zero is equal to (2n+k−1 − 2k − 1). Hence, one can approximate the
function Ink by the zero function with probability (1− 12n−1 − 12n+k−1 ). 2
Proposition 5.3.4 For any n, k ≥ 1, the nonlinearity of function Ink is equal to
NInk = H(I
n
k ) = 2
k + 1 for n > 3.
Proof It is well-known that the nonlinearity of a Boolean function can be obtained
by calculating the minimum distance between the function and all affine functions
[23]. In Proposition 5.3.3, we calculated the cardinality of Supp(Ink ), which is
equal to (2k + 1). The minimum distance between Ink and all affine functions is
achieved only for the zero function, and that is equal to (2k + 1). For all other
nonzero functions, the least distance between Ink and an affine function can be
(2n+k−2− (2k + 1)). For n > 3, (2n+k−2− (2k + 1)) > (2k + 1). Therefore, for n > 3,
the nonlinearity of Ink equals the Hamming weight of I
n
k . 2
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For a small value of k, the function Ink can be approximated by the zero function
or a linear function due to its low nonlinearity.
5.3.2 Cycle Structure of an Approximated Recurrence Re-
lation
By Propositions 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, the function Ink can be approximated by the zero
function with probability about (1 − 1
2n−1 ). As a consequence, Eq. (5.1) can be
approximated as follows
Rnk,a(x0, x1, ..., xn+k) = ((xn + x0) +G(x1, x2, ..., xn−1)) ◦ ψk (5.4)
= g(x0, x2, ..., xn−1) ◦ ψk.
The recurrence relation Rnk,a = 0 is called an approximated recurrence relation.
In the following proposition, we provide the cycle structure of an approximated
recurrence relation.
Lemma 5.3.5 For an integer k ≥ 1, Ω(Rnk,a) = Ω(g) ⊕ Ω(ψk), i.e., any sequence
x ∈ Ω(Rnk,a) can be written as x = b + c, where b’s minimal polynomial is the
same as the minimal polynomial of a span n sequence that is generated by g and
c’s minimal polynomial is (1 + x)k and ⊕ denotes the direct sum operation.
Proof Let s be a span n sequence generated by g and let h(x) the minimal poly-
nomial of s. Then, h(x) = h1(x) · h2(x) · · ·hr(x), where hi’s are distinct irreducible
polynomials of degree less than or equal to n and the value of r depends on the
sequence s, see [45, 48, 82]. If hi(x) = (1 + x) for some i, then the sequence s
is not a span n sequence. On the other hand, the minimal polynomial of ψk is
(1 + x)k. Again, the minimal polynomial of a sequence generated by ψk is a factor
of (1 + x)k. As h(x) does not contain the factor (1 + x), the minimal polynomial
of s and the minimal polynomial of ψk are relatively prime with each other. Then,
by Lemma 3.2.3, any sequence x ∈ Ω(Rnk,a) can be represented by x = b+ c where
b ∈ Ω(g) and c ∈ Ω(ψk). Hence, the cycle decomposition of Rnk,a is a direct sum of
Ω(g) and Ω(ψk), i.e., Ω(Rnk,a) = Ω(g)⊕ Ω(ψk). 2
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Proposition 5.3.6 The cycle decomposition of Rnk,a, i.e., Ω(R
n
k,a) contains 2 ·
(Γ2(k) + 1) cycles with (Γ2(k) + 1) cycles of period at least (2
n− 1) and (Γ2(k) + 1)
cycles of period at most 2dlog2 ke, where Γ2(k) is the number of all coset leaders
modulo (2k − 1).
Proof For any positive integer k ≥ 1, the cycle decomposition of ψk is the cy-
cle decomposition of polynomial (1 + x)k, which contains sequences with period
2dlog2 ie, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and the number of cycles is given by (Γ2(k) + 1) including the
zero cycle (see [43], Th. 3.4, page-42). Again, the cycle decomposition of g contains
only two cycles, one is a cycle of length 2n − 1 and the other one is the zero cycle
of length one. Therefore, by Lemma 5.3.5, Ω(Rnk,a) contains 2 · (Γ2(k) + 1) cycles
where (Γ2(k) + 1) cycles are of length at least 2
n − 1 and (Γ2(k) + 1) cycles are of
length at most 2dlog2 ke. 2
Remark 5.3.7 If the function Rnk is approximated by the function (R
n
k,a + J
n−1
k )
with high probability, then the number of cycles in Ω(Rnk,a+J
n−1
k ) equals (Γ2(k)+1),
and the period of a sequence in Ω(Rnk,a + J
n−1
k ) is bounded below by 2
n.
Proposition 5.3.8 Let Ω(Rnk,a) be the cycle decomposition of R
n
k,a. For any se-
quence x ∈ Ω(Rnk,a) with period at least 2n−1, the linear complexity of x is bounded
below by the linear complexity of the sequence generated by g.
Proof We already showed in Lemma 5.3.5 that any sequence x ∈ Ω(Rnk,a) can be
written as x = b + c where b ∈ Ω(g), c ∈ Ω(ψk), and the minimal polynomial of b
is coprime with the minimal polynomial of c. Since the minimal polynomial of b is
coprime with the minimal polynomial of c, the linear complexity of x is equal to
the sum of the linear complexities of b and c. Therefore, the linear complexity of
x is greater or equal to the linear complexity of sequence b generated by g. Hence,
the assertion is established. 2
Remark 5.3.9 Using recurrence relation (5.1) with G as a linear function, one
can generate a de Bruijn sequence with period 2n+k and linear complexity at least
(2n+k−1 +n+k+ 1) for an arbitrary positive integer k. Nevertheless, this de Bruijn
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sequence is not suitable for using it as a building block in designing a cryptographic
primitives such as PRSGs or stream ciphers, because in the entire sequence most
of the bits are linearly related to the internal state bits and only at H(Ink ) positions
the bits are nonlinearly related to the internal state bits due to the nonlinear term
Ink , which is vulnerable against a cryptanalytic attack. For a more detailed analysis
on both linearly and nonlinearly composed de Bruijn sequences, we refer the reader
to [71]. On the other hand, if the function g is nonlinear, then the bits of the de
Bruijn sequence will be nonlinearly related to the internal state bits of the NLFSR,
thereby a cryptanalytic attack would be more complex.
Propositions 5.3.3, 5.3.6, and 5.3.8 suggest that in order to generate a strong
de Bruijn sequence by the composited construction, the starting span n sequence
generated by g should have good randomness properties, particularly, long period
and an optimal or near-optimal linear complexity. If an attacker is successful in
approximating the feedback function Rnk by the feedback function (g ◦ψk), then the
security of the sequence generated by Rnk depends on the security of the sequence
generated by g. If the de Bruijn sequences are used as building blocks in PRNGs
and stream ciphers, an attack would not have direct access to a de Bruijn sequence.
5.4 Designing Parameters for Cryptographic de
Bruijn Sequences
This section presents a few examples of strong de Bruijn sequences with period
2n+k that are generated by an (n + k)-stage NLFSR for 19 ≤ n ≤ 24 and k = 16.
In order to generate de Bruijn sequences with period 240, we choose n = 24 and
k = 16.
5.4.1 Tradeoff Between n and k
We observe that the parameter n is the measure of unpredictability of a sequence
and the parameter k is the measure of efficiency for computing the feedback func-
tion. In the composited construction, one can construct an (n+k)-stage recurrence
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relation by choosing a small value of n and a large value of k, since for a small value
of n it is easy to find a span n sequence and the success probability of approximat-
ing the feedback function is low (see Proposition 5.3.3). However, for such a choice
of the parameters, the recurrence relation contains many product-of-sum terms, as
a result, the function Ink may not be calculated efficiently. Thus, for generating a
strong de Bruijn sequence of period 2n+k efficiently, one needs to choose the param-
eters in such a way that the nonlinearly generated span n sequence is large enough
and the number of product-of-sum terms in Ink is as small as possible.
5.4.2 Examples of de Bruijn Sequences with Large Periods
Let {xj}j≥0 be a binary span n sequence generated by an n-stage recurrence relation,
defined in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4, for a suitable choice of a decimation number
d, a primitive polynomial p(x), and a t-tap position
xn = x0 + fd(xr1 , xr2 , ..., xrt) (5.5)
where (r1, r2, ..., rt) with 0 < r1 < r2 < · · · < rt < n is called a t-tap position and fd
is a WG transformation. Here a decimation number is a coset leader that is coprime
with 2t−1. Then the recurrence relation (5.3) with G as a WG transformation can
be written as
Rn16 = xn+16 + xn + x0 + x16 + fd(xr1 + xr1+16, ..., xrt + xrt+16) + J
n−1
16
+Xn15 +X
n+1
14 + · · ·+Xn+141 +Xn+15 = 0 (5.6)
where Jn−116 =
∏n−1
i=1 (xi + xi+16) and X
p
k = T
p
o,k · T pe,k, n ≤ p ≤ n + 15, 1 ≤ k ≤ 15,
T po,k and T
p
e,k are given in Table 5.3. The recurrence relation (5.6) can generate
a de Bruijn sequence for a suitable choice of a decimation number d, a primitive
polynomial p(x), and a t-tap position. Following the representation of span n
sequences in Chapter 4, our de Bruijn sequences are uniquely represented by the
following four parameters:
1. the decimation number d,
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2. the primitive polynomial p(x),
3. the t-tap position (r1, r2, ..., rt), and
4. Ink .
Table 5.4 presents a few examples of cryptographically strong de Bruijn se-
quences with periods in the range of 235 and 240. In Table 5.4, the computations
for the linear complexity of the 24-stage span n sequence has not finished yet.
However, currently the lower bound of the linear complexity is at least 222. For
more instances of span n sequences with an optimal or near-optimal linear span,
see Chapter 4 and Appendix A.
Table 5.4: De Bruijn sequences with periods ≥ 235
WG over F2t Decimation Basis Polynomial t-tap positions span n Linear Span, Ik, Period
t d (c0, c1, ..., ct−1) (r1, r2, ..., rt) n span n k 2n+k
13 1207 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22) 24 −− 16 240
13 55 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17) 24 −− 16 240
8 53 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15) 21 221 − 5 16 237
8 29 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19) 21 221 − 26 16 237
8 31 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19) 20 220 − 6 16 236
8 1 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) (1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15) 19 219 − 2 16 235
7 5 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16) 20 220 − 7 16 236
7 19 (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 18) 19 219 − 2 16 235
5 1 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) (5, 10, 12, 18, 19) 20 220 − 2 16 236
Remark 5.4.1 Any feedback function g that generates a span n sequence can be
used in recurrence relation (5.3) for producing a long de Bruijn sequence. To the
best of our knowledge, Table 5.4 contains a set of (longest) de Bruijn sequences
whose algebraic representations of the recurrence relations are known. We use the
structured search for producing span n sequences to be used in the composited
construction as we have seen in Chapter 4 that the structured search can produce
span n sequences with optimal linear complexity in a systematic manner.
5.5 Implementation of Function In16
We note that Ink is the most complicated module in the feedback function R
n
k = 0.
Moreover, the function g ◦ ψk can be chosen efficiently. For a fixed value of n
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and k, Ink is fixed, but the function g is different for different span n sequences.
This section provides some techniques for optimizing the number additions in the
product-of-sum terms in Ink for k = 16, and give an estimation for the number of
multiplications and the time required for computing the function Ink in terms of n
and k.
5.5.1 Optimizing the Number of Additions for In16
For k = 16, Ink in recurrence relation (5.6) contains 17 product-of-sum terms. For
example, for n = 24 and k = 16, one needs 2116 addition operations for computing
all product terms in Ink . In Table 5.3, we can observe that many partial-sum
terms appear in different product terms. By reusing the result of a previously
computed sum term, we can optimize the number of additions. For k = 16, three
optimization rules are described in Table 5.5. According to the above three rules
Table 5.5: Optimization rules for addition
Optimization Rule I (OR-I)
Y 11,i = xi + xi+1 Y
2
1,i = xi+2 + xi+3 Y
1
3,i = xi+8 + xi+9 Y
2
3,i = xi+10 + xi+11
Y 12,i = xi+4 + xi+5 Y
2
2,i = xi+6 + xi+7 Y
1
4,i = xi+12 + xi+13 Y
2
4,i = xi+14 + xi+15
Y1,i = Y
1
1,i + Y
2
1,i Y2,i = Y
1
2,i + Y
2
2,i Y0,2,i = xi + xi+2 Y4,6,i = xi+4 + xi+6
Y3,i = Y
1
3,i + Y
2
3,i Y4,i = Y
1
4,i + Y
2
4,i Y8,10,i = xi+8 + xi+10 Y12,14,i = xi+12 + xi+14
Q0,i = xi Q4,i = xi + xi+4 Q3,i = Y1,i Q7,i = Q3,i + Y2,i
Q8,i = xi + xi+8 Q12,i = Q4,i + xi+8 + xi+12 Q11,i = Q3,i + Y3,i Q15,i = Q7,i + Y3,i + Y4,i
Q2,i = Y0,2,i Q6,i = Q2,i + Y4,6,i Q1,i = Y
1
1,i Q5,i = Q1,i + Y
1
2,i
Q10,i = Q2,i + Y8,10,i Q14,i = Q6,i + Y8,10,i + Y12,14,i Q9,i = Q1,i + Y
1
3,i Q13,i = Q5,i + Y
1
3,i + Y
1
4,i
Optimization Rule II (OR-II)
Y 11,i = xi + xi+1 Y
2
1,i = xi+2 + xi+3 Y1,i = Y
1
1,i + Y
2
1,i Y2,i = Y
1
2,i + Y
2
2,i
Y 12,i = xi+4 + xi+5 Y
2
2,i = xi+6 + xi+7 Yi = Y1,i + Y2,i Y0,2,i = xi + xi+2
Y4,6,i = xi+4 + xi+6 Y8,10,i = xi+8 + xi+10
W0,i = xi W1,i = Y
1
1,i W4,i = xi + xi+4 W5,i = Y
1
1,i + Y
1
2,i
W2,i = Y0,2,i W3,i = Y1,i W6,i = Y0,2,i + Y4,6,i W7,i = Y1,i + Y2,i
W8,i = xi + xi+8 W9,i = Y
1
1,i + xi+8 + xi+9 W10,i = Y0,2,i + Y8,10,i
Optimization Rule III (OR-III)
Y1,i = xi + xi+1 Y2,i = xi+2 + xi+3 Z0,1 = xi Z1,i = Y1,i
Z2,i = xi + xi+2 Z3,i = Y1,i + Y2,i Z4,i = xi + xi+4
given in Table 5.5, the product terms in Table 5.3 can be written as that are given
in Table 5.6. Applying the rules given in Tables 5.5, the total number of additions
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Table 5.6: Product terms of the recurrence relation (5.6)
T no,15 =
∏
i∈Zno Q15,i T
n+1
o,14 =
∏
i∈Zn+1o Q14,i
T n+2o,13 =
∏
i∈Zn+2o Q13,i T
n+3
o,12 =
∏
i∈Zn+3o Q12,i
T n+4o,11 =
∏
i∈Zn+4o Q11,i T
n+5
o,10 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q10,i
T n+6o,9 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q9,i ·W9,n+6 T n+7o,8 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q11,i
∏n+7
i=n+6,oddW8,i
T n+8o,7 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q7,i ·
∏n+8
i=n+6,oddW7,i T
n+9
o,6 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q6,i ·
∏n+9
i=n+6,oddW6,i
T n+10o,5 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q5,i ·
∏n+10
i=n+6,oddW5,i T
n+11
o,4 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q4,i ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,oddW4,i
T n+12o,3 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q3,i ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,oddW3,i · Z3,n+12 T n+13o,2 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q2,i ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,oddW2,i ·
∏n+13
i=n+12,odd Z2,i
T n+14o,1 =
∏
i∈Zn+5o Q1,i ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,oddW1,i ·
∏n+13
i=n+12,odd Z1,i · (xn+14 + xn+15) T n+15o,0 =
∏
i∈Zn+16o xi
T ne,15 =
∏
i∈Zne (Q15,i + 1) T
n+1
e,14 =
∏
i∈Zn+1e (Q14,i + 1)
T n+2e,13 =
∏
i∈Zn+2e (Q13,i + 1) T
n+3
e,12 =
∏
i∈Zn+3e (Q12,i + 1)
T n+4e,11 =
∏
i∈Zn+4e (Q11,i + 1) T
n+5
e,10 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q10,i + 1)
T n+6e,9 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q9,i + 1) · (W9,n+6 + 1) T n+7e,8 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q11,i + 1)
∏n+7
i=n+6,even(W8,i + 1)
T n+8e,7 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q7,i + 1) ·
∏n+8
i=n+6,even(W7,i + 1) T
n+9
e,6 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q6,i + 1) ·
∏n+9
i=n+6,even(W6,i + 1)
T n+10e,5 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q5,i + 1) ·
∏n+10
i=n+6,even(W5,i + 1) T
n+11
e,4 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q4,i + 1) ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,even(W4,i + 1)
T n+12e,3 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q3,i + 1) ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,even(W3,i + 1) · (Z3,n+12 + 1) T n+13e,2 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q2,i + 1) ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,odd(W2,i + 1) ·
∏n+13
i=n+12,even(Z2,i + 1)
T n+14e,1 =
∏
i∈Zn+5e (Q1,i + 1) ·
∏n+11
i=n+6,even(W1,i + 1) ·
∏n+13
i=n+12,even(Z1,i + 1) · (xn+14 + xn+15 + 1) T n+15e,0 =
∏
i∈Zn+16e (xi + 1)
required for computing In16 is given by (n− 1 + 32 · dn+52 e+ 32 · bn+52 c+ 3 · 18 + 3 ·
19 + 2 · 5 + 2 · 6 + 3 + 16) = (32 · (n+ 5) + n+ 151), since the numbers of additions
required for OR-I, OR-II and OR-III in Table 5.5 are 32, 18 and 5, respectively.
For n = 24, the number of additions after applying the above three rules is equal
to 1103.
5.5.2 Total Number of Multiplications and Time Complex-
ity for Computing Ink
The maximum number of multiplications required for computing Ink is given by∑n+k−1
i=n−1 (i− 1) = (n(k + 1) + (k−1)(k−2)2 − 3) as one requires (i− 1) multiplications
to compute a product of i numbers. In the following proposition, we estimate the
time required for computing the function Ink .
Proposition 5.5.1 The time required for computing the function Ink is approxi-
mately given by d((k + 1) log2 n+ k(k−1)2n log2 e)e if k << n.
Proof To compute a product-of-sum term Xpk , n ≤ p ≤ n+ k − 1, one requires at
most dlog2 pe-time. Since the function Ink contains (k + 1) product terms, the time
complexity for computing Ink is given by
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n+k−1∑
p=n−1
dlog2 pe ≈ dlog2(nk+1(1−
1
n
)
k−1∏
i=1
(1 +
i
n
))e
≈ d((k + 1) log2 n+
k(k − 1)
2n
log2 e)e if k << n.
2
5.6 Summary of Chapter 5
In this chapter, we first refined the composited construction for producing a long
period de Bruijn sequence from a short period span n sequence through the com-
position operation. We then determined the linear complexity of a composited de
Bruijn sequence and performed an analysis of the feedback function of a compos-
ited de Bruijn sequence from the cryptographic point of view. In our analysis, we
studied an approximation of the feedback functions, the cycle structure of an ap-
proximated feedback function, and determined the linear complexity of a sequence
generated by an approximated feedback function. In addition, we presented a com-
pact algebraic representation of an (n + 16)-stage NLFSR, and a few instances of
composited de Bruijn sequences with periods in the range of 235 and 240 together
with the discussions of their implementation issues. A long period de Bruijn se-
quence produced by the composited construction can be used as a building block to
design secure lightweight cryptographic primitives such as pseudorandom sequence
generators and stream ciphers with desired randomness properties.
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Chapter 6
Warbler Family: A Lightweight
PRNG Family for Smart Devices
In this chapter, we present Warbler family – a new pseudorandom number generator
family based on nonlinear feedback shift registers with desired randomness proper-
ties. In Section 6.1, we provide a detailed architectural description of the Warbler
family, which is composed of two building blocks, namely a combination of modi-
fied de Bruijn blocks, and a nonlinear feedback WG generator. Then, we derive the
randomness properties of sequences produced by the combination of modified de
Bruijn blocks in Section 6.1.1, and give a general description of the initilization and
running phases in Section 6.3. Randomness properties of output sequences of the
Warbler family are inherited from the combination of modified de Bruijn blocks. In
Section 6.4, some criteria for the selection of parameters of the Warbler family are
proposed to offer a maximum level of security. Finally, we conclude this chapter in
Section 6.5. The contents of the chapter can be found in [75].
6.1 Description of the Warbler PRNG Family
This section describes the general architecture of the Warbler PRNG family. Warbler
is composed of a combination of modified de Bruijn blocks (CMDB) and a nonlinear
feedback Welch-Gong (WG) generator (NFWGG) where the CMDB can be regarded
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as a combinatorial generator which consists of a number of primitive nonlinear
feedback shift registers. On the other hand, the nonlinear feedback WG generator
can be regarded as an NLFSR over an extension field and which is similar to the key
initialization phase of the WG cipher family [94]. Randomness properties of output
sequences are inherited from the CMDB. The CMDB is protected by two different
filtering functions. We now explain the design of Warbler whose CMDB contains
m primitive NLFSRs of different lengths, and nonlinear feedback WG generator is
defined over F2n . A block diagram of the Warbler family is provided in Figure 6.1.
. . . f 
γ 
NLFSR-l 
NLFSR-l1 
NLFSR-l2 
NLFSR-lm-1 
NLFSR-lm 
Combination of Modified  
 de Bruijn Blocks (CMDB) 
Nonlinear Feedback WG Generator 
                      (NFWGG) 
n-bit 
1-bit 
WG 
n-bit 
1-bit 
Buffer 
Figure 6.1: A general architecture of the Warbler family
6.1.1 Randomness Properties of the CMDB of Warbler Fam-
ily
The combination of modified de Bruijn blocks of Warbler family is constituted by
m distinct primitive NLFSRs whose recurrence relations are defined as (3.2). Let
l1, l2, ..., lm be the lengths of the primitive NLFSRs where li’s are pairwise coprime
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with each other. We denote by NLFSR-li the NLFSR of length li with feedback
function fi, which generates a span n sequence of period 2
li − 1 that is denoted by
ai = {ai,j}j≥0. We choose the NLFSRs in such a way that the linear complexities
of the span n sequences are optimal or near-optimal. Let f be a Boolean function
in m variables. Using sequences ai’s and function f , we generate a new binary
sequence s = {sj} as
sj = f(a1,j, a2,j, ..., am,j), j ≥ 0. (6.1)
We note that the sequence s can be regarded as an output sequence of a combina-
torial generator with NLFSRs. The randomness properties of sequence s depend on
Boolean function f and primitive NLFSRs. We now present the period and linear
complexity of the binary sequence s below.
Proposition 6.1.1 Let l1, l2, ..., lm be the lengths of the NLFSRs which are coprime
with each other, then the period of the output sequence s is given by
m∏
i=1
(2li − 1).
The lengths of the NLFSRs are chosen to be co-prime with each other for achiev-
ing the maximum period of the sequence s. Assume that the algebraic degree of
f in Eq. (6.1) is k and the indices {ii, i2, ..., ik} appear in the leading monomial of
f . For the maximum linear span or complexity of sequence s, we make an arrange-
ment of k NLFSRs in descending order as li1 > li2 > · · · > lik . Then we have the
following proposition for the linear complexity.
Proposition 6.1.2 Let each NLFSR produces a span n sequence with optimal lin-
ear span (2li − 2), then the maximum linear complexity of sequence s is bounded
below by approximately
k∏
j=1
(2lij − 2) ≈ 2
∑k
j=1 lij for the above arrangement of the
NLFSRs. The exact linear complexity of sequence s is equal to f(2l1−2, · · · , 2lm−2).
For the NLFSR case, the proofs of the period and linear complexity can be done
in the same way as proved for the LFSR case in [62]. For details, we refer the reader
to [62].
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Proposition 6.1.3 Let l1, l2, ..., lm be the lengths of the NLFSRs which are co-
prime with each other, then the number of occurrence of an m-tuple (x1, x2, ..., xm)
produced by m NLFSRs is equal to 1
2m
∏m
j=1(2
lj − 1 + (−1)xj+1), xj ∈ F2.
Proof We prove the result by the mathematical induction on m. Let m = 2. Let
a = {a0, a1, ..., aM−1} and b = {b0, b1, ..., bN−1} be two binary span n sequences of
period M = (2l1 − 1) and N = (2l2 − 1), respectively with gcd(M,N) = 1. We can
write these two sequences in the interleave form as
(a0, b0) (a1, b1) ... (aN−1, bN−1)
(aN , b0) (aN+1, b1) ... (a2N−1, bN−1)
(a2N , b0) (a2N+1, b1) ... (a3N−1, bN−1)
... ... ... ...
(a(M−1)N,b0) (a(M−1)N+1, b1) ... (aMN−1, bN−1)
 .
Denote δ = (M−1)(N−1)
22
. Then the number of (x, y), denoted as #(x, y), is given by
#(x, y) =

δ if x = 0, y = 0
δ + 2(M − 1) if x = 0, y = 1
δ + 2(N − 1) if x = 1, y = 0
δ + 2(M +N − 2) + 4 if x = 1, y = 1.
Therefore, the result is true for m = 2. We now show that the result is also true
for m = 3. Let c = {c0, c1, ..., cP−1} be another binary span n sequence with period
P = 2l3 − 1 which is co-prime to both M and N . We define a new sequence
AjN+i = (ajN+i, bi), 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤M − 1 with period MN . In the similar
fashion we can write the sequences AjN+i and ci in the interleave form as
(A0, c0) (A1, c1) ... (AP−1, cP−1)
(AP , c0) (AP+1, c1) ... (A2P−1, cP−1)
(A2P , c0) (A2P+1, c1) ... (A3P−1, cP−1)
... ... ... ...
(A(MN−1)P , c0) (A(MN−1)P+1, c1) ... (AMNP−1, cP−1)
 .
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From the interleave structure, the number of binary 3-tuple (x, y, z), denoted by
#(x, y, z), is calculated as
#(x, y, z) =
(M + (−1)x+1)(N + (−1)y+1)(P + (−1)z+1)
23
=
(2l1 − 1 + (−1)x+1)(2l2 − 1 + (−1)y+1)(2l3 − 1 + (−1)z+1)
23
.
We assume that the result is true for m = t. Assume that {Wi} is a t-tuple sequence
of period R =
∏t
i=1(2
li−1) and each t-tuple (x1, x2, ..., xt) occurs
∏t
i=1(2
li−1+(−1)xi+1)
2t
times. Let q = {qi} be a span n sequence of period Y = (2lt+1 − 1). We now form
a new sequence Si = (WjY+i, qi), 0 ≤ i ≤ Y − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ R − 1 with period Y R,
and the sequence can also be written in the form of an interleave structure as the
above. The number of binary (t+1)-tuple (x1, x2, ..., xt, xt+1) is
∏t
i=1(2
li−1+(−1)xi+1)
2t
·
(2lt+1−1+(−1)xt+1+1)
2
as the sequence q contains (2
lt+1−1+(−1)y+1)
2
y’s, y = 0, 1. Hence,
the result is true for m = (t + 1). Thus, any m span n sequences of periods
2li − 1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where each li’s are co-prime to each other can be written in
the form of the interleave structure and the number of occurrence of an m-tuple
x = (x1, x2, ..., xm) is given by
1
2m
∏m
j=1(2
lj − 1 + (−1)xj+1). 2
When the number of occurrences of eachm-tuple is known, the imbalanced range
of an output sequence can be calculated from the truth table of the function f . The
imbalance range also depends on the arrangement of the NLFSRs. For sequence s,
the imbalance range needs to be minimized by keeping the linear complexity high.
The randomness properties of the output sequence s are summarized as follows:
1. The period P =
m∏
i=i
(2li − 1)
2. The linear complexity at least
k∏
j=1
(2lij − 2)
3. The imbalance range
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 12m
 ∑
x:f(x)=1
m∏
j=1
(2lj − 1 + (−1)xj+1)−
∑
x:f(x)=0
m∏
j=1
(2lj − 1 + (−1)xj+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣.
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We now produce a sequence t= {tk} over F2n from sequence s as
tk = (snk, snk+1, ..., snk+n−1) ∈ F2n , k ≥ 0
where n 6≡ 0 mod 3 since a WG transformation is defined over F2n when n 6≡ 0 mod
3.
Proposition 6.1.4 The period of sequence t over F2n is equal to Pt,
Pt =

n · P
gcd(n, P )
if n - P
P
n
if n | P
where P =
∏m
i=i(2
li−1). For the maximum period of sequence t, gcd(n, 2li−1) = 1
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Since the characteristics of F2 and F2n are the same, the linear complexity of
sequence t is bounded below by the linear complexity of sequence s [63]. We use
the sequence t in the nonlinear feedback WG generator for providing nonlinearity,
and to bound the period and linear complexity of the output sequence.
Remark 6.1.5 Span n sequences with optimal or near-optimal linear complexity
for the CMDB can be found by the structured search.
6.1.2 Description of the Nonlinear Feedback WG Genera-
tor
The nonlinear feedback WG generator of Warbler has two components, namely a
nonlinear recurrence relation and a WG transformation module. The nonlinear
recurrence relation is composed of a primitive polynomial, the feedback sequence t,
and one bit feedback from the WG module, and that is used to update the internal
state of the nonlinear feedback WG generator. Note that the WG transformation
module contains two WG transformations where one WG transformation is used
in the nonlinear recurrence relation and another one is used to filter the output
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sequence. Let p(x) = c0 + c1x+ . . .+ cr−1xl−1 + xl be a primitive polynomial over
F2n . Let z = {zi} be a sequence generated by an l-stage NLFSR whose nonlinear
recurrence relation is defined as
zl+i = c0zi + c1zi+1 + · · ·+ cl−1zl+i−1 + ti + wi, i ≥ 0 (6.2)
where wi = (0, 0, · · · , 0, g(zl−1+i)) and g is a WG transformation. The output
sequence o = {oi} of Warbler is obtained as
oi = WG(zl+i−1), i ≥ 0 (6.3)
whereWG(·) is a WG transformation defined in Section 3.4.1. The reason for choos-
ing WG transformations is that a WG transformation has excellent cryptographic
properties such as high algebraic degree, high nonlinearity, 2-level autocorrelation
and high linear span.
In Eq. (6.3), it can be noticed that each output bit oi is related to (n · m)
independent variables of the CMDB, since the function f is a function in m variables
and the sequence t is constructed by taking n bits from each NLFSR. This can also
be regarded as the CMDB is protected by a Boolean function with (n ·m) variables.
Property 4 The period of the output sequence o is a multiple of the period of
sequence t.
The proof of the above property follows from Theorem 3 of [58]. Moreover, the
linear span of the output sequence is greater than or equal to the linear span of
the sequence produced by the CMDB since the output sequence o can be written
in terms of the sequences s and z.
We obtain u-bit random numbers from the binary sequence o by taking disjoint
u-bit segments. Symbolically, u-bit random numbers {Rk}k≥0 are generated from
the output sequence o = {oi} as
Rk = (ouk, ouk+1, ..., ouk+u−1), k ≥ 0.
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We denote by Warbler(L,m, n, l) an instance of the Warbler family, which con-
tains m primitive NLFSRs in the CMDB and the NLWGG is defined over F2n ,
and the total length of the internal state of the CMDB is L and the length of the
internal state of the NLWGG is (n · l). We present two lightweight instances, War-
bler(35, 2, 5, 6) and Warbler(62, 3, 5, 6), of the Warbler family in Chapters 7 and 8,
respectively. The parameters of the Warbler family are summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Parameters description of the Warbler family
Description Parameters
Number of NLFSRs in the CMDB m
Length of NLFSR-li li
Feedback function of NLFSR-li fi
Combining function in the CMDB f
Finite field F2n n
Length of the NLFSR in the NFWGG l
Primitive polynomial in the NFWGG p(x)
Feedback function in the NFWGG g(x)
Filtering function WG(x)
6.2 Design Rationale
Warbler family is a lightweight PRNG family based on nonlinear feedback shift
registers, and is designed for smart devices such as RFID tags. The objective of
designing Warbler family is to design an NLFSR-based PRNG with guaranteed
randomness properties such as period and linear complexity. The strength of our
design is based on the difficulty of solving a large system of nonlinear multivariate
equations over the binary field, since an NLFSR-based PRNG can be reduced to
a system of nonlinear equations. The main reasons of employing NLFSRs in the
design are to thwart known cryptanalytic attacks such as algebraic attacks, cube
attacks, distinguishing attacks and discrete fourier transform (DFT) attacks against
stream ciphers, and make compatible to resource-constrained environments with
restriction on the speed, gate-count and power consumption. Another reason for
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employing multiple NLFSRs in the CMDB is to generate shift distinct sequences,
using one NLFSR it is impossible to generate shift distinct sequences for different
initial states. Some applications, for instance the EPC C1 Gen2 standard, demand
the output sequences to be shift distinct. Since the nonlinear feedback functions
are used to update the internal states, the complexity of the algebraic attack would
be high, and the attack may not be better than the exhaustive search. In our
design, it is hard to determine the exact period and linear complexity of an output
sequence and that depend on the initial state of the PRNG. As a result, the powerful
DFT attack can be resisted. Since the CMDB determines randomness properties
of output sequences, the CMDB is protected by two functions f(x) and WG(x).
Moreover, the output sequence filtered by the WG transformation WG(x) is related
to the internal state of the NFWGG. Consequently, the divide-and-conquer attack
cannot be mounted easily. The reason for selecting the nonlinear feedback WG
generator is that a WG transformation has excellent cryptographic properties such
as high algebraic degree, nonlinearity, linear span and WG transformations can be
used for both feedback and filtering purposes.
6.3 Key Initialization Phase of Warbler
We note that the total number of bits in Warbler is (
∑m
i=1 li + l · n). Based on the
lengths of the key and the initial vector (IV), we divide the whole internal state
bits (
∑m
i=1 li + l · n) into two parts. The key can be uploaded at the predefined
positions and the IV at the remaining positions. The internal state of Warbler in
the initialization phase is updated as follows.
a1,l1+i = a1,i + f1(a1,1+i, a1,2+i, ..., a1,l1+i−1) + oi, i ≥ 0,
a2,l2+i = a2,i + f2(a2,1+i, a2,2+i, ..., a2,l2+i−1) + oi, i ≥ 0,
...
...
am,lm+i = am,i + fm(am,1+i, am,2+i, ..., am,lm+i−1) + oi, i ≥ 0,
si+n−1 = f(a1,i, a2,i, ..., am,i), sj = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 2, i ≥ 0,
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ti = (si, ..., si+n−1) ∈ F2n , i ≥ 0,
zl+i = c0zi + c1z1+i + · · ·+ cl−1zl+i−1 + ti + wi, i ≥ 0,
o1+i = WG(zl+i−1), o0 = 0, i ≥ 0.
Let ` = max{l1, l2, ..., lm, l} be the maximum value among the lengths of the NLF-
SRs. We must apply the above initialization process for 2` rounds. The purpose
of the key initialization phase is to make a complex algebraic relation among the
key and IV bits. After ` rounds, all the key bits and IV bits would be in each
NLFSR as the output bit oi is fed in each NLFSR and the sequence t is added
to the NFWGG. We remember that the construction of sequence t in the running
phase and the initialization phase is different.
6.4 Optimal Security Conditions for the Warbler
Family
This section provides a list of criteria for choosing the parameters for an Warbler in-
stance in order to offer a maximum level of security. In [77], Mandal et al. proposed
a set of criteria for choosing the optimal parameters for a WG transformation in
the WG cipher family. As Warbler contains the NFWGG, the criteria for choosing
the parameters of an Warbler PRNG is a combination of the criteria for choosing
parameters of the NLFSRs in the modified de Bruijn block and the criteria for
optimal parameters of WG transformations. The parameters for an Warbler PRNG
are chosen as follows.
1. The lengths of the primitive NLFSRs in the CMDB should be as large as
possible, and the number of NLFSRs in the CMDB should be as small as
possible.
2. The linear span or linear complexity of a span n sequence generated by
NLFSR-li should be optimal (2
li−2) or near-optimal (2li−2−k), k << 2li−1.
3. The combining function f in Eq. (6.1) should have large algebraic degree,
90
correlation immunity, algebraic immunity, nonlinearity, and balance prop-
erty. The algebraic degree and balance property of f determine the linear
complexity and imbalanced range of the output sequence s. Moreover, the
high algebraic immunity and nonlinearity ensure the high linear complexity
of the sequence. In other words, it prevents from approximating the output
sequence to a low linear complexity as well as a low period sequence. Fur-
thermore, the function must be chosen carefully so that the period and linear
complexity of sequences produced by the CMDB cannot be reduced by setting
an initial state to some special initial states, for example weak initial states.
4. The WG transformation used for the feedback purpose should have maxi-
mum algebraic degree as it would help to prevent algebraic attacks and cube
attacks.
5. The WG transformation used for the filtering purpose must have the maxi-
mum algebraic degree and maximum algebraic immunity.
6. The WG transformation used for the filtering purpose should have nonlinear-
ity as large as possible.
7. The WG transformation used for filtering should have low k-normal value as
for large values k the internal state will have large bias. This condition is for
resisting Mihaljevic´ et al.’s attack.
Three criteria (4)− (6) for the WG transformations are presented in [77].
6.5 Summary of Chapter 6
This chapter presented a family of pseudorandom number generators, named War-
bler family for smart devices. Warbler family is a purely nonlinear feedback shift
register based PRNG family with desirable randomness properties. Randomness
properties of the output sequence of the Warbler family are derived. Parameter
selection criteria for the Warbler family are proposed for offering a maximum level
of security against known attacks. Two lightweight instances, Warbler(35, 2, 5, 6)
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and Warbler(62, 3, 5, 6), of Warbler family are presented in Chapters 7 and 8, re-
spectively. It is worth to mention that the Warbler family is a general family, which
can be applied to the case that requires higher security level by choosing suitable
parameters.
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Chapter 7
Warbler-I: A Lightweight PRNG
for the EPC C1 Gen2 RFID Tags
This chapter presents an instance, Warbler(35, 2, 5, 6), of the Warbler family, named
Warbler-I based on nonlinear feedback shift registers for low-cost EPCglobal Class-1
Generation-2 (EPC C1 Gen2 in short) RFID tags. The EPC C1 Gen2 standard
uses a couple of 16-bit random numbers in the tag identification protocol for iden-
tifying tags [29]. In Section 7.1, we review the previous proposals for the PRNG in
compliance to the EPC C1 Gen2 RFID tags . Then, we describe the details of the
design of Warbler-I in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3.1, the security properties of the
proposed PRNG are analyzed in great detail by employing cryptographic statistical
tests specified by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard as well as the NIST test suite. Vari-
ous cryptanalysis techniques have been applied to demonstrate the attack resistant
properties of the proposed PRNG in Section 7.3.2. Furthermore, a hardware im-
plementation on a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA device shows that the new PRNG can
be implemented using 46 slices. The details of the hardware implementation can
be found in [72]. Section 7.6 summarizes the contribution of this chapter. The
research results of this chapter have been published in [72–74]. In [72,74], Warbler-I
is known by the name Warbler.
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7.1 Motivation and Related Work
For most RFID applications, the security and privacy are important and even cru-
cial requirements [60]. Since most protocols for securing RFID systems proposed
so far are based on the usage of an on-board true random and/or pseudorandom
number generator (TRNG/PRNG), a number of solutions have been proposed in
the literature for implementing TRNGs/PRNGs on RFID tags [4,18,57,85,97]. All
of the proposals for TRNGs are based on analog circuits that sample a random
physical phenomenon like thermal noise. To the best of our knowledge, only three
PRNGs have been proposed for the EPC C1 Gen2 passive tags [18, 85, 97], among
which two proposals use TRNGs as a component and the security properties of
those two PRNGs rely on the security of TRNGs. The motivation for designing
Warbler-I is to reduce the high power consumption and area, and to increase the
throughput of the PRNG. The basic idea of our design is to replace the TRNG
in [18,85] by a lightweight pseudorandom sequence generator with good statistical
properties.
7.1.1 Che et al.’s PRNG
Che et al. [18] designed a PRNG based on a combination of an oscillator-based
TRNG and a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with 16 stages. In their design,
the TRNG is implemented using an analog circuit and exploits thermal noise of the
circuit. To introduce randomness, one truly random bit from the TRNG is XORed
with each bit of a 16-bit sequence generated from the LFSR. In 16 clock cycles, a
16-bit random number is generated by the PRNG. Due to the linear structure, Che
et al.’s scheme has been attacked by Melia-Segui et al. in [85] with a high success
probability (n+1)
8n
, where n is the length of the LFSR.
7.1.2 Melia-Segui et al.’s PRNG
To avoid such an attack on Che et al.’s PRNG, Melia-Segui et al. [85] proposed a
similar design by employing multiple primitive polynomials instead of one in the
94
LFSR. The design consists of a true random source, a module with eight primitive
polynomials, and a decoding circuit taking inputs from the true random source,
where the decoding circuit is designed in such a way that the same primitive poly-
nomial is not chosen consecutively. At each clock cycle, one primitive polynomial
is chosen according to the decoding logic and true random bits for producing a
pseudorandom bit. Thus, the PRNG produces a 16-bit random number in 16 clock
cycles, and the security of the PRNG relies on the TRNG. Recently, Melia-Segui et
al. [86] proposed J3Gen which contains four instances of PRNG for different lengths
of the LFSR with different numbers of primitive polynomials. The design principle
of J3Gen is also based on an LFSR with multiple primitive polynomials and a true
random source. The security properties of all PRNGs are analyzed by performing
the statistical tests proposed by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard.
7.1.3 Peris-Lopez et al.’s PRNG
In [97], Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a PRNG named LAMED for RFID tags, which
is in compliance with the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and can provide 32-bit as well
as 16-bit random numbers. The basic operations for updating the internal state of
LAMED consist of bitwise XOR operations, modular algebra, and bit rotations. The
internal state of the LAMED is of 64-bit, including a 32-bit key and a 32-bit initial
vector. The key length can be further increased by replacing the IV bits with the
key bits. Note that LAMED always outputs a 32-bit random number and a 16-bit
random number is obtained by dividing 32-bit number into two equal halves and
XORing them together.
7.2 Description of Warbler-I
Warbler-I is an NLFSR-based PRNG, which is composed of two main building
blocks. The first one consists of two NLFSRs of length 17 and 18 over F2, each
one generating a span n sequence or modified de Bruijn sequence with optimal
linear complexity, whereas the second one includes a NLFSR over F25 and each
NLFSR uses one or two WG transformations. In our design, the binary sequence
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generated by the first building block is converted to a sequence over F25 and this
sequence is used in the recurrence relation in the second building block. The final
output sequence is filtered by the WG transformation and n-bit random numbers
are generated by taking disjoint n-bit sequences from the final output sequence. A
high-level architecture of the proposed PRNG is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: A diagram of Warbler-I for EPC C1 Gen2 tags
7.2.1 WG-5 Transformation
Finite field F25 = GF (25) is defined by a primitive element α such that p(α) = 0
where p(x) = 1 + x + x3 + x4 + x5 is a primitive polynomial over F2. The trace
function, from F25 → F2, is given by Tr(x) = x+ x2 + x22 + x23 + x24 . For m = 5,
the WG permutation is
WGP5(x) = x+ (x+ 1)
5 + (x+ 1)13 + (x+ 1)19 + (x+ 1)21, x ∈ F25 ,
and the WG transformation over F25 , denoted by WG-5, is given by
WG(x) = f(x) = Tr(WGP5(x)) = Tr(x
19), x ∈ F25 .
96
7.2.2 Building Block I: An Alternative to TRNG
The first building block contains two NLFSRs whose lengths are chosen to be
co-prime in order to achieve the maximum period. The reason that two shorter
NLFSRs are used instead of a long one is due to the impossibility of generating shift
distinct sequences from a long NLFSR for different initial states. In other words,
by XORing the output sequences from two NLFSRs we can obtain shift distinct
sequences for different initial states. In our design, the WG transformation WG-5
over F25 is used as a nonlinear feedback function to generate span n sequences. We
use the nonlinear recurrence relation for the structured search defined in Chapter 4
to generate span n sequences. Let b = {bi} be a binary sequence generated by an
n-stage NLFSR which is defined as
bn+k = bk ⊕ f(xd), x = (br1+k, br2+k, . . . , br5+k) ∈ F25 , bi ∈ F2 (7.1)
for all k ≥ 0, and 0 < r1 < r2 < . . . < r5 < n are tap positions of the NLFSR,
where ⊕ denotes addition over F2. Using the parameters in Table 7.1 and recurrence
relation (7.1), we can generate two span n sequences b = {bi}i≥0 and c = {ci}i≥0
with NLFSR18 and NLFSR17, respectively. These two span n sequences are obtained
by the structured search in Chapter 4. The output sequence of the first building
block is denoted by s = {si | si = bi ⊕ ci, i ≥ 0}, which is almost balanced and has
the following statistical properties:
a) The period is (218 − 1)(217 − 1) ≈ 235;
b) The imbalance range is 4; and
c) The linear span is (217 − 2 + 218 − 2) ≈ 218.585.
For different initial states of the NLFSRs, the number of shift distinct sequences
(s) is (218 − 1)(217 − 1)− 2.
We now generate a new sequence t= {tk}k≥0 over F25 from s as follows
tk = (s5k, s5k+1, s5k+2, s5k+3, s5k+4) ∈ F25 ,∀k ≥ 0.
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Table 7.1: Parameters and statistical properties of two primitive NLFSRs
NLFSR Length Decimation Primitive polynomial Tap positions Period Linear
n d p(x) to generate F25 (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5) Span
NLFSR18 (b) 18 3 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 4, 7, 8, 10, 15 218 − 1 218 − 2
NLFSR17 (c) 17 3 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 217 − 1 217 − 2
Table 7.2: Cryptographic properties of WG-5 transformations used in Warbler-I
f(x), p(x) to define F25 Cryptographic Properties
f(x), 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 deg(f) = 3, AI(f) = 3, NLf = 12
f(x3), 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 deg(f(x3)) = 3, AI(f(x3)) = 3, Nf(x3) = 12
The period of the sequence t equals 237.32. Note that the sequence t is a shift
distinct sequence for different initial states of the NLFSRs and the linear complexity
of sequence t is bounded below by 218.58 [63]. The sequence t is used in the second
building block for introducing nonlinearity in the recurrence relation in each 5 clock
cycles (see Section 7.4 for details). This building block is used as an alternative to
the TRNG in [18,85].
7.2.3 Building Block II: Pseudorandom Number Generator
The second building block consists of an NLFSR and two WG transformation mod-
ules given by f(x) and f(x3), respectively. Letting the length of NLFSR6 be l = 6
and the primitive polynomial be g(x) = x6 + x + γ, where γ = α15 ∈ F25 , the
recurrence relation is defined as
ak+6 = γak + ak+1 + wk + tk, ai ∈ F25 , wk = (0, 0, 0, 0, f(ak+5)), k ≥ 0, (7.2)
where wk is the nonlinear feedback with the least signification bit generated by
WG transformation f(x) and t = {tk}k≥0 is the sequence over F25 that is defined
in the previous subsection. While the WG transformation f(x) is only used as a
nonlinear feedback function in NLFSR6, the WG transformation f(x3) is employed
as a nonlinear feedback for NLFSR18 and NLFSR17 as well as to filter the output
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sequences. The cryptographic properties of the WG transformations f(x) and f(x3)
are provided in Table 7.2. In the above recurrence relation (7.2), the nonlinearity
is introduced by tk and wk and those feedback will affect other bit positions after
multiplying by γ. Note that the period of the sequence a = {ak}k≥0 is a multiple of
the period of t. Moreover, the final output sequence o = {ok} of the second building
block is defined by ok = f(a
3
5+k), for k ≥ 0, where f is the WG transformation. The
period of o is a multiple of 237.32 and the linear complexity of o is lower bounded
by the linear complexity of t. The 16-bit random numbers {RNk}k≥0 are obtained
using sequence {ok} as follows
RNk = (o16k, o16k+1, · · · , o16k+15), k ≥ 0.
7.2.4 System Initialization of Warbler-I
The proposed PRNG has an internal state of 65 bits, including a 45-bit secret
seed as well as a 20-bit initial vector (IV). While the secret seed and the IV are
preloaded into RFID tags at the very beginning, the 20-bit IV is also updated at
the end of each protocol session. Before generating random numbers, a 36 rounds
of initialization phase is applied to mix the key and IV properly. In our design,
the secret seed and IV are preloaded as follows: the first consecutive 12, 11 and 22
positions of NLFSR18, NLFSR17 and NLFSR6 are respectively reserved for key bits,
whereas the remaining positions in each NLFSR are for the IV. The initialization
process is illustrated in Figure 7.1 (b). During the initialization phase the internal
states of the three NLFSRs are updated as follows:
bk+18 = bk ⊕ f(x3)⊕ ok, x = (bk+4, bk+7, bk+8, bk+10, bk+15), k ≥ 0, o0 = 0,
ck+17 = ck ⊕ f(y3)⊕ ok, y = (ck+4, ck+7, ck+8, ck+9, ck+12), k ≥ 0, o0 = 0,
sk+4 = bk ⊕ ck, k ≥ 0, sj = 0, j = 0, 1, 2, 3,
tk = (sk, sk+1, sk+2, sk+3, sk+4), k ≥ 0,
ak+6 = γak + ak+1 + wk + tk, wk = (0, 0, 0, 0, f(ak+5)), k ≥ 0,
ok+1 = f(a
3
5+k), k ≥ 0
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where bk+18, ck+17 and ak+6 are the updated values of NLFSR18, NLFSR17 and
NLFSR6, respectively, and wk is generated by the WG transformation f(x). Se-
quence {sk} is the XOR of two output bits from NLFSR18 and NLFSR17 and five
consecutive sk’s are collected to form a 5-bit vector tk. The output ok of NLFSR6
is used as a nonlinear feedback to affect the internal states of both NLFSR18 and
NLFSR17.
Remark 7.2.1 The 20-bit IV can be generated from the initial SRAM state of
tags when tags are powered up (see [57]). The entropy of IV can also be increased
by employing the von Neumann technique, which can be efficiently implemented in
hardware [109]. However, the implementation of these components needs additional
hardware support.
7.3 Security Analysis of Warbler-I
The security analysis of the proposed PRNG is conducted in two steps. In the first
step, we performed all cryptographic statistical tests that are specified in the EPC
C1 Gen2 standard [29] and the NIST standard [103] on several sets of pseudoran-
dom sequences generated by the proposed PRNG with different initial states. In
the second step, we investigate the attack resistant properties of the new PRNG
by launching the algebraic attacks, cube attacks, and time-memory-data tradeoff
attacks.
7.3.1 Randomness Analysis of the PRNG
According to the EPC C1 Gen2 standard, a true random or pseudorandom number
generator must satisfy the following three statistical properties:
– Probability of a single sequence: The probability that any 16-bit random
sequence (RN16) drawn from the PRNG has value j, shall be bounded by
0.8
216
< Pr(RN16 = j) < 1.25
216
, for any j.
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– Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a tag popula-
tion up to 10, 000, the probability that any of two or more tags simultaneously
generate the same sequence of bits shall be less than 0.1%, regardless of when
the tags are energized.
– Probability of predicting a sequence: A sequence drawn from the PRNG
10ms after the end of transmission shall not be predictable with a probability
grater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from the PRNG, performed
under identical conditions, are known.
We implemented our PRNG in software for checking whether the proposed
PRNG meets the above three criteria. To verify the first criterion, we generated 18
different test sequences for different initial states of the NLFSRs and calculated the
probability of occurrence of 16-bit numbers. Our experimental results show that
the probability of any 16-bit number j, i.e., Pr(RN16 = j) lies between 0.9409
216
and
1.0693
216
, which are better bounds than those obtained in [85]. The upper and lower
bounds of probability values for different tests are given in Table 7.3a. With respect
to the second criterion, our PRNG can generate up to 245−1 shift distinct sequences
for different keys to each tag, since the sequence t generated in Section 7.2.2 is shift
distinct. Thus the probability that any two tags will generate the same sequence
with period at least 237.32 is ≈ 2−45 that is much less than 0.1%. For the third
criterion, given a 16-bit random number, an attacker can recover the internal state
of NLFSR6 with probability 2−24 after getting 80 bits of the sequence s. To obtain
the next 16-bit random number from the given one, the adversary needs to know
the next consecutive 80 bits of the sequence s and the internal state of NLFSR6.
The 80 bits can be obtained either by guessing or obtaining about 2
18.58
5
= 216.26
consecutive random numbers. Due to the high linear span of the sequence s, it is
impossible to generate the next consecutive 80 bits from previous known 80 bits
in practice. Furthermore, it is also difficult for an adversary to intercept 216.28
consecutive random numbers in one protocol session because the communication
session in RFID systems is usually quite short and the IV is different. Moreover,
the secret seed can also be updated for different sessions. Hence, the attacker can
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guess the next 16-bit random number with the better probability 2−16, which is
much less than 0.025% as specified in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard.
To measure the linear dependency between an n-bit output and the previous
n-bit output, we performed a serial correlation test [65] on the sequences generated
by the PRNG. We generated 18 distinct sequences for different initial values of the
NLFSRs, each one is of size 226 bytes and calculated the serial correlation coefficient
for 1-bit, 1-byte and 2-byte lag. Our experimental results demonstrate that the
serial correlation coefficients are close to zero, which indicates the good randomness
of the generated sequences. The serial correlation coefficients for different sequences
are given in Table 7.3b.
Table 7.3: Successful fulfillment of the requirements of the EPC C1 Gen2 standard
(a) The first requirement
Sequences Upper Lower
S1 1.0471 0.9497
S2 1.0476 0.9530
S3 1.0444 0.9555
S4 1.0693 0.9517
S5 1.0468 0.9537
S6 1.0440 0.9545
S7 1.0457 0.9550
S8 1.0454 0.9560
S9 1.0533 0.9550
S10 1.0483 0.9544
S11 1.0541 0.9532
S12 1.0456 0.9514
S13 1.0487 0.9493
S14 1.0494 0.9523
S15 1.0506 0.9550
S16 1.0302 0.9850
S17 1.0499 0.9505
S18 1.0533 0.9409
(b) The third requirement
Sequences 1-bit 1-byte 2-byte
S1′ 0.000098 -0.000080 -0.000061
S2′ -0.000012 0.0000025 -0.000055
S3′ 0.000094 -0.000064 -0.000006
S4′ -0.000075 0.000106 -0.000046
S5′ 0.000057 0.000041 -0.000041
S6′ -0.000012 0.000012 0.000078
S7′ -0.000063 -0.000028 0.000080
S8′ 0.000025 0.000085 0.000032
S9′ -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000042
S10′ 0.000082 -0.000023 0.000023
S11′ 0.000045 -0.000033 0.000046
S12′ 0.000030 0.000026 0.0000012
S13′ -0.000006 0.000101 0.000071
S14′ -0.000053 -0.000047 0.000036
S15′ -0.000075 -0.000091 -0.000086
S16′ 0.000015 0.000004 -0.000106
S17′ -0.000091 0.000025 -0.000067
S18′ 0.000012 -0.000028 -0.000043
Different from the statistical tests in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard, the NIST test
suite contains 15 demanding statistical tests for characterizing the randomness of
a binary sequence. According to the NIST specification [103], a PRNG passes the
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test suite successfully if it passes all the tests simultaneously with a proportion of
96%. In our experiment, 10 test sequence (TS) sets are generated, each of which
has 100 different sequences with different initial values and each sequence has a
length of 225. We computed the proportion values for each TS set and listed the
test results2 for 5 TS sets in Table 7.4. It is not difficult to find out that each TS
set can pass the NIST test suite successfully.
Table 7.4: NIST test suite results of our proposal
Tests TS1 TS2 TS3 TS4 TS5
proportion proportion proportion proportion proportion
Frequency 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
Block-frequency 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
Cumulative-sum 0.97, 1.00 1.00, 1.00 0.97, 0.97 0.99, 0.99 0.99, 1.00
Runs 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00
Longest-run 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98
Rank 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
DFT 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99
Overlapping-templates 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99
Universal-stat. 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99
Approx. entropy 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.99
Serial 0.99, 0.98 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 1.00
Linear-complexity 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99
Random-excursions 0.97, 0.9 0.98, 1.00 0.98, 1.00 1.00, 0.99 0.99, 0.97
0.97, 0.97 0.98, 0.97 1.00, 0.99 1.00, 0.98 0.98, 0.97
0.98, 1.00 0.97, 0.97 1.00, 0.99 0.98, 0.97 0.99, 1.00
0.97, 0.96 0.98, 0.97 0.98, 0.97 0.99, 0.98 1.00, 0.99
Random-excur-variant 0.98, 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 0.98, 0.99 0.98, 0.97, 0.99
0.98, 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 0.97, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 0.99 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 0.99
1.00, 1.00, 0.99 1.00, 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 1.00, 0.99
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.98, 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 1.00, 0.99 0.99, 0.99, 1.00
0.98, 0.98, 0.98 0.98, 0.96, 0.96 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.97, 0.98, 1.00 1.00, 0.98, 1.00
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.98, 0.98, 0.98 1.00, 0.99, 0.99 0.97, 0.96, 0.96 1.00, 0.99, 0.98
7.3.2 Cryptanalysis of Warbler-I
In this subsection, the attack resistant properties of the PRNG are investigated
by considering the algebraic attacks, cube attacks, and time-memory-data tradeoff
attacks in detail. Since our PRNG uses nonlinear feedback shift registers over
2 Non-overlapping template matching test results are not given in Table 7.4 because of 148
entries. However, the proposed PRNG has passed the test successfully.
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different fields, we also explain below why the correlation attacks [84], Discrete
Fourier Transformation (DFT) attacks [46], and differential attacks [110] are not
applicable.
Algebraic Attack
Algebraic attack [20] is a powerful attack against stream ciphers. In our PRNG de-
sign, nonlinear feedback functions are used to update the internal states of different
NLFSRs and the output bits are filtered by the WG transformation. Noting that
the length of the internal state of the PRNG is 65-bit and the length of the secret
key is 45-bit, one can reduce the PRNG to a system of linear equations with about
245 unknown variables, which can be solved by approximately 7
64
· (245)log2 7 opera-
tions. As a result, the algebraic attack is not better than the exhaustive search in
this case.
Cube Attack
Cube attack [24] is a generic key-recovery attack that can be applied to any cryp-
tosystem, provided that the attacker can obtain a bit of information that can be
represented by a low-degree decomposition multivariate polynomial in Algebraic
Normal Form of the secret and public variables of the target cryptosystem. Ac-
cording to the cube attack, our PRNG can be regarded as a system of multivariate
polynomials p(k1, ..., k45, v1, v2..., v20) with public IV variables v1, v2, ..., v20 and se-
cret key variables k1, k2, . . . , k45. The polynomial
p(k1, ..., k45, v1, v2..., v20) = tI · pS(I) + q(k1, ..., k45, v1, v2..., v20)
is called a master polynomial, where tI = vi1vi2 · · · vik is a monomial with {i1, i2, ..., ik}
⊆ {1, 2, ..., 20} and pS(I) is called a superpoly of tI in p. The term tI is called a
maxterm if deg(pS(I)) = 1. We implemented the cube attack against our PRNG
in CUDA and exploited the power of a GPU (i.e, a Tesla C2070 from NVIDIA) for
accelerating the computation significantly. We took the first output bit after the
36-round initialization phase in order to find the maxterms in the master polyno-
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mial and performed an exhaustive search over all possible cube dimensions ranging
from 1 to 20. Our experiment was run for around 46 days on Tesla C2070 to ex-
haust all cube dimensions, but we did not find any linear and quadratic superpoly
equations for different cube dimensions.
Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attack
Time-memory-data tradeoff attack is a generic cryptanalytic attack which can be
applied to any cipher. In a stream cipher, the complexity of a time-memory-data
tradeoff attack depends on the length of the internal state, which is given by O(2
n
2 ),
where n is the length of the internal state [6]. We note that a stream cipher with
low sampling resistance is vulnerable to a more flexible time-memory-data tradeoff
attack. In our PRNG, the WG transformation is the filtering function as well as
the internal state update function and the number of terms in the algebraic normal
form representation of the WG transformation is 15, among which only two terms
are linear and the remaining terms are either quadratic or cubic. Only by fixing
four input variables in the WG transformation, one can obtain a linear function in
one variable. Thus, the sampling resistance of the proposed PRNG is high. Since
the length of the internal state is 65-bit in our PRNG, the expected complexity of
the time-memory- data tradeoffs attack is O(2l), where l = 32.5.
Other Attacks
In the fast correlation attacks [84], the internal state of an LFSR based stream
cipher can be recovered by first determining a system of linear equations according
to a statistical model and then solving the system of linear equations. In our PRNG,
the internal state is updated in a nonlinear way. Thus it is hard for an attacker to
decide such a system of (non-)linear equations according to some statistical models.
For an LFSR based stream cipher, the DFT attacks [46] can be applied when
the exact linear complexity of the output sequence and enough consecutive output
bits are known. In our PRNG, the exact linear complexity of the output sequence
is not known and hard to determine. Therefore, the DFT attacks cannot be applied
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to our PRNG. Moreover, in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard protocol, it is hard for an
attacker to obtain enough consecutive bits.
A chosen IV attack on the original version of WG cipher was presented in
[110], where one can distinguish several bits of the output sequence by building
a distinguisher based on differential cryptanalysis. In our PRNG, two nolinear
terms wk and tk (i.e., an output from the WG transformation and a 5-bit tuple
generated by the first building block) are added to the recurrence relation. Thus
the differentials after 36 rounds of the initialization phase will contain most internal
state bits. As a result, it would be hard for an attacker to distinguish output bits
generated by the proposed PRNG.
7.4 Hardware Implementation of Warbler-I
To demonstrate the hardware complexity of the proposed lightweight PRNG, the
PRNG module is implemented in VHDL for the low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 (Pack-
age PQ208 with speed grade -5) FPGA device from Xilinx, and our results are
compared with other reported lightweight PRNG implementations. The hardware
implementation shows that the proposed PRNG core totally occupies 46 slices (12
and 34 slices for building blocks I and II, respectively) on the target FPGA device
and achieves a throughout of 45 Mbps. For the details of the implementation, we
refer the reader to [72].
Table 7.5 presents a comparison with other PRNGs in terms of the hardware
implementation and achieved randomness properties. One can notice that our
PRNG has a lower hardware complexity than that in [97]. When compared to the
PRNG proposed in [85], our design costs a similar number of logic gates with the
usage of two NLFSRs replacing the TRNG in [85]. However, if we only compare
the hardware implementation cost for the pseudorandom number generator module
(i.e., the building block II in our design) in both proposals, our design only needs
a half number of logic gates as that in [85]. Although the hardware complexity of
our PRNG is slightly larger than that of SPONGENT-80, our design can provide
desirable randomness properties such as period and linear complexity that cannot
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be guaranteed by SPONGENT-80. For AKARI-1/2, the implementation cost of an
instance depends on the length of the output random number, and in Table 7.5,
we present the hardware implementation cost for the instances that generate 16-bit
random numbers.
Table 7.5: A comparison with other PRNGs
Functions Size of the Area Device Randomness Properties
internal state Period LS
Warbler-I 65 46 Slices/760 GE (est.) XC3S50-PQ208 ≥ 237.32 ≥ 218.58
LAMED [97] 64 1585 GE (est.) – – –
Melia-Segui et al. [85] 16 761 GE (est.) – – –
SPONGENT-80 [7] 88 738 GE 0.13 µm CMOS – –
AKARI-1 A/B [78] 64 1018 (GE)/922 (GE) 90 nm CMOS – –
AKARI-2 A/B/C [78] 128 1861/1650/1620 (GE) 90 nm CMOS – –
7.5 Applications in RFID Systems
We have designed Warbler-I for the low-cost EPC C1 Gen2 passive RFID tags.
Warbler-I can be used to generate 16-bit random numbers in the tag identification
protocol. Warbler-I passed all the statistical tests specified the EPC C1 Gen2 stan-
dard as well as the NIST standard. Our PRNG is also resistant to the cryptanalytic
attacks against stream ciphers.
In terms of the time delay for generating the first 16-bit pseudorandom number,
our design totally requires 134 clock cycles, including 18 clock cycles for loading key
and IV, 36 clock cycles for the initialization, and 80 clock cycles for generating the
first 16-bit random number. After that, each 16-bit random number can be obtained
every 80 clock cycles. Assuming that the EPC tags run at the clock frequency of
100 KHz and two 16-bit random numbers are needed for the tag identification
protocol according to the EPC C1 Gen2 standard, one can identify about 510 tags
in one second by using the proposed lightweight PRNG. Warbler-I perfectly meets
the requirements on the gate-count/area and the security of the EPC C1 Gen2
standard.
Remark 7.5.1 In the proposed PRNG, we can update the 45-bit key at the end
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of each session by generating 45 extra bits in 225 clock cycles and these 45 bits will
be loaded at proper aforementioned key positions. This key updating procedure
can be used to provide better security. In this way it is possible to generate at least
216.26 × 220 consecutive random numbers for one key and for different IVs.
7.6 Summary of Chapter 7
In this chapter, we proposed a lightweight pseudorandom number generator, War-
bler-I, which is in compliance to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard and has
guaranteed randomness properties such as period and linear span. Considering the
high power-consumption, large area and low throughput of TRNGs, we replace the
TRNG used in previous works by a PRNG with good statistical properties. In
our design, the pseudorandom sequence is generated using a nonlinear feedback
shift register. Moreover, the statistical tests specified by the EPC C1 Gen2 and the
NIST standards, algebraic attacks, cube attacks and time-memory-data tradeoff at-
tacks are employed to characterize the security properties of the proposed PRNG.
A comparison with the sponge-based PRNGs is also conducted. In addition, an
FPGA implementation shows that the proposed PRNG can be implemented using
46 slices ( approximately 760 GE) and can generate a 16-bit random number every
80 clock cycles after an initialization process of 36 clock cycles.
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Chapter 8
Warbler-II: A Lightweight PRNG
for RFID Tags
In this chapter, we present another instance, Warbler(62, 3, 5, 6), of the Warbler fam-
ily, named Warbler-II, which contains three primitive NLFSRs in the combination of
modified de Bruijn blocks, and one NLFSR over F25 of length 6 in the NFWGG. The
goal of designing Warbler-II is to offer a better security level compare to Warbler-I.
In Section 8.1, we describe the mathematical details and the details of the running
and initialization phases of Warbler-II. Randomness properties of output sequences
produced by Warbler-II are derived. We present a security analysis of Warbler-II in
great detail, which is twofold. First, we perform the cryptographic statistical tests
recommended by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and NIST in Section 8.2.1. Then,
in Section 8.2.2, we apply several cryptanalytic attacks such as algebraic attacks,
cube attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks and Mihaljevic´ et al.’s attacks
against Warbler-II. In addition, an implementation of Warbler-II in VHDL for the
low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 FPGA device shows that the PRNG requires about 58
slices. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 8.6. The research results in this
chapter can be found in [75].
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8.1 Description of Warbler-II
This section presents the design details of Warbler-II. The CMDB of Warbler-II
contains three NLFSRs, and the construction of Warbler-II is also based on the
WG transformations over F25 . The length of the internal state of the PRNG is 92
bits including 60-bit for the secret key and 32-bit for the initial vector. Our second
PRNG is dedicated to the passive RFID tags. An overview of the architecture of
Warbler-II is provided in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: A block diagram of Warbler-II
8.1.1 Mathematical Functions of Warbler-II
In this section, we give the mathematical functions to be used in Warbler-II. We
use a primitive polynomial A(x) over F2 to define finite field F25 , and the WG
transformation is defined over F25 . In our design, the WG transformations with
decimations d = 3, 7 and 11 over F25 are used as nonlinear feedback functions to
generate span n sequences, and the WG transformation with decimation d = 3
is used as a filtering function. For the definition of the WG transformation over
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F25 , we refer the reader to Section 7.2.1. Table 8.1 summarizes the cryptographic
properties of all the WG transformations over F25 that are used in the PRNG.
Table 8.1: Cryptographic properties of WG-5 transformations used in Warbler-II
WG(x), A(x) to define F25 Cryptographic Properties
WG(x3), 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 deg(WG) = 3, AI(WG) = 3, NWG = 12
WG(x11), 1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5 deg(WG) = 4, AI(WG) = 3, NWG = 10
WG(x11), 1 + x3 + x5 deg(WG) = 4, AI(WG) = 3, NWG = 10
WG(x11), 1 + x+ x2 + x4 + x5 deg(WG) = 4, AI(WG) = 3, NWG = 10
WG(x7), 1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 deg(WG) = 2, AI(WG) = 2, NWG = 12
Let {bi} be a binary sequence generated by an n-stage NLFSR whose nonlinear
recurrence relation is defined, in Chapter 4, as
bn+k = bk ⊕WG(xd), x = (br1+k, br2+k, . . . , br5+k) ∈ F25 (8.1)
for all k ≥ 0, and 0 < r1 < r2 < . . . < r5 < n are tap positions of the NLFSR,
where ⊕ denotes addition over F2. Again, let {ei} be a binary sequence generated
by an n-stage NLFSR whose nonlinear recurrence relation is defined as
en+k = 1⊕ ek ⊕WG(xd), x = (er1+k, er2+k, . . . , er5+k) ∈ F25 (8.2)
ci = ei ⊕ 1.
where WG(x) is the WG transformation over F25 . Sequences {bi} and {ci} can be
span n sequences for proper selections of parameters. Span n sequences generated
by recurrence relations (8.1) and (8.2) are represented by three parameters, namely
decimation number d, primitive polynomial A(x), and tap position (r1, r2, ..., r5).
We use these two types of recurrence relations in the combination of modified de
Bruijn blocks to generate span n sequences.
8.1.2 Description of the CMDB of Warbler-II
The combination of modified de Bruijn blocks is composed of three NLFSRs, namely
NLFSR22, NLFSR21, and NLFSR19 of lengths 22, 21 and 19, respectively are chosen
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to be co-prime with each other to achieve the maximum period. We use the nonlin-
ear recurrence relation (8.1) for NLFSR22, and nonlinear recurrence relation (8.2)
for NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 for generating three span n sequences. Using nonlinear
recurrence relations (8.1) and (8.2) and the parameters in Table 8.2, we can gen-
erate three span n sequences with optimal linear span. We denote by ζ = {ζi},
λ = {λi} and µ = {µi} the internal states of NLFSR22, NLFSR21, and NLFSR19,
respectively.
Table 8.2: Parameters and statistical properties of three primitive NLFSRs
NLFSRs Length Decimation Primitive polynomials Tap Positions Period Linear
n d A(x) to generate F25 (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5) Span
NLFSR22 (ζ = {ζi}) 22 11 1 + x3 + x5 (3, 4, 8, 12, 20) 222 − 1 222 − 2
NLFSR21 (λ = {λi}) 21 11 1 + x+ x2 + x4 + x5 (4, 10, 12, 15, 20) 221 − 1 221 − 2
NLFSR19 (µ = {µi}) 19 7 1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 (3, 6, 14, 16, 18) 219 − 1 219 − 2
We now combine the outputs of three NLFSRs by a 3-variable Boolean function
to produce a new output sequence. The combining Boolean function is given by
f(x0, x1, x2) = x0x1 + x1x2 + x0x2 + x0 + x1.
The function f is balanced, having maximum nonlinearity 2, and algebraic immu-
nity 2. The reason for choosing a quadratic function is to increase the linear span
of an output sequence produced by the combination of modified de Bruijn blocks.
The output sequence s = {si} is defined by
si = f(ζi, λi ⊕ 1, µi ⊕ 1)
where {λi⊕ 1}i≥0 and {µi⊕ 1}i≥0 are span n sequences according to recurrence re-
lation (8.2), and {ζi}i≥0 is a span n sequence generated by recurrence relation (8.1).
The statistical properties of sequence s are:
1. The period (222 − 1)(221 − 1)(219 − 1) ≈ 262
2. The linear span or complexity 243.39
3. The imbalance range 244.32.
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Note that for an all-zero initial state of the NLFSRs, the output sequence s is
a nonzero sequence. The output sequence can be a zero sequence when the initial
state of NLFSR22 is all-zero and the initial states of NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 are
all-one. The probability of occurring such a situation is 1
262
. We have chosen the
combining function f with three quadratic terms for keeping the period and linear
span of sequence s approximately at least 240 when one of three NLFSRs produces
an all-zero or all-one sequence.
We now generate a new sequence t = {ti} as follows
ti = (s5i, s5i+1, s5i+2, s5i+3, s5i+4) ∈ F25 ,∀i ≥ 0.
According to the design, the shift distinct sequence t is added into the nonlinear
recurrence relation of the nonlinear feedback WG generator. Note that the period
of sequence t is equal to approximately 264.32, which follows from Proposition 6.1.4.
8.1.3 Description of the NFWGG of Warbler-II
The mathematical functions used in the recurrence relation in the nonlinear feed-
back WG generator are the same as the mathematical functions used in the nonlin-
ear feedback WG generator of Warbler-I with one exception. Here we use the WG
transformation WG(x11) instead of WG(x) as nonlinear feedback for introducing
more nonlinearity in the internal state. The 6-stage NLFSR over F25 , denoted by
NLFSR6, is defined as
ak+6 = γak + ak+1 + wk + tk, ai ∈ F25 , wk = (0, 0, 0, 0,WG(a11k+5)), k ≥ 0, (8.3)
where g(x) = x6 + x + γ with γ = α15 ∈ F25 is a primitive polynomial over
F25 , wk is the nonlinear feedback with the least signification bit generated by WG
transformation WG(x11) and t = {tk}k≥0 is a sequence over F25 that is produced
in the CMDB. We choose the decimation d = 11 in WG(x11) because the func-
tion WG(x11) has the maximum algebraic degree 4 and that will rapidly increase
the algebraic degree of the key bits and IV bits in the internal state. While the
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WG transformation WG(x11) is used as a nonlinear feedback function in NLFSR6,
the WG transformation WG(x3) is employed to filter the output sequences. The
cryptographic properties of WG(x3) can be found in Table 8.1. In recurrence re-
lation (8.3), the nonlinearity is introduced by tk and wk, and the feedback wk will
affect other components and bit positions after multiplying by γ. Note that the
period of the sequence a = {ak}k≥0 is a multiple of the period of t. Moreover, the
final output sequence o = {ok} of the NFWGG is defined by ok = WG(a35+k) for
k ≥ 0. The period of o is a multiple of 264.32 and the linear complexity of o is lower
bounded by the linear complexity of t [63].
We obtain n-bit random numbers by taking disjoint n-bit segments from the
output sequence. In particular, the 16-bit random numbers are obtained from the
output sequence o as follows
RNi = (o16i, o16i+1, ..., o16i+15), i ≥ 0.
8.1.4 Key Initialization Phase of Warbler-II
Our PRNG has an internal state of 92 bits, uses a 60-bit secret key (seed) as well
as a 32-bit initial vector (IV). While the secret seed and the IV are preloaded into
RFID tags at the very beginning, but the 32-bit IV can also be updated at the
end of each protocol session. Before generating random numbers, we must execute
the generator for 44 rounds to mix the key and IV properly. In our design, the
secret seed and IV are preloaded as follows: the first consecutive 14, 13, 13 and 20
positions of NLFSR22, NLFSR21, NLFSR19 and NLFSR6 are respectively reserved
for key bits, whereas the remaining positions in each NLFSR are reserved for the IV.
The initialization process is illustrated in Figure 8.1 (b). During the initialization
phase the internal states of three NLFSRs are updated as follows:
ζk+22 = ζk ⊕WG(x11)⊕ ok, x = (ζk+3, ζk+4, ζk+8, ζk+12, ζk+20),
λk+21 = 1⊕ λk ⊕WG(y11)⊕ ok, y = (λk+4, λk+10, λk+12, λk+15, λk+20),
µk+19 = 1⊕ µk ⊕WG(z7)⊕ ok, z = (µk+3, µk+6, µk+14, µk+16, µk+18),
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sk+4 = f(ζi, λi ⊕ 1, µi ⊕ 1),
= ζi(λi ⊕ 1)⊕ (λi ⊕ 1)(µi ⊕ 1)⊕ (µi ⊕ 1)ζi ⊕ ζi ⊕ λi ⊕ 1, sj = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3,
tk = (sk, sk+1, sk+2, sk+3, sk+4), k ≥ 0,
ak+6 = γak + ak+1 + wk + tk, wk = (0, 0, 0, 0,WG(a
11
k+5)), k ≥ 0,
ok+1 = WG(a
3
5+k), k ≥ 0, o0 = 0
where ζk+22, λk+21, µk+19 and ak+6 are the updated values of NLFSR22, NLFSR21,
NLFSR19 and NLFSR6 respectively, and wk is generated by the WG transformation
WG(x11). Sequence {sk} is the output of f which takes three bits from NLFSR22,
NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 as input and five consecutive sk’s are collected to form a
5-bit vector tk. The output ok of NLFSR6 is used as a nonlinear feedback to affect
the internal states of NLFSR22, NLFSR21 and NLFSR19.
8.2 Security Analysis of Warbler-II
This section conducts a detailed security analysis of Warbler-II. Our analysis is
twofold. We start our analysis by performing the statistical tests proposed by the
EPC C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST standard. Then, in the second step, we
conduct a detailed cryptanalysis on the proposed PRNG by considering algebraic
attacks, cube attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks, Mihaljevic´ et al.’s at-
tacks, and weak internal state and fault injection attacks.
8.2.1 Cryptographic Statistical Tests
In this section, we present the results obtained by performing the statistical tests
recommended by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST standard.
EPC C1 Gen2 Statistical Test Results
The EPC C1 Gen2 standard specified three statistical properties that a PRNG
must satisfy in to order to be used in that standard. Three statistical properties
are provided in Section 7.3.1. We implemented Warbler-II in software for checking
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whether Warbler-II PRNG meets three EPC standard’s criteria as well as NIST’s
randomness test criteria. To verify the first criterion, we generated 18 different test
sequences for different keys and initial vectors of the NLFSRs and the lengths of test
sequences lie in the range of 226 to 229. We calculated the probability of occurrence
of 16-bit numbers. Our experimental results show that the probability of any 16-bit
number j, i.e., Pr(RN16 = j) lies between 0.8769
216
and 1.0981
216
. The upper and lower
bounds of probability values for different tests are given in Table 8.3a. With respect
to the second criterion, our PRNG can generate up to 262−1 shift distinct sequences
for different keys to each tag, since the sequence t generated in Section 8.1.2 is shift
distinct. Thus the probability that any two tags will generate the same sequence
with period at least 264.32 is ≈ 2−62 that is much less than 0.1%. For the third
criterion, given a 16-bit random number, an attacker can recover the internal state
of NLFSR6 with probability 2−24 after getting 80 bits of the sequence s. To obtain
the next 16-bit random number from the given one, the adversary needs to know
the next consecutive 80 bits of the sequence s and the internal state of NLFSR6.
The 80 bits can be obtained either by guessing or obtaining about 2
43.39
5
= 241.07
consecutive random numbers. Due to the high linear span of the sequence s, it is
impossible to generate the next consecutive 80 bits from previous known 80 bits
in practice. Furthermore, it is also difficult for an adversary to intercept 241.07
consecutive random numbers in one protocol sessions because the communication
session in RFID systems is usually quite short and the IV is different. Moreover,
the secret seed can also be updated for different sessions. Hence, the attacker can
guess the next 16-bit random number with the better probability 2−16, which is
much less than 0.025% as specified in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard.
To measure the linear dependency between an n-bit output and the previous
n-bit output, we performed a serial correlation test [65] on the sequences generated
by the PRNG. We generated 18 distinct sequences for different initial values of
the NLFSRs, each one is of size either 225 or 226 bytes and calculated the serial
correlation coefficient for 1-bit, 1-byte and 2-byte lag. Our experimental results
demonstrate that the serial correlation coefficients are close to zero, which indicates
the good randomness of the generated sequences. The serial correlation coefficients
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for different sequences are given in Table 8.3b.
Table 8.3: Successful fulfillment of the requirements of the EPC C1 Gen2 standard
(a) The first requirement
Sequences Upper Lower
S1 1.0637 0.9399
S2 1.0666 0.9289
S3 1.0664 0.9282
S4 1.0637 0.9333
S5 1.0598 0.9396
S6 1.0644 0.9404
S7 1.0693 0.9387
S8 1.0673 0.9335
S9 1.0981 0.9033
S10 1.0971 0.9130
S11 1.0855 0.8769
S12 1.0693 0.9372
S13 1.0467 0.9555
S14 1.0472 0.9547
S15 1.0502 0.9563
S16 1.0442 0.9537
S17 1.0442 0.9478
S18 1.0455 0.9547
(b) The third requirement
Sequences 1-bit 1-byte 2-byte
S1′ -0.000187 -0.000109 -0.000109
S2′ -0.000095 -0.000166 -0.000095
S3′ -0.000233 -0.000144 -0.000001
S4′ -0.000188 -0.000188 -0.000188
S5′ -0.000017 -0.000061 -0.000012
S6′ -0.000115 0.000025 0.000013
S7′ 0.000209 -0.000178 -0.000219
S8′ 0.000127 0.000097 0.000046
S9′ 0.000040 0.000052 0.000244
S10′ 0.000021 -0.000038 0.000074
S11′ -0.000006 0.000162 0.000010
S12′ 0.000183 -0.000155 -0.000122
S13′ -0.000198 0.000019 -0.000057
S14′ -0.000097 -0.000074 -0.000262
S15′ 0.000226 -0.000000 -0.000255
S16′ 0.000069 0.000035 0.000125
S17′ -0.000203 -0.000203 -0.000203
S18′ -0.000085 0.000039 0.000094
NIST Statistical Test Results
Different from the statistical tests in the EPC C1 Gen2 standard, the NIST test
suite contains 15 demanding statistical tests for characterizing the randomness of
a binary sequence. According to the NIST specification [103], a PRNG passes the
test suite successfully if it passes all the tests simultaneously with a proportion of
96%. In our experiment, 10 test sequence (TS) sets are generated, each of which
has 100 different sequences with different seeds and each sequence has a length of
225. We computed the proportion values for each TS set and listed the test results1
1Non-overlapping template matching test results are not given in Table 8.4 because of 148
entries. However, Warbler-II has passed the test successfully.
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for 5 TS sets in Table 8.4. It is not difficult to find out that each TS set can pass
the NIST test suite successfully.
Table 8.4: NIST test suite results of Warbler-II
Tests TS1 TS2 TS3 TS4 TS5
proportion proportion proportion proportion proportion
Frequency 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97
Block-frequency 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99
Cumulative-sum 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 0.99 0.98, 0.99 1.00, 0.99 0.98, 0.97
Runs 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Longest-run 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00
Rank 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.00
DFT 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99
Overlapping-templates 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.96
Universal-stat. 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
Approx. entropy 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
Serial 0.99, 0.99 0.99, 1.00 0.98, 0.98 0.99, 1.00 0.99, 0.99
Linear-complexity 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
Random-excursions 0.98, 0.99 1.00, 0.99 1.00, 0.99 0.99, 0.99 0.99, 0.99
0.99, 1.00 0.96, 0.99 0.99, 0.99 0.98, 1.00 0.99, 0.99
0.99, 1.00 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 1.00 0.99, 0.99 1.00, 1.00
0.99, 1.00 0.99, 0.99 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 0.98 1.00, 0.92
Random-excur-variant 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 0.99, 0.99 0.99, 1.00, 1.00 0.98, 0.98, 0.98
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 0.99, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.97, 0.97, 0.98
1.00, 0.99, 0.98 1.00, 1.00, 0.99 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 0.99, 0.99 0.99, 1.00, 1.00
1.00, 0.99, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.99, 0.99, 0.99 0.97, 0.98, 0.99 0.99, 1.00, 0.99
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 0.97, 0.99, 0.98 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00
8.2.2 Cryptanalysis of Warbler-II
In this section, we perform a detailed cryptanalysis against Warbler-II PRNG by
considering algebraic attacks, cube attacks, time-memory-data-tradeoff attacks, the
attacks proposed by Mihaljevic´ et al. and weak internal states and fault injection
attacks. We also argue that some attacks such as correlation attacks and distin-
guishing attacks cannot be applied to our PRNG.
Resistance against Algebraic Attacks
Warbler family was designed to resist algebraic attacks [20]. In our PRNG design,
nonlinear feedback functions are used to update the internal states of different
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NLFSRs, and the output bits are filtered by the WG transformation. For an Warbler
instance, the total length of the internal state is L = (
∑m
i=1 li + l · n) where K-bit
is reserved for the key and (L−K)-bit is for the initial vector. We remember that
Warbler family fully exploits NLFSRs in the design. According to the algebraic
attack technique, an Warbler instance can be reduced to a system of linear equations
with 2K unknowns while it is assumed that the initial vector is known, and the
system of linear equations can be solved by approximately 7
64
· (2K)log2 7 operations.
In particular, the total length of the internal state of Warbler-II PRNG is 92-bit and
the length of the secret key is 60-bit, one can reduce the PRNG to a system of linear
equations with about 260 unknown variables, which can be solved by approximately
7
64
· (260)log2 7 operations. We have chosen the feedback functions of the maximum
algebraic degree for NLFSR22, NLFSR21 and NLFSR6. As a result, the algebraic
degree of the system will grow rapidly during the initialization phase as well as the
running phase. Thus, the algebraic attack is not better than the exhaustive search
in this case.
Resistance against Cube Attacks
Cube attack [24] is a generic key-recovery attack that can be applied to any cryp-
tosystem, provided that the attacker can obtain a bit of information that can be
represented by a low-degree decomposition multivariate polynomial in Algebraic
Normal Form of the secret and public variables of the target cryptosystem. Ac-
cording to the cube attack, our PRNG can be regarded as a system of multivariate
polynomials p(k1, ..., k60, v1, v2..., v32) with public IV variables v1, v2, ..., v32 and se-
cret key variables k1, k2, . . . , k60. The polynomial
p(k1, ..., k60, v1, v2..., v32) = tI · pS(I) + q(k1, ..., k60, v1, v2..., v32)
is called a master polynomial, where tI = vi1vi2 · · · vik is a monomial with {i1, i2, ..., ik}
⊆ {1, 2, ..., 32} and pS(I) is called a superpoly of tI in p. The term tI is called a
maxterm if deg(pS(I)) = 1. We implemented the cube attack against Warbler-II in
CUDA and exploited the power of a GPU (i.e, a Tesla C2070 from NVIDIA) for
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accelerating the computation significantly. We took the first output bit after the
44-round initialization phase in order to find the maxterms in the master polyno-
mial and performed an exhaustive search over all possible cube dimensions ranging
from 1 to 32. Our PRNG was run on the GPU for around 85 days to exhaust all
initial vectors, but we did not find any linear and quadratic superpoly equations
for different cube dimensions.
Resistance against Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff Attacks
Time-memory-data tradeoff attack is a generic cryptanalytic attack which can be
applied to any cipher. In a stream cipher, the complexity of a time-memory-data
tradeoff attack depends solely on the length of the internal state, which is given by
O(2
n
2 ), where n is the length of the internal state [6]. In particular, the complexity
of the time-memory-data tradeoff attack against Warbler family is lower bounded
by O(2
L
2 ) where L is the total length of the internal state of Warbler. We note
that a stream cipher with low sampling resistance is vulnerable to a more flexible
time-memory-data tradeoff attack. In our PRNG, the WG transformation WG(x3)
is the filtering function and the number of terms in the algebraic normal form
representation of WG(x3) is 15, among which only two terms are linear and the
remaining terms are either quadratic or cubic. Only by fixing four input variables
in the WG transformation, one can obtain a linear function in one variable. Thus,
the sampling resistance of the proposed PRNG is high. Since the length of the
internal state is 92-bit in Warbler-II, the expected complexity of the time-memory-
data tradeoffs attack is bounded below by 246.
Resistance against Mihaljevic´ et al.’s Attacks
Recently Mihaljevic´ et al. [89] proposed an attack on Grain v1 to recovered an
internal state by exploiting the normality of the filtering function used in the stream
cipher. As the architecture of our PRNG is similar to Grain v1, it seems natural
that the attack can be applied to our PRNG. The key idea of the attack is to
determine the bias of the internal state using the normality of the filtering function
and then apply the strategy of the generic time-memory-data tradeoff attack. For
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details of the attack, we refer the reader to [89]. Note that the WG transformation
WG(x3) has the lowest normality which is equal to 1, whereas the filtering function
of stream cipher Grain v1 has normality 2. In the attack, we assume that the
attacker can collect a set of D sequences and the length of each sequence is S and
the attacker is observed the pattern of occurring the 16-bit random number zero.
In this sample, the expected number of random number zero is 2log2D+log2S−16 as
the length of each random number is equal to 16. We also assume that the attacker
does not know any internal state bits of the PRNG. But, in Grain v1, the attacker
can recover 18 internal state bits of the NLFSR using some bits of the LFSR and
NLFSR states. However, such a trick cannot be applied to Warbler-II. Then, the
following is the complexity of the attack for recovering an internal state of the
PRNG.
Table 8.5: The processing and pre-processing attack complexities
Required samples Time complexity Pre-processing time and
of processing space complexities
D = 237, S = 243 24×16 = 264 2L−(4×16) = 228, 2L−(5×16) = 212
D = 239, S = 241 24×16 = 264 2L−(4×16) = 228, 2L−(5×16) = 212
D = 246, S = 235 24×16 = 264 2L−(4×16) = 228, 2L−(5×16) = 212
In the above table, we can observe that the time complexity of the processing
phase is much greater than the time complexity at the pre-precessing phase, and
an attacker requires a huge amount of sample to launch the attack. For lightweight
applications, it is impossible to collect that amount of data. Thus, the attack
cannot be a practical attack on our PRNG.
Weak Internal States and Fault Injection
In Warbler-II, the CMDB contains three NLFSRs namely NLFSR22, NLFSR21 and
NLFSR19 of lengths 22, 21, and 19, respectively. For the initial state all-zero 0 =
(0, 0, ..., 0), NLFSR22 generates the zero sequence, and for initial state all-one 1 =
(1, 1, ..., 1), NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 generate the all-one sequence. For any other
initial states, the output sequence from the CMDB is a nonzero sequence. We call
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initial states 0 and 1 weak initial states of respective NLFSRs, which are vulnerable
only for the running phase of the PRNG, not for the initialization phase. For the
combining function f(x0, x1, x2) = x0x1 +x1x2 +x0x2 +x0 +x1, the sequence s is a
zero sequence for the following initial states of NLFSRs: a) when the initial state of
NLFSR22 is 0 and initial states of NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 are 1; b) when the initial
state of NLFSR22 is 0 and the initial state of NLFSR21 is 1. The scenario (a) can
occur with probability 2−62 and the scenario (b) can occur with probability 2−43.
Note that the period and linear complexity of the output sequence can be reduced
by setting the initial states of the NLFSRs to weak internal states. However, the
above scenarios can be detected and avoided by adding an OR gate to NLFSR22
and two NAND gates to NLFSR21 and NLFSR19 and then adding the final outputs
of OR and NAND gates to the finite state machine (FSM). An overview of the
PRNG after adding OR and NANG gates is provided in Figure 8.2. Based on the
outputs of OR and NAND gates, the FSM preforms an action such as update the
seed or apply the initialization round again. In other words, when any of NLFSRs
in the CMDB contains a weak initial state after the initialization phase, the seed of
the PRNG is updated, followed by the initialization round or only the initialization
phase is applied again. On the other hand, an attacker might inject faults to the
internal states of three NLFSRs and set the initial states to the weak initial states.
In the best case, injecting faults to produce the sequence s to be a zero sequence,
an attacker needs to have a complete knowledge of internal states of NLFSR22 and
NLFSR21. If the attacker is successful in setting the internal states to weak internal
states, according to the above strategy, the seed of the PRNG will be updated and
the initilization round will be applied. Hence, the fault injection can be prevented.
Other Cryptanalytic Attacks
In the fast correlation attacks [84], the internal state of an LFSR based stream
cipher can be recovered by first determining a system of linear equations according
to a statistical model and then solving the system of linear equations. In Warbler-II,
the internal state is updated in a nonlinear way. Thus it is hard for an attacker to
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Figure 8.2: Warbler-II after adding the control circuit
decide such a system of (non-)linear equations according to some statistical models.
For an LFSR-based stream cipher, the DFT attacks [46] can be applied when the
exact linear complexity of the output sequence and enough consecutive output bits
are known. In Warbler-II, the exact linear complexity of the output sequence is not
known. Moreover, the period of a sequence is dependent on the initial state of the
PRNG. Therefore, the DFT attacks cannot be applied to our PRNG. Furthermore,
for lightweight applications such as the EPC C1 Gen2 standard protocol, it is hard
for an attacker to obtain enough consecutive bits.
A chosen IV attack on the original version of WG cipher was presented in [110],
where one can distinguish several bits of the output sequence by building a distin-
guisher based on differential cryptanalysis. In our PRNG, two nonlinear terms, tk,
wk (i.e., an output from the WG transformation as well as a 5-bit tuple generated
by the first building block) are added to the recurrence relation. Furthermore, the
WG permutation is not added in the recurrence relation, only wk is added. Thus
the differentials after 44 rounds of the initialization phase will contain most internal
state bits. As a result, it would be hard for an attacker to distinguish output bits
generated by the Warbler-II PRNG.
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8.3 Hardware Implementation and Comparisons
Warbler-II is implemented in VHDL for the low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 (Package
PQ208 with speed grade -5) FPGA device from Xilinx for measuring the hardware
complexity. The hardware implementation shows that the PRNG core totally occu-
pies about 58 slices (19 and 39 slices for the CMDB and the NFWGG, respectively)
on the target FPGA device and achieves a throughout of 45 Mbps. For the details
of the hardware implementation, we refer the reader to [75].
Table 8.6 presents a comparison with other PRNGs in terms of hardware imple-
mentation and achieved randomness properties. We notice that Warbler-II requires
12 more slices, compared to the PRNG Warbler-I, but Warbler-II provides a better
security level. If we compare the hardware implementation cost for Warbler-II with
Grain-128 and Trivium, our design needs 10 and 17 more slices, respectively [9].
Randomness properties period and linear complexity of Warbler-II are bounded
below by 264.32 and 243.39, respectively, but the period and linear complexity of
keystreams of Trivium are not guaranteed. Warbler-II can easily be converted to a
sponge-based PRNG architecture like U-QUARK architecture [3]. However, it is
hard to promise the randomness properties of output sequences produced by the
sponge-based structure.
Table 8.6: A comparison with other PRNGs
Functions Size of the internal state Area Device Randomness Properties
µm Period LS
Warbler-II 92 58 Slices XC3S50-PQ208 ≥ 264.32 ≥ 243.39
Warbler-I [72] 65 46 Slices/760 GE (est.) XC3S50-PQ208 ≥ 237.32 ≥ 218.58
LAMED [97] 64 1585 GE (est.) – – –
Melia-Segui et al. [85] 16 761 GE (est.) – – –
Grain-128 [9] 256 48 Slices Virtex-II ≥ 2128 –
Trivium [9] 288 41 Slices Virtex-II – –
U-QUARK [3] 136 1379 GE 0.18 µm CMOS – –
KECCAK [61] 128 1300 GE 0.13 µm CMOS – –
PHOTON-80/20/16 [52] 100 865 GE 0.18 µm CMOS – –
SPONGENT-80 [7] 88 738 GE 0.13 µm CMOS – –
8.4 Application to the RFID Tags and Protocols
Warbler-II is designed for the resource-constrained environments such as RFID tags.
Warbler-II can be used to generate random numbers in the automatic identification
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protocols and authentication protocols, for example the Flyweight RFID protocol
[10]. Several lightweight authentication protocols for RFID systems can be found
in [112]. The authentication process requires 3 to 5 random numbers, and the
security of the protocol depends on the on-chip random number generator. Since
an output sequence produced by Warbler-II has good randomness properties such
as period at least 264.32 and linear complexity at least 243.39, Warbler-II can be used
as a keystream generator in a stream cipher for lightweight applications.
When Warbler-II is used in the automatic tag identification protocol of the EPC
C1 Gen2 standard, Warbler-II totally requires 146 clock cycles, including 22 clock
cycles for loading the key and IV into the registers, 44 clock cycles for the initial-
ization phase, and 80 clock cycles for generating the first 16-bit random number.
After that, each 16-bit random number can be obtained in every 80 clock cycles.
Assuming that the EPC tags run at the clock frequency of 100 KHz and two 16-bit
random numbers are needed for the tag identification protocol according to the
EPC C1 Gen2 standard, one can identify about 443 tags in one second by using
the proposed lightweight PRNG.
8.5 Comparisons with Other PRNGs
In this section, we provide a comparison between Warbler-II and Warbler-I, a com-
posited de Bruijn sequence and the WG-5 stream cipher.
8.5.1 Comparison with Warbler-I
The main aim of designing Warbler-II is to offer a better security level, compared
to Warbler-I. Designs of both Warbler-I and Warbler-II are similar. The CMDB
of Warbler-II contains three primitive NLFSRs of lengths 19, 21 and 22, and the
CMDB of Warbler-I contains two primitive NLFSRs of lengths 17 and 18, but the
nonlinear feedback WG generators over F25 for both cases are the same except for
the feedback function. In the NFWGG of Warbler-I, WG(x) is used as a feedback
function, whereas in the NFWGG of Warbler-II, WG(x11) is used as a feedback
function. Warbler-II produces output sequences with period at least 264.32 and
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linear complexity at least 243.39, whereas Warbler-I produces output sequences with
period at least 237.32 and linear complexity at least 218.58. The attack resistant
properties of Warbler-II are much better than the attack resistant properties of
Warbler-I. The hardware implementation of Warbler-I requires 46 slices, but the
hardware implementation of Warbler-II requires 12 more slices. We restrict the
application of Warbler-I to the EPC C1 Gen2 RFID tags, but Warbler-II can be
used in the EPC C1 Gen2 tags as well as RFID applications where more security
level is required.
8.5.2 Comparisons with a Composited De Bruijn Sequence
and WG-5 Stream Cipher
If we compare Warbler-II with a composited de Bruijn sequence of period 292, then
the composited de Bruijn sequence can generate all 92-tuples exactly once in a
period, but Warbler-II cannot generate all 92-tuples exactly once. Warbler-II gener-
ates different sequences with period a multiple of 264.32 for different initial states,
but the composited de Bruijn sequence is of period 292 for all initial states. We
note that the composited de Bruijn sequence is generated by an NLFSR with di-
rect feedback. On the other hand, the period of an output sequence produced by
Warbler-II is controlled by the CMDB that is composed of three primitive NLFSRs.
The feedback function of a composited de Bruijn sequence would contain a number
of product-of-sum terms, as a result, the generation of the composited de Bruijn
sequence would be cost effective compared to Warbler-II.
WG-5 stream cipher [1] is a filtering generator based on an LFSR over F25 and
a WG-5 transformation. The internal state of the WG-5 stream cipher is updated
using a linear function that generates an m-sequence, and the output sequence is
obtained by filtering the m-sequence through the nonlinear WG-5 transformation.
Contrariwise, the internal states of Warbler-II are updated using nonlinear functions
and the output sequence is produced by filtering the sequence of the NFWGG
through the WG-5 transformation. For the WG-5 cipher, the m-sequence guarantees
the period of an output sequence, but for Warbler-II, the primitive NLFSRs of the
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CMDB promise the lower bound of the period of an output sequence. Due to the
nonlinear internal state update, Warbler-II has better attack resistance properties
compared to the WG-5 stream cipher.
8.6 Summary of Chapter 8
This chapter presented Warbler-II, a new lightweight pseudorandom number genera-
tor based on nonlinear feedback shift registers with desirable randomness properties.
We provided a detailed mathematical description of Warbler-II including its mode
of operations. We performed a security analysis of Warbler-II in two steps. First,
we performed the statistical tests on the sequences generated by the PRNG speci-
fied by the EPC C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST standard. Our PRNG passed all
the statistical tests. We then characterized our PRNG by applying algebraic at-
tacks, cube attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks, Mihaljevic´ et al.’s attacks
and weak initial states and fault injection attacks. A hardware implementation of
Warbler-II in VHDL for the low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 FPGA device shows that
Warbler-II can be implemented using about 58 slices. Warbler-II can be employed
as a random number generator in the automatic tag identification protocol as well
as the authentication protocols for RFID systems.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Research
In this chapter, we summarize the research contributions of this thesis, and present
the future research directions related to the subjects therein. The main contribu-
tions of each chapter are presented.
9.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we concentrated on the design and analysis of cryptographically
strong pseudorandom sequence and number generators. Specifically, we focused on
the generation of de Bruijn sequences and span n sequences, which have good ran-
domness properties such as maximum period, balance, and high linear complexity,
and which are suitable for cryptographic applications. We fully exploited nonlinear
feedback shift registers for generating de Bruijn sequences and span n sequences,
and for designing random number generators.
We first studied the generation span n sequences using nonlinear feedback shift
registers whose feedback functions are composed of a permutation and a trace func-
tion over a finite field, a decimation number, and a t-tap position. Considering these
parameters, a class of feedback functions in an NLFSR is formed and a number of
span n sequences are produced. The span n sequence generation by this technique
is called the structured search. In the structured search, we used WG transforma-
tions, three-term functions, five-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami
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exponent, and MCM functions as nonlinear feedback functions, and presented the
number of span n sequences produced by each class of functions for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20. We
study the linear span or complexity of new span n sequences. The linear complexity
of a span n sequence lies in the range of (2n − 2 − 3n) and (2n − 2). The success
probability of obtaining a span n sequence in the structured search is empirically
compared with the success probability of obtaining a span n sequence in a random
generation method. The comparison showed that one can obtain a span n sequence
with optimal or near-optimal linear complexity in the structured search with a bet-
ter success probability. New span n sequences or span n sequences generated by
the structured search can be used to design lightweight pseudorandom number gen-
erators and stream ciphers. Moreover, they can be used in the composition method
to generate long de Bruijn sequences.
We first refined the composition method so that we could generate long de Bruijn
sequences, and then determined the linear complexity of a composited de Bruijn
sequence. We conducted an analysis of a composited nonlinear feedback function
that generates a de Bruijn sequence. In the analysis, we studied an approxima-
tion of the feedback function by setting some product terms as constant functions.
The cycle structure of an approximated feedback function and the linear complex-
ity of a sequence generated by an approximated feedback function are determined.
Our analysis also indicated that a composited de Bruijn sequence can be crypto-
graphically strong if the starting span n sequence is of long period and optimal
linear complexity. Moreover, we presented a few example of de Bruijn sequences
of periods in the range of 235 and 240 with their algebraic forms. Furthermore, the
implementation issues of a feedback function of a composited NLFSR are taken
into consideration.
We proposed a new pseudorandom number generator family, named Warbler
family for resource-constrained smart devices such as RFID tags. Warbler family is a
purely NLFSR-based PRNG family with desirable randomness properties. Warbler
family is composed of two building blocks, namely a combination of modified de
Bruijn blocks (CMDB) and a nonlinear feedback WG generator (NFWGG). The
combination of modified de Bruijn blocks consists of a number of primitive NLFSRs.
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The nonlinear feedback WG generator contains an NLFSR over an extension field
and two WG transformation modules used for the feedback as well as filtering
purpose. Randomness properties of an output sequence produced by the Warbler
family are derived, followed by a description of the initilization and running phases
of Warbler family. Some parameter selection criteria for an instance of the Warbler
family are proposed to offer the best security level against known attacks.
We presented an instance, Warbler-I, of the Warbler family for the EPC Class-1
Generation-2 passive RFID tags. Considering the high power-consumption, large
area and low throughput of TRNGs, we replace the TRNG used in previous works
by a PRNG with good statistical properties. Warbler-I can generate sequences
with good randomness properties such as period at least 237.32 and linear span
at least 218.58. In our design, the pseudorandom sequences are generated using
nonlinear feedback shift registers. The statistical tests specified by the EPC C1
Gen2 and NIST standards, algebraic attacks, cube attacks and time-memory-data
tradeoff attacks are employed to characterize the security properties of the proposed
PRNG. A comparison with the sponge-based PRNGs is also conducted. In addition,
an FPGA implementation shows that Warbler-I can be implemented using 46 slices
and can generate a 16-bit random number every 80 clock cycles after an initialization
process of 36 clock cycles. Warbler-I perfectly satisfies the requirements of the EPC
C1 Gen2 standard and hence a suitable candidate for the EPC C1 Gen2 standard.
We proposed another instance, Warbler-II, of the Warbler family, which is de-
signed for providing a better security level compared to Warbler-I. We described
Warbler-II with its mathematical functions in detail. The CMDB of Warbler-II
contains three primitive NLFSRs. The period and linear complexity of an output
sequence produced by Warbler-II are at least 264.32 and 243.38, respectively. We per-
formed a detailed security analysis of Warbler-II in two steps. First, we performed
the statistical tests on the sequences generated by Warbler-II specified by the EPC
C1 Gen2 standard and the NIST standard. Our PRNG passed all the statisti-
cal tests. Then, we characterized Warbler-II by applying algebraic attacks, cube
attacks, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks, Mihaljevic´ et al.’s attacks, and weak
initial states and fault injection attacks. A hardware implementation of Warbler-II
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in VHDL for the low-cost Spartan-3 XC3S50 FPGA device shows that Warbler-II
can be implemented using about 58 slices. Warbler-II can be used as a random
number generator in the automatic tag identification and authentication protocols
for RFID systems.
9.2 Future Research
Nonlinear feedback shift registers are of great importance, especially in resource-
constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks due to their effi-
cient hardware implementation. Well-designed NLFSR-based cryptographic primi-
tives such as stream ciphers and PRNGs can provide good randomness in communi-
cation systems and would be resistant to the known cryptanalytic attacks because
of the hardness of solving a system of nonlinear equations over the binary field.
Only limited results exist in the theory of nonlinear feedback shift registers. In
this section, we provide the reader with an overview of various interesting research
directions where the future research can be conducted.
On Generation of Span n Sequences
A primitive NLFSR or an NLFSR that generates a span n sequence is an important
component in a keystream generator, since it ensures the periodicity of a keystream.
Span n sequences are also fundamental building blocks of a keystream generator
like a combinatorial generator. In Chapter 4 we dealt with the generation of good
span n sequences using NLFSRs. The current technique of checking the primitivity
of a nonlinear feedback function is the exhaustive search algorithm whose time
complexity is exponential in n. For a large value of n, it is impossible to verify
the primitivity of a nonlinear feedback function in real time. A sub-exponential
or polynomial time algorithm for testing the primitivity of some special nonlinear
feedback function needs to be developed in order to design NLFSR-based stream
ciphers and PRNGs with high level security and guaranteed randomness properties.
For a fixed n and t of the recurrence relations, the numbers of span n sequences
for different permutations are bounded by certain numbers, and the upper and
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lower bounds mainly depend on n and t. The problem of determining the upper
and lower bounds of the number of span n sequences for a fixed n and t is interesting
from a theoretical point of view. It seems to be a difficult problem when there is no
polynomial algorithm for testing the primitivity of a nonlinear feedback function.
We have observed that, in the structured search, many span n sequences have
the same t-tap position, primitive polynomial and the same linear complexity, but
their decimation numbers are different. The problem of determining the relation
between the decimation numbers of those span n sequences is significant. If such a
relation is established, then from one span n sequence, many other span n sequences
of the same length can be produced.
On the Composited Construction and de Bruijn Sequences
The efficient construction of long de Bruijn sequences is a challenging problem.
For cryptographic applications, a de Bruijn sequence must be strong (long period
and high linear complexity) and should have an efficient implementation. The
composited construction based on a span n sequence is the only known construction
in the literature for generating long de Bruijn sequences. The feedback function
of a composited de Bruijn sequence contains a number of product-of-sum terms
for which the evaluation of the feedback function becomes cost effective. If an
efficient hardware implementation of composited feedback functions is found, then
they can be used in RFID tags for generating random numbers with desirable
randomness properties. Therefore, an efficient hardware implementation of the
product-of-sum terms is crucial for the use of composited de Bruijn sequences in
resource-constrained environments.
Games’s generalized construction where a de Bruijn sequence is constructed
from two different de Bruijn sequences can be written as the composited construc-
tion. As a future research, Games’s generalized construction can be investigated
from the composited construction point of view.
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On Warbler-I and Warbler-II PRNGs
Warbler-I and Warbler-II are two hardware-based pseudorandom number generators
designed for RFID tags. In Warbler-II, when any of the internal states of three
NLFSRs in the CMDB is at a weak internal state, we either apply an initialization
round or update the seed, followed by an initialization round, and this is controlled
by the finite state machine. The side channel attack is a cryptanalytic attack which
exploits information from the physical implementation of a primitive. Our PRNGs
can be analyzed from the side channel attack point of view to examine its attack
resistance property.
Since Warbler-I and Warbler-II are based on WG-5 transformations, Warbler-I
and Warbler-II require five clock cycles to output one bit. To optimize the number
of clock cycles required for outputting one bit, a Galois configuration of the NLFSRs
in the CMDB can be found as a future work. As a result, Warbler-I and Warbler-II
can produce one bit in one clock cycle.
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Appendix A
Span n Sequences and Linear
Complexity Bounds
A.1 Example of Span n Sequences
In this section, we present some examples of span n sequences produced by re-
currence relation (4.1) defined in Chapter 4 using WG transformations, 5-term
functions, 3-term functions, monomial functions with Kasami exponent, and MCM
functions. We represented the span n sequences by three parameters, namely dec-
imation number d, primitive polynomial p(x) over F2 and a t-tap position. Ta-
bles A.1 and A.2 contain all span n sequences produced by WG transformations
over F25 for different lengths of NLFSRs. Table A.3 contains span n sequences pro-
duced by WG transformations over F27 , where span n sequences for different lengths
of the NLFSRs are provided. Tables A.4 - A.7 present some instances of span n se-
quences produced by 5-term functions, 3-term functions, monomial functions with
Kasami exponents, and MCM functions, respectively.
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Table A.1: WG span n sequences gener-
ated using rec. rel. (4.1)
n Decimation Polynomial Tap position
d (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4) (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)
8 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 5 7
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 4 5 6
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 4 5 6 7
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 5 6
7 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 7
7 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 4 6 7
15 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 4 6 7
9 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 5 6 8
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 5 7 8
1 1 1 1 0 1 4 5 6 7 8
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 4 5 6
3 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 5 8
3 1 0 1 0 0 2 4 6 7 8
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 6
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 6 7 8
11 1 1 1 1 0 2 4 5 6 7
11 1 1 1 1 0 2 4 5 6 8
11 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 6 7 8
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 6
15 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 5 7 8
10 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 4 5 8
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 6 7
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 6 9
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 8
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 7 8
11 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 7 8
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 5 8 9
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 7 8 10
1 1 1 1 1 0 3 4 5 8 10
1 1 1 1 0 1 6 7 8 9 10
7 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 7
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 7 8 10
7 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 7 10
7 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 7 9 10
7 1 0 0 1 0 2 4 5 6 10
7 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 5 8 9
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 5 8
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 6 10
12 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 4 5 8
1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 5 7 9
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 6 9 10
1 1 1 1 0 1 4 6 9 10 11
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
3 1 1 0 1 1 2 5 7 8 10
3 1 0 1 0 0 4 5 6 9 11
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 7 8
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 6 8
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 4 6 10
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 9 11
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 5 8 9
11 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 6 7 10
11 1 1 1 1 0 3 5 7 8 9
11 1 1 1 1 0 4 6 7 9 10
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 7 8
Table A.2: WG span n sequences gener-
ated using rec. rel. (4.1)
n Decimation Polynomial Tap position
d (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4) (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5)
13 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 4 5 9
1 1 0 1 0 0 5 8 9 11 12
3 1 1 0 1 1 5 6 10 11 12
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 6 8
7 1 1 0 1 1 3 5 7 10 12
7 1 1 0 1 1 6 7 9 10 12
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 5 10
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 5 10 12
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 6 10 12
11 1 1 1 0 1 4 5 7 8 9
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 6 8
14 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 5 7 9
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 6 8 9 13
1 1 1 1 0 1 3 4 6 8 10
1 1 1 1 0 1 3 5 8 10 13
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 10 11 13
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 6 9 12
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 10 12 13
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 6 9 12 13
7 1 0 1 0 0 3 5 7 8 9
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 11 12
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 9 10 11
15 1 1 1 0 1 3 5 6 8 13
15 1 1 1 1 0 3 5 7 8 9
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 5 12 13 14
3 1 0 1 0 0 2 6 8 9 10
3 1 0 1 0 0 4 5 6 7 14
7 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 7 10 13
7 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 8 11 14
7 1 0 0 1 0 3 4 5 7 12
11 1 0 0 1 0 2 3 6 7 13
11 1 1 1 0 1 2 4 9 11 13
11 1 0 1 1 1 2 9 10 11 12
15 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 5 6
16 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 10 11 12 14
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10 11 12 14
15 1 1 1 0 1 3 6 9 12 14
17 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 7 8 9
3 1 1 0 1 1 4 7 8 9 12
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 12 13 14
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 4 10 11 13
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 5 11 12 13
11 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 6 12 13
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 12 13 14
18 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 12 13 14
3 1 1 0 1 1 4 7 8 10 15
3 1 1 0 1 1 5 10 11 14 17
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 7 11
7 1 1 0 1 1 5 7 8 11 17
11 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 9 11 15
15 1 1 1 0 1 2 9 12 15 17
20 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 10 12 18 19
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Table A.3: WG span n sequences for t = 7
Length Decimation Polynomial t-tap position
n d (c0, c1, ..., c5, c6) (r1, r2, ..., r6, r7)
8 5 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
9 1 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
10 27 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
11 1 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10)
12 1 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11)
13 9 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8)
14 43 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
15 31 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 14)
16 27 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14)
17 1 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13)
18 1 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 16)
19 3 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 15, 17)
20 31 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 12, 15)
Table A.4: 5-term span n sequences for t = 7
Length Decimation, Primitive polynomial m-tap positions
n d (c0, c1, ..., c6) (r0, r1, ..., r6)
8 13 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
9 5 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
10 43 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
11 7 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8)
12 9 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
13 47 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10)
14 63 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9)
15 63 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13)
16 47 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
17 31 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 16)
18 5 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 17)
19 5 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 18)
Table A.5: 3-term span n sequences for t = 7
Length Decimation, Primitive polynomial m-tap positions
n d (c0, c1, ..., c6) (r0, r1, ..., r6)
8 31 (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
9 21 (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
10 55 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
11 13 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
12 11 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11)
13 31 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9)
14 55 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12)
15 43 (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14)
16 3 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15)
17 63 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 14)
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Table A.6: Span n sequences generated by monomial functions for t = 9
Length Decimation, Primitive polynomial m-tap positions
n d (c0, c1, ..., c6, c7, c8) (r0, r1, ..., r6, r7, r8)
10 29 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
11 125 (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
12 85 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10)
13 45 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
14 59 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
15 27 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12)
16 5 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
Table A.7: MCM span n sequences for k = 3 and t = 7
Length Decimation, Primitive polynomial m-tap positions
n d (c0, c1, ..., c6) (r0, r1, ..., r6)
8 19 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
9 1 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
10 21 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)
11 5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8)
12 55 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9)
13 19 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10)
14 9 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12)
15 23 (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12)
16 23 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9)
17 13 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 15, 16)
18 3 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 14)
19 27 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)
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A.2 Linear Complexity of New Span n Sequences
This section presents the upper and lower bounds of the linear complexity of
new span n sequences generated using WG transformations, three-term, five-term,
monomial functions with Kasami exponent, and MCM functions, for different val-
ues of n and t. Tables A.8 - A.12 exhibit the upper and lower bounds of the
linear complexity of span n sequences produced by WG transformations, five-term,
three-term, monomial functions with Kasami exponents, and MCM functions, re-
spectively. We observe that the linear complexity of a span n sequence produced
by the structured search lies between (2n − 2 − 3n) (near-optimal) and (2n − 2)
(optimal).
Table A.8: The bounds of the linear span of WG span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 20 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 20 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
9 ≤ n ≤ 20 8 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
11 ≤ n ≤ 17 10 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 17 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
By recurrence relation (4.2)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 20 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 20 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
9 ≤ n ≤ 20 8 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
11 ≤ n ≤ 17 10 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 16 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
Table A.9: The bounds of the linear span of five-term span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 19 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 19 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
9 ≤ n ≤ 19 8 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
11 ≤ n ≤ 17 10 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 16 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
By recurrence relation (4.2)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 20 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 20 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
9 ≤ n ≤ 20 8 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
11 ≤ n ≤ 17 10 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
12 ≤ n ≤ 16 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
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Table A.10: The bounds of the linear span of three-term span n sequences
By recurrence relation (4.1)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 17 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 9 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 17 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
By recurrence relation (4.2)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 17 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 9 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 17 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
Table A.11: The bounds of the linear span of span n sequences produced by mono-
mial functions with Kasami exponents
By recurrence relation (4.1)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 19 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 19 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 9 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 16 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
By recurrence relation (4.2)
Range on n t Upper bound of LS Lower bound of LS
7 ≤ n ≤ 19 5 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
8 ≤ n ≤ 19 7 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
8 ≤ n ≤ 17 9 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
12 ≤ n ≤ 16 11 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
Table A.12: The upper and lower bounds of the linear span of MCM span n se-
quences
By recurrence relations (4.1) and (4.2)
m k Range on n Upper bound Lower bound
7 3 8 ≤ n ≤ 19 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
5 8 ≤ n ≤ 19 2n − 2 2n − 2− 2n
9 5 10 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
7 10 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
11 3 12 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
5 12 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
7 12 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
9 12 ≤ n ≤ 16 2n − 2 2n − 2− 3n
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